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As globalization has accelerated, unofficial transnational (a.k.a. track-two) 
dialogues have proliferated. Do these networks matter? This study examines both their 
effects in the United States and, by focusing on nuclear nonproliferation, their potential to 
improve cooperative security as well as conflict resolution. Reviews of relevant theory, 
secondary literature, and primary materials produced by three case studies—the Council 
on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), the Northeast Asian Cooperation 
Dialogue (NEACD), and the Program on New Approaches to Russian Security 
(PONARS)—supplemented and guided 67 original interviews to help answer the 
question: Have transnational security policy networks changed U.S. nuclear 
nonproliferation policies or the perceptions that shape them?
These networks have improved intelligence and private as well as public 
diplomacy, enhancing the analytical capacity and soft power of their participants and 
interlocutors. They have strengthened otherwise weak ties across countries, areas of 
expertise, generations, and professions, particularly from inside government to 
nongovernmental experts, to provide blunter feedback and improve open-source 
intelligence analysis. These improvements are three-dimensional—delving deeper into 
overseas foreign policy elite, integrating across wider issues and regions, over longer 
periods of time—to help understand the implications of political changes, summits, and
crises. Diplomatically, they have provided fora for nongovernmental experts and 
government officials in their private capacity to better understand and convey interests 
behind official talking points. 
Although U.S. policymakers will realistically rarely participate, they benefit from 
one-page or personal briefings by the most effective networks—those that have diverse 
members, integrate current or former government officials, and focus on ideas and 
information exchange. Although pressures exist to prove networks changed near-term 
policy decisions, the diversity that improves intelligence also impedes consensus  on 
policy recommendations, which can be more effectively made by issue-specific cells 
derived from the network base. 
Ultimately, these networks empower their members and interlocutors with ideas 
and information, which enhances their soft power and builds their capacity to diagnose
and agree on the root causes of contemporary threats, understand the political pressures 
shaping national responses to them, evaluate the merits of potential strategies to respond, 
and explore prospects for cooperative solutions.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Every year, security experts from around the world gather at conferences for days on end 
to share opinions, ideas, information, stories, and recommendations about threats to 
global stability and ways to reduce them. Some meet by the hundreds in large, cavernous 
hotel ballrooms; others gather more intimately in groups of 20-30 around a conference 
table. Some get together only two or three times and disband; others keep coming back, 
year after year. Participants are invited from a variety of countries with a range of 
experiences: life-long government employees, academics, think tank analysts, or 
consultants might attend. Some have worked at the same place for years; others change 
jobs or even the countries where they live frequently. Participants might renew 
acquaintances with colleagues with whom they have worked for most of their 
professional lives, or they might meet others for the first time. Some participants will not 
see or talk to each other again until they reconvene; others will be linked by network 
organizers in cyberspace, or may even make an effort to stay in touch on their own—
electronically, over the phone, or face-to-face. 
Although similar networks have existed at least since scientists from around the 
world were invited to attend the first Pugwash Conference almost fifty years ago, in 
1957, 1 their number has increased dramatically in the last fifteen since the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union. On Asian political and security matters, for example, one scholar 
1 Maureen R. Berman and Joseph E. Johnson, eds. Unofficial Diplomats (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1977): esp. 37-41.
2
counted three or four such groups in 1989, and almost 30 just five years later.2 To try to 
catalogue all these networks is effectively impossible since they take so many shapes, 
forming and dissipating without notice or central organization. They are part of the 
modern, decentralized, agile infrastructure of globalization. A number of reasons explain 
why they are growing. The post-Soviet acceleration of globalization has facilitated access 
to a previously shrouded part of the world, while simultaneously making it easier and 
cheaper to travel everywhere internationally, communicate by e-mail, and distribute 
working papers or conference reports. The concomitant growth of think tanks in other 
countries has also increased potential nongovernmental dialogue partners. In today’s 
more complex, multipolar world, these networks may also be more strategically valuable 
to help experts sort through myriad challenges.3
Whatever the reasons for their growth, skeptics counter that these gatherings are 
simply talk shops, at best: gab fests that produce nothing useful. At worst, they may 
confuse foreign policy by organizing dissension or sending conflicting diplomatic signals 
to other countries from individuals not authorized to speak for governments. Yet, 
advocates point out, participants in and out of government keep coming back to some of 
these meetings, a few for a decade or more, and they keep getting funding to continue 
meeting and talking. Why? What do these networks do? Do they matter?
Key Terms of Inquiry
This study focuses on a piece of this burgeoning universe. It asks: Have transnational 
2 Paul M. Evans, “The Dialogue Process on Asia Pacific Security Issues: Inventory and Analysis,” in 
Evans, ed. Studying Asia Pacific Security (Toronto: University of Toronto-York University Press, 1994):
299.
3 Louise Diamond and John McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace (West 
Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1996): 23.
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security policy networks changed U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policies or the 
perceptions that shape them? What those terms mean and why they have been chosen is 
the subject of this first section of the introductory chapter, with the methodology and 
potential significance of the findings following.
Transnational Security Policy Networks 
Starting by having to define what the subject even means can be an inauspicious 
beginning to any research project, no matter how specialized. Here, at least, it reflects 
how new the subject area is. No precise definition for transnational policy networks 
exists. Broadly, transnational relations were defined in 1995 by University of Konstanz 
Professor Thomas Risse-Kappen as “regular interactions across national boundaries when 
at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national 
government or an intergovernmental organization.”4 The starting point then is to look 
beyond traditional national policymaking or diplomatic channels. 
For those with more spatial minds, Harvard political science professor Robert 
Putnam equipped analysts with a model of a “two-level game” in foreign policy, in which
each government must negotiate simultaneously with other governments at one
(horizontal) level and its own domestic interests at a second (vertical) level. Picture two 
parallel, horizontal circles: the upper circle simply depicts traditional diplomacy, with 
each point around its rim representing a country’s government officials (U.S., China, 
Russia, etc.) who regularly and formally interact. Within each country, government 
officials must work, or at least contend, with experts out of government (non-state actors) 
4 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures 
and International Institutions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995): 3.
4
who seek to influence their government’s policy. In this picture, each country’s 
nongovernmental experts are represented by a point on the second, or lower, level 
directly underneath its own government. Each country, then, is represented by a vertical 
pillar around a cylinder connecting the upper circle, representing government 
policymakers and diplomats, with the lower one, nongovernmental experts.    
Putnam speculated that on this lower level “transnational alignments may emerge, 
tacit or explicit, in which domestic interests [in different countries] pressure their 
respective governments to adopt mutually supportive policies.”5 Transnational policy 
networks are an explicit form of these alignments. To return to the diagram, they connect 
the dots around the rim of the lower circle, or nongovernmental experts from different 
countries. The organizers of transnational networks can be represented as points at the 
center of the lower (nongovernmental) level. The image of the lower tier then resembles a 
wheel with spokes extending from network organizers at the hub to global 
nongovernmental experts all around its perimeter. 
To extend this model for one more paragraph (and mercifully end it for the less 
geometrically inclined), networks operating within each country are represented by a 
two-dimensional slice, or right triangle, of this cylinder. The three points of the triangle 
are network organizers at the hub of the lower wheel, a country’s nongovernmental 
members on its perimeter (the point at the right angle of the triangle), and its 
governmental officials directly above it on the upper level. The triangle depicts two paths 
by which networks may seek to influence governments. The direct path, or shortest 
distance between networks and governments, is the hypotenuse of the right triangle 
5 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games,” in Peter B. 
Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, editors, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International 
Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993): 445.
5
representing a variety of ways network organizers may reach out to governments 
(including publications, briefings for officials, or invitations to attend network sessions). 
The other two sides of the triangle represent an indirect path from network organizers 
through domestic, nongovernmental experts who participate in transnational networks 
(represented by the base of the triangle) and seek to influence their country’s officials 
(represented by the vertical leg of the triangle). A closer look at this vertical leg in the 
United States, or how U.S. nongovernmental experts seek to influence Washington, is the 
subject of chapter two.
This study is limited to a network’s effects within the United States because of my 
own limitations and interests. I have neither the language skills nor sufficient knowledge
of any other government’s foreign policymaking process to investigate potential effects 
in other countries. Therefore, the study focuses only on the influence of these networks 
on U.S. government officials directly, on U.S. nongovernmental members directly, or on 
the U.S. government indirectly through U.S. nongovernmental participants. 
In theory, security policy networks face a particularly uphill battle. Traditionally, 
security policymaking processes are more closed than those for other issues because of 
the premium on security clearances, inherently giving some government officials the 
perception that outsiders are not “in the know,” potentially limiting their influence.6  The 
U.S. security policymaking apparatus may be even more difficult to penetrate than other 
countries because of its relative military power globally. Previous work, drawing on John 
Ikenberry who is now at Princeton, argues that U.S. networks may be more resistant 
because of the balance of power: the more powerful a country is, the less they may be 
6 See, for example, Alexandra G. Carter, Politics and Physics: Epistemic Communities and the Origins of
United States Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy, PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, April 2000, pp. 
37, 313-314.
6
influenced by transnational networks.7
 Nevertheless, Cornell Professor Matthew Evangelista looked for empirical 
evidence of the influence of transnational relationships in security issues in his 1999 
book, Unarmed Forces: the Transnational Movement to End the Cold War. In it, he 
concluded that scientists and physicians in the United States and Soviet Union who 
primarily populated groups like the Pugwash conference pursued three strategies to seek 
to reduce the risk of superpower conflict: by providing ideas and information to their 
like-minded colleagues on the other side of the world; by coordinating policy initiatives 
to influence their governments; and by appealing to international norms, such as peace 
and disarmament, that might resonate in their own country.8 These three strategies—
information exchange, policy coordination, and norm construction—are potentially the 
forerunners of contemporary transnational networks.
Today, these networks seek to influence government policymaking processes that 
have arguably become more receptive to nongovernmental actors over time. Although 
Evangelista ironically found that Gorbachev empowered transnational movements to 
change the authoritarian Soviet system more effectively than actors in a decentralized
democracy could,9 the emergence of 24/7 cable news channels and real-time coverage of 
Congressional hearings on C-SPAN provide prima facie evidence of the eroding barriers 
between those inside government and out. As early as the 1970s, political scientist Hugh 
7 Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination,” 
International Organization 46:1 (Winter 1992): 6-7; and G. John Ikenberry, “A Word Economy Restored: 
Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement,” International Organization 46:1 (Winter 
1992): 289-322.
8 Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1999): especially 381-382.
9 Evangelista, pp. 341-373, 378. Sarah E. Mendelson, Changing Course: Ideas, Politics, and the Soviet 
Withdrawal from Afghanistan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998): 127, similarly concludes 
that certain nongovernmental actors with access to political leaders that controlled resources influenced the 
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.
7
Heclo was arguing that the traditional U.S. policymaking model of iron triangles 
dominated by the executive branch, Congress, and vested interest groups overlooked 
other members of what he called “issue networks” that were also influencing policy. 
Subcultures of policy experts outside the iron triangles, some of whom had previously 
worked in government and were now based in universities and think tanks, were defining 
public policy issues, shaping the way they were debated, and developing policy 
proposals, making policymaking more fluid and decentralized.10
Heclo himself distinguished these larger issue networks, whose members simply 
exchanged knowledge about a particular subject, from a subset which he called “shared-
action groups” that formed coalitions to do something about it. Other scholars in the 
1990s picked up on this distinction, labeling the latter, more directed groups either policy 
communities or policy networks.11 This study does not necessarily define policy networks 
in that way, primarily because the line between issue and policy networks is not as easy 
to distinguish in practice. 
Here, the adjective “policy” is meant to distinguish those networks whose 
members seek to study and influence policy, even if they do not agree on the definition of 
the security problem or how to solve it, from transnational advocacy networks, which has 
simultaneously emerged as an area of study in the 1990s.12 Advocacy networks are active 
for normative reasons in debates over issues such as human rights or the environment. 
Their members are not necessarily recognized professional experts, but can be extremely 
10 Hugh Heclo, “Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment,” ch. 3 in Anthony King, ed. The New 
American Political System (Washington: AEI for Public Policy Research, 1st ed., 1978): 87-124.
11 Diane Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process (London: Frank 
Cass, 1996): 90, and Tanja A. Borzel, “Organizing Babylon—on the Different Conceptions of Policy 
Networks,” Public Administration 76 (Summer 1998): 253-273.
12 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1998), particularly chapter 1, “Introduction,” pp. 1-38. Also see Diane Stone, “Introduction: Global 
Knowledge and Advocacy Networks,” Global Networks 2:1 (2002): 4.
8
effective, primarily by leveraging public attention to those principles through the media 
or Congressional hearings. One prominent example is the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines, for which its founder Jody Williams shared a 1997 Nobel Peace Prize.13
Members of transnational security policy networks studied here are both more 
heterogeneous than advocacy networks and seek greater collaboration with actors inside 
government across countries. They operate at the intersection of an increasing supply of 
transnational experts and a fluid U.S. policymaking system that demands, or at least 
accommodates, nongovernmental participation. 
One set of practitioners at the World Bank and the UN calls this the universe of 
global public policy networks, of which transnational are a subset of global, and security 
policy are a subset of public policy, networks.14 What theoretically enables these 
networks to be useful to government bureaucracies is their superior flexibility and 
subsequent capacity to acquire policy-relevant information and even apply it to policy 
problems. Those networks with the most diverse membership are the ones notionally 
most likely to be effective because they can take advantage of what economic sociologist 
Marc Ganovetter in 1973 dubbed “the strength of weak ties,”15 more recently popularized 
13 See Kenneth Robin Rutherford, NGOs and the International Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines, PhD 
dissertation, Georgetown University, 2000.
14 Jan Martin Witte, Wolfgang H. Reinicke, and Thorsten Benner, “Beyond Multilateralism: Global Public 
Policy Networks,” International Politics and Society (Politik und Gesellschaft Online) 2/2000 
(www.fes.de/IPG/ipg2_2000/artwitte.html (accessed April 16, 2004)); and Wolfgang H. Reinicke, “The 
Other World Wide Web: Global Public Policy Networks,” Foreign Policy (Winter 1999-2000): 44-57. Also 
see Diane Stone, “Think Tanks Across Nations: The New Networks of Knowledge,” NIRA Review (Winter 
2000): 34-39; and Stone, “Introduction: Global Knowledge and Advocacy Networks,” Global Networks 2:1 
(2002): 1-11.
15 Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” The American Journal of Sociology 78:6 (May
1973): 1360-80. For a related discussion on the distinction between homogeneous and heterogeneous 
networks, see Tanja A. Borzel, “Organizing Babylon—on the Different Conceptions of Policy Networks,” 
Public Administration 76 (Summer 1998): esp. 257-258
9
in Malcolm Gladwell’s The Tipping Point and Frans Johansson’s The Medici Effect.16
Diversity arguably both sparks greater learning among members and distributes ideas 
more widely, even if members do not agree. The key is not necessarily a common agenda 
like banning landmines, but a common interest and an opportunity to exchange 
information through transnational security policy networks.
Although their structure widely varies, criteria for membership in security policy 
networks generally limit participation to experts. They are predominantly 
nongovernmental participants employed in think tanks or universities, although
government employees may also be invited to attend network events either in their 
private capacity, meaning they can express their personal opinions and not be held 
accountable for views of the governments that employ them, or as guest speakers in their 
official capacity. The core of each network is a regular, usually annual, conference where 
various contemporary security issues are discussed. Network members may also interact
through smaller working groups, an exclusive website or electronic listserv, memos or 
briefs distributed through the network, or individual efforts to contact other network 
members.
Nuclear Nonproliferation
Rather than look at a colossal array of security threats—traditional causes of war as well 
as so-called soft security issues such as migration and environmental catastrophe—this 
study is focused on nuclear nonproliferation for a number of reasons. Proliferation threats 
take a relatively long time to become acute, allowing official as well as informal dialogue 
16 Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Difference (New York: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 2000) and Frans Johansson, The Medici Effect: Breakthrough Insights at the 
Intersection of Ideas, Concepts & Cultures (Boston: Harvard University Business School Press, 2004).
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to develop.17 Nonproliferation is also a common interest of countries, facilitating 
multilateral efforts at cooperation,18 such as the six-party talks on North Korea. A series 
of international treaties, institutions, and regimes have also been developed to formally 
buttress these efforts and provide a normative framework for addressing them.19 Finally, 
the technology to make nuclear weapons has become so diffuse that cooperative 
strategies have become at least the first option by default.20 Even unilateral military 
strikes to preempt nuclear proliferation threats would be preceded by official and 
unofficial diplomatic efforts. 
Nuclear proliferation is not the only threat that fits these criteria, but it is a 
particularly salient one that does. Especially if the U.S. security policymaking system is 
resistant to nongovernmental influences, choosing a security issue that networks are most 
likely to address maximizes the chances of results that show influence, enabling a better 
understanding of how these networks operate if and when they are useful. Any findings 
of network influence must be qualified by these enabling factors, however, which may 
not apply to all security issues.
Policies 
Finding that these networks directly changed policy would be the most direct way to 
identify influence. But direct causal links from nongovernmental actors to government 
17 David Cortright, “Incentives Strategies for Preventing Conflict,” ch. 11 in The Price of Peace: Incentives 
and International Conflict Prevention (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1997): 277.
18 Cortright, p. 285
19 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic 
Structures and International Institutions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995): 6-7 
20 Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security 
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), 1992: 31; and Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 
Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1977): 
233.
11
policy decisions can be elusive. Ideas or recommendations from outside government are 
usually intangible, while inside government, decisions take time, diffusing influence 
through an opaque process particularly in national security—all problem s that recur in 
chapter two.21
Thankfully, theory provides other potential benchmarks to evaluate. In his classic 
policymaking study, University of Michigan professor John Kingdon widens the policy 
lens into four procedural aspects: setting the agenda, developing options to address the 
problem, the policy decision itself, and implementing it. He focuses on agenda setting 
and option development as preliminary points in the policy process where what he calls 
policy entrepreneurs, which include a variety of nongovernmental actors, might more 
realistically have influence, although they still risk being intangible, diffuse, and 
opaque.22  Kingdon concluded that “policy windows” may open at certain times, such as 
either during political change or a crisis, enabling some policy entrepreneurs a greater 
opportunity to get an issue or a policy option onto the agenda and possibly have it chosen 
at those times.23
Perceptions
Theoretically, network effects are unfortunately even more likely to be found in the 
amorphous world of perceptions. Evangelista, Heclo, and Reinicke et al. all discuss 
information sharing and issue definition among the benefits of transnational security 
21 David M. Ricci, The Transformation of American Politics: The New Washington and the Rise of Think 
Tanks (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993): 24; Diane Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination: 
Think Tanks and the Policy Process (London: Frank Cass, 1996): 3-4, 112, 219; and Donald E. Abelson, 
Do Think Tanks Matter? Assessing the Impact of Public Policy Institutes (Ithaca, NY: McGill-Queens 
University Press, 2002): 5, 87, 164.
22 John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 
1995), esp. 16-18, 196-201.
23 Kingdon, pp. 165-195, 203-4 
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policy networks. Three other authors reinforce the need to better understand the ethereal 
benefits that the dialogue process, or even just contact facilitated by networks, may 
provide and give ideas where to look. 
Similar to Putnam’s two-tier model, Joseph Montville coined the term “track-two 
diplomacy” to describe efforts to help address the core psychology of conflicts between 
Arabs and Israelis, Indians and Pakistanis, Croats and Serbs, and others where 
stereotypes exacerbate strife.24 Montville explains that unofficial, problem-solving 
workshops among nongovernmental leaders can help break down negative stereotypes. 
These workshops are examples of track-two diplomacy. Others have called dialogues that 
include government employees, even if in their private capacity, “track one and a half,” 
denoting their close collaboration with “track one,” or traditional diplomacy.25 Whoever 
attends, Montville postulates that workshops can help participants develop workable 
personal relationships, understand the perspective of other members, and “at some point” 
develop joint strategies for cooperation. While transnational security networks include 
but are not limited to bringing adversaries like North Koreans and Americans together, 
they could provide value to its members if a) new and useful contacts are made, b) 
understanding is improved, or c) joint strategies are developed. 
Roger Fisher and William Ury of the Harvard Negotiation Project are two other 
analysts focused on addressing the psychology behind conflicts, at least diplomatic ones. 
In Getting to Yes, Fisher and Ury advise negotiators to focus on the interests behind 
stated government positions, not the statements themselves, to reach negotiated 
24 Joseph V. Montville, “The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy,” in Vamike 
D. Volkan, Joseph V. Montville, and Demetrios A. Julius, eds. The Psychodynamics of International 
Relationships: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991): 161-175.
25 David Capie and Paul Evans, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2002): 209-220.
13
agreements.26 Because transnational dialogues theoretically enable participants to interact 
as individuals, not as officials, they may help participants discover the interests behind 
the talking points used in official negotiations, helping improve understanding and 
facilitate agreements. The informality of dialogues, then, can theoretically aid diplomacy 
and change perceptions.
These networks are also examples of what Peter Haas calls epistemic 
communities or “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in 
a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that 
domain or issue-area.”27 Haas highlights four reasons why governments may seek help 
from epistemic communities: nongovernmental experts may provide perspective to help 
explain why crises emerged (what might be called their root causes); they may predict 
whether certain policies will help alleviate the crises; they may help the state define its 
interests in a crisis; or they may provide intellectual support, or political cover, to justify 
a policy decision.28
Methodology
These models, descriptions, or observations of how transnational security policy 
networks operate (Putnam, Evangelista, Reinicke et al., Ganovetter) in a more fluid U.S. 
policymaking system (Heclo and a literature survey in chapter two of how think tanks 
operate in U.S. foreign policy) with an expanded view of the policy process (Kingdon) 
and directions to look for perceptions potentially changed (Montville, Fisher and Ury, 
26 Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1981): particularly pp. 41-57.
27 Haas, p. 3
28 Haas, pp. 14-16
14
Haas) can be combined into a framework for analysis, or a set of benchmarks to guide the 
study.
Such a framework is crucial for a subject that is fundamentally subjective. My 
own interest in these networks stems from personal experience. Any dissertation or book-
length project is a labor of love, or at least passion to find the answers to the questions 
asked. My own passion derives from the unsurpassed benefits that I believe I have 
professionally gained from traveling and learning from colleagues on week-long 
professional programs to Germany, Japan, Spain, and China as well as my 18-month 
service at the U.S. State Department as a foreign affairs officer. These experiences are 
not examples of transnational security policy networks for a variety of reasons, but they 
have inspired me to look for as many opportunities as possible to meet with colleagues 
from the countries that I study, particularly because I have never lived abroad, while 
employed at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where I have 
worked for most of the last fifteen years. The chance to share opinions, ideas, and better 
understand how counterparts from China, Europe, Japan, India, Russia, the Middle East, 
Australia, or anywhere else see the world is indispensable to being a foreign affairs 
analyst or scholar-practitioner.
That passion led me to join CSCAP, one of the case studies which will be 
discussed later, and informally begin this study. The question that remained in my mind 
was whether my experience was unique. What did others get from these networks, if 
anything? Did government officials benefit from them, or are benefits limited to experts 
outside government straining to get in? To be fully transparent, CSCAP and one of the 
other case studies (PONARS) have loosely or partially been affiliated with CSIS, 
15
although not the division at which I work. The director of PONARS was also a professor 
of mine as an undergraduate fifteen years ago. There have been benefits from my 
experience at CSCAP and this affiliation, including a more intimate understanding of 
those networks, access to its members, and potentially a certain candor to interviews. 
It also meant that I had a constant challenge throughout this study to balance the 
advantages that familiarity brought with the need to remain objective, analytical, and 
even skeptical of various claims. One way I did that was to constantly remind myself that 
this study would not evaluate the fundamental goals these networks set for themselves. It 
focused on nonproliferation (while networks also addressed other issues) and tested their 
impact in the United States alone. Therefore, finding no relevance for nonproliferation or 
in the United States should not lead me or anyone else to conclude that these networks 
have no value, mitigating any potential bias in their favor in this study. If these networks 
have no impact in the U.S. government, it is also in my selfish interest to know that now, 
before wasting any subsequent time seeking that effect as a scholar-practitioner based in 
a U.S. think tank or university. Finally, lessons learned about any limits of these networks 
or ways to improve them are not intended to be criticisms of the network organizers, but 
could be passed on to them, offering to help them improve network influence rather than 
blithely overlooking any deficiencies.
 Nevertheless, ignoring the potential bias in favor of these networks would be 
naïve, particularly because any study of perceptions is inherently subjective. The rest of 
this section is divided into three parts to describe the methodology—or the set of 
benchmarks, sources and methods, and case studies—employed to help limit the potential 
bias, guide the inquiry, and seek to answer whether transnational security policy networks 
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have changed U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policies or the perceptions that shape them. 
Put another way, the rest of this chapter answers: what is this study looking for to 
evaluate the impact of these networks, how and to whom it will turn for answers, and 
where (or to which case studies) it will look. 
Framework for Analysis
Because the contemporary use of these networks is unexplored territory, no single theory 
is available to guide the inquiry. Instead, the models, observations, and descriptions 
previously discussed in this chapter can be combined and condensed to form a hybrid 
analytical framework to focus on four potential areas of influence, or benchmarks. 
First are the contacts and perceptions facilitated by networks, the most intangible 
but potentially promising aspect of study. Ganovetter’s emphasis on weak ties makes the 
search for contacts important, while those contacts can be a source for the new 
perceptions, ideas, information, and opinions which Evangelista, Heclo, Reinecke et al., 
Montville, Fisher and Ury, and Haas all emphasize.29 What, if any, contacts and 
perceptions did networks facilitate? Did networks help U.S. participants think of new 
ideas, reexamine assumptions, see different perspectives, or change their understanding 
of the interests behind certain foreign government positions in ways that only looking at 
policies might not make immediately obvious? 
Second are the ways that networks sought to interact with government 
participants. How did networks seek to influence U.S. policymakers? Putnam’s two-level 
game, Evangelista’s conclusion that Gorbachev’s Soviet system was more permeable 
29 Also see Diane Stone, “Think Tanks Across Nations: The New Networks of Knowledge,” NIRA Review
(Winter 2000): 36.
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than the United States to transnational networks, Haas’ hypotheses that epistemic 
communities might help policymakers, and Kingdon’s concept of policy windows 
opening at certain times all raise questions about the timing and pathways of a network’s 
access to government. Did networks publish recommendations, or summaries or 
transcripts of annual meetings? Did U.S. government officials receive them? Did they 
read them? Did they participate in network activities? At what level? Did they receive 
briefings about network activities? Did they request them? Did they ask networks to 
consider certain issues? Did government officials previously know network participants? 
Did network members become government officials through what is known as the 
revolving door, in and out of U.S. government?
Because some network members are based in U.S. think tanks and because the 
ways that U.S. think tanks seek to influence U.S. policy could provide a potential model 
for transnational networks, the literature on the timing and ways that think tanks seek to 
influence U.S. foreign policymaking will be surveyed in chapter 2. At this point, it is 
simply worth highlighting that an incentive may exist for nongovernmental actors to hide 
public attention from any contribution they may have made to policies recommended by 
government officials. That contribution is not necessarily unseemly, but 
nongovernmental actors may prefer to allow policymakers to take credit for any ideas, 
recommendations, or policies that they generate, seeking to preserve their long-term 
influence as a consultative staff. There is no incentive for government officials to give 
that recognition.30 If such influence is not publicized, consistent access to policymakers 
may provide an alternate indicator of their value to those policymakers and potential 
influence.
30 See, for example, Kenneth Lieberthal, “Initiatives to Bridge the Gap,” Asia Policy 1 (January 2006): 14.
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The third potential benchmark is any network effect on the U.S. policy agenda, 
what John Kingdon calls agenda setting or Hugh Heclo calls issue shaping. How a 
problem is defined or how public debate is framed can theoretically have an effect on 
whether any action is taken, or even what policies are subsequently favored.31 In Harvard 
University Professor Joseph Nye’s terms, agenda setting is a form of soft power, or the 
ability to shape the preferences of others through noncoercive means, and persuade them 
to seek the same goals.32 What proliferation issues did the networks discuss, such as 
North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, the 1998 Indian nuclear tests, inadequately secured 
nuclear materials, the A.Q. Khan network, or terrorist threats? Do government officials 
acknowledge networks in private or in public, such as briefings or press releases,33 for 
drawing their attention to aspects of those issues? Do issues uniquely or principally 
discussed by networks subsequently appear on the political agenda in a way that 
networks might credibly claim some credit? 
Fourth are potential policy options that networks may develop. Evangelista’s 
policy coordination, Montville’s joint strategies, Kingdon’s policy options, and Haas’s 
policies to alleviate crises all provide theoretical support for this line of inquiry. What 
nonproliferation policy options did networks discuss, such as export controls, economic 
31 For more on agenda setting, see Andrew Rich, Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise 
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2004): esp. 111-112; David A. Rochefort and Roger 
W. Cobb, “Problem Definition: An Emerging Perspective,” ch. 1 in Rochefort and Cobb, eds. The Politics 
of Problem Definition: Shaping the Policy Agenda (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994): esp. 
9, 15-26; and Joseph G. Peschek, Policy Planning Organizations: Elite Agendas and America’s Rightward 
Turn (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987): 7.
32 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 
2004): esp. x, 5, 31, 91.
33 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, in Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy 
Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998): 24, 
argue that such statements can often be used to force a government to address a particular 
issue, once it has acknowledged that a problem exists.
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sanctions, military operations, missile defense, arms control, security assurances, trade 
incentives, conflict resolution, or crisis management? Did networks reach a consensus 
supporting any options? Do government officials acknowledge networks in public or 
private for drawing their attention to particular options? Does evidence exist that those 
policies were considered by government? Were they chosen? If so, can networks credibly 
claim some credit for it? Alternatively, did network efforts generate tension, antagonize, 
complicate, or otherwise interfere with government activities?
Table 1.1 summarizes these four benchmarks, some of the potential indicators of 
network influence for each, and some hypothetical conditions under which results might 
be more likely.
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Table 1.1 Potential Indicators of Influence
Benchmark Indicators of Influence Could be more likely 
when…
Contacts and Perceptions - new contacts formed
- contacts maintained
- anecdotal claims from 
interviews
- ties otherwise weak
- former foreign govt 
officials participate 
- more useful for 
nongovernmental 
members?
Access to Government - officials claim to read 
network publications
- number of govt 
attendees at meetings
- seniority of govt 
attendees at meetings
- briefings to 
government officials
- network members 
become govt officials
- briefings convened 
at government 
initiative
- higher level 
attendance
- govt officials know 
and trust nongovt 
network member







Policy Options and 
Selection




- changes in institutional 
procedures34
- recommended policy 






- network consensus 
recommendations
34 Keck and Sikkink, p. 25, argue that network efforts may lead governments to change institutional 
procedures or bureaucratic structure to address network concerns.
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Sources and Methods
These four benchmarks point to what network influence to look for, but not how to 
answer those questions. What is the data to be examined, and how can it be acquired? 
Primary network materials—such as publications, conference summaries or transcripts—
of selected case studies are instrumental to understand how networks operate and what 
they seek to do. But to try to address how governments perceive and interact with them or 
ascertain anybody’s perceptions, original interviews are necessary.  
Interviews raise some understandable methodological concerns. The data acquired 
are inherently unverifiable unless a reader asks the author for interview transcripts. Even 
then, interviews do not have the objective power of proper statistical models, when they 
are available, because they are the product of conversations conducted by an individual. 
Different interviewers will ask different questions and get different responses. They are 
inherently subjective, imprecise, and vulnerable to a range of exogenous influences and 
biases. Network directors are potentially inclined to exaggerate their influence, with 
government officials potentially inclined to dismiss them. The interviewer’s potential 
bias, a subject’s memory, and even their mood during the interview may play a part. 
Nevertheless, there is no better way to get at perceptions, which are by definition 
subjective. Ultimately, topics lend themselves to be examined in certain ways, and 
determine the methodology, not the other way around. Although conclusions drawn must 
be mindful of the vulnerabilities of interview-based studies, not asking these questions 
will simply perpetuate ignorance about the operations and potential value of part of the 
emerging foreign policymaking architecture in a globalizing world. At the cutting edge of 
research, exploratory methods are often necessary. In this case, interviews are an 
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essential, if imperfect, way to get at perceptions and other intangible effects networks 
may have.
Some of a reader’s uncertainties about interviews can be tempered by doing more 
than just citing “interview with author” while also protecting the confidentiality and 
identity of some interview subjects. When only one source makes a particular claim, that 
is noted in this study in the text, not just a footnote. Interviews are also coded to preserve 
the identity of the subject and cited (i.e. “interview A1”), unless their personal 
background or view is relevant and they did not request anonymity in which case they are 
cited by name. Coding enables readers to see how many and which (coded) subjects 
make a particular claim. The text also includes relevant professional descriptions of 
sources, such as whether they are government employees. 
An open-ended set of questions was used to loosely guide interviews. This 
allowed conversations to flow and focus on the most relevant topics for each subject, 
particularly since many had limited time available. Rather than using a survey, a more 
flexible format both increased the chances of participation, since policymakers are 
extremely unlikely to fill out a form, and allowed for greater exploration of a topic that 
has been practically untouched. The goal is to seek to better understand how networks 
operate, when they might have influence, and on what aspects of U.S. security policy, so 
that hypotheses can be reached for subsequent, potentially more rigorous examination. As 
of now, analysts can’t even be sure where to look.
The interview questions were loosely based around some preliminary background 
queries (how long subjects had been members or participants in networks, whether they 
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had worked in government, etc.) and examined the four benchmarks of potential 
influence, by asking:
• Without necessarily mentioning anyone by name, have you made or maintained 
any professionally valuable contacts through the network? If so, why were they 
valuable?
• Was the network trying to influence U.S. policy? How?
• Was the network useful to you? To public policy?
• Are network activities harmful for any reason?
• How could this network improve its utility?
Because none of the networks were limited to nonproliferation, in practice the interviews 
often discussed networks broadly. In cases where individual subjects focused on 
nonproliferation, they were also asked whether perceptions about or attention to any 
nonproliferation issues or policy options were derived from network activities. In 
practice, however, nonproliferation mainly served to limit the review of primary written 
materials more than interviews, which ranged more widely.
Five different groups of people were sought to be interviewed, each of whom 
bring different biases, perspectives, and experiences to the networks:  
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• Directors of the networks, who in all cases also founded them, were consulted. 
Although they have an obvious bias in favor of the relevance of the networks, 
they have the largest reservoir of experience and knowledge from which to draw. 
• Funders were sought for their perspective as well as ways they evaluate each 
network’s success.
• U.S. nongovernmental members were asked about their experiences and contacts 
in each network. Permanent nongovernmental members may have a bias in favor 
of networks, but those who are part of the revolving door rotating in and out of 
government may have less of a bias.
• U.S. government members may have a bias against significant policy impact of 
networks, as it could diminish their own influence, and have insight into how 
networks may have complicated their work or the work of their colleagues.
• U.S. senior government policymakers, meaning Deputy Assistant and Assistant 
Secretaries in the Departments of State and Defense as well as directors in the 
National Security Council (and higher, if relevant and possible) for relevant 
regions and issues, were sought whether they attended network events or not. 
Interviews were conducted with 67 subjects, mostly ranging from 30-60 minutes with a 
few as long as 90 minutes or as short as 15. Although the cases will be introduced 
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momentarily and discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, table 1.2 summarizes 
the interviews conducted with nongovernmental members, those members of the 
revolving door that worked both in and out of government, and government officials. The 
level of government officials interviewed ranged from current or former assistant 
secretaries through deputy assistant secretaries, policy planning staff members, office 
directors, desk officers, staff from Capitol Hill, and members of the intelligence 
community.
Table 1.2 Summary of Interviews
Subjects interviewed Case 1 (CSCAP) 2 (NEACD) 3 (PONARS) Total
Only NGO members 6 4 10 20
Revolving door 11 4 6 21
Only govt employees 5 9 12 26
Total 22 17 28 67
Interviews were transcribed and direct quotes are liberally preserved in the results 
presented in chapters 3-5 to maintain the voice of the subjects. In all cases, except for 
some more senior government policymakers, interviews were sought with people who 
had experience with the network. This may give a bias, even among government 
participants, in favor of network influence as it seeks to better understand the experience 
of those that keep coming back. Findings, then, arguably indicate how networks may 
have maximized their influence in ideal circumstances, when government officials are 
interested. 
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Finally, to examine more tangible policy impacts, such as agenda setting and 
policy options, a method called “process-tracing,”35 can be used, which pretty much 
sounds like what it is. Explorations of how networks interact with governments can help 
to trace any claimed agenda setting or policy option results back to their network 
foundations. However, even if experiences, perceptions, or recommendations can be 
traced from policies back to networks, that does not necessarily prove that transnational 
dialogues caused those effects. Tracing can only reveal a relationship, or a correlation, 
between networks and tangible results. Successful correlations also need to reexamine the 
context, for example to see if exogenous crises may explain both network and 
government activity independently. Even epistemic community theory acknowledges that 
they may be cited for their influence by politicians or decisionmakers as political cover 
for choices they had already reached anyway. Only correlations can be determined; 
causal conclusions are unlikely and unrealistic. In historical research, this is known as the 
“critical method,”36 where scholars attach probabilities to inferences about events. Any 
correlations, however, can at least help conclude this research with hypotheses that would
give some insight and merit further research to evaluate the strength of those correlations.
Case Studies
The final step of the methodology is to determine where to look, or to what case studies. 
Although networks are decentralized and not catalogued anywhere, a vast number of 
35 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, “Process-Tracing and Historical Explanation,” ch. 10 in Case 
Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciencies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005): 205-232; and 
Mendelson, p. 11.
36 Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” in 
Goldstein and Keohane, eds. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press): 26-29. 
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options are available. To limit the study to relevant transnational security policy networks 
and a reasonable number of differences among them, a number of guidelines were used to 
select cases. These guidelines are not the only ones that could be chosen but they were 
selected for various analytical reasons. As mentioned earlier, policy networks among 
experts with similar interests but not necessarily similar goals that often worked with 
governments were selected, not advocacy networks that sought to externally and publicly 
pressure governments to make a particular change. Networks that have operated since the 
end of the Cold War were selected, to analyze their contemporary role in a globalizing 
world. Only networks that have existed for at least five years and continued to meet 
during this research were chosen, providing sufficient data to examine the enduring effect 
of broad networks, as opposed to numerous discrete subjects that may be discussed in a 
two-year project. 
Although this study only tests the effects of these networks in the United States, 
whom U.S. members interact with is crucial to what members might learn and a 
network’s potential value. For this study, networks that included Chinese and/or Russian 
participants were selected for four reasons. First, U.S. relations with these two countries 
have been dynamic since the end of the Cold War. The political space for 
nongovernmental actors to help navigate these changes has potentially been greater than 
if relations with those countries were static. Second, the countries are not historical U.S. 
allies, also potentially generating more interest in nongovernmental channels than with 
allies who have well-developed formal government channels with Washington. Third, as 
global powers, the agenda with China and Russia may include security challenges where 
those countries have similar interests with the United States, such as preventing North 
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Korean nuclear proliferation, as well as potentially competing interests, such as how to 
cease Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran or Chinese missile sales to Pakistan. 
Choosing these countries enables this study to test the value of these dialogues as both 
cooperative security management and conflict resolution tools. Finally, testing 
participation by more than one other country reduces the risk that the single partner 
country studied might hold security policy networks hostage.
Case studies primarily comprised of scientists or others with particular technical 
knowledge not likely to be prevalent among government policymakers were avoided. 
Choosing cases other than the Pugwash conference or the National Academy of Science’s 
Committee on International Security and Arms Control helped test the inherent value of 
transnational efforts, rather than the technical consultative role that scientific networks 
may provide. 
Finally, although each of the network directors is well qualified and may have 
government experience in their own right, networks that were not dominated by a high-
profile chair were selected. Other cases—such as former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry 
and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Ash Carter’s efforts through the Preventive 
Defense Project at Stanford and Harvard, or the Aspen Strategy Group, currently led by 
former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and former Assistant Secretary of 
Defense Joseph Nye—are more likely to test an extension of the directors’ influence 
rather than the network’s inherent value and effect.   
Nothing would necessarily be wrong with changing any of the above guidelines 
for case selection. If anything, they emphasize the potential scope of the universe of 
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transnational security policy networks. Although other cases may also fit these 
guidelines, three were selected for study here.
Arguably the largest and most well-known transnational security policy network, 
the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), established in June 
1993, focuses on security issues in the Asia-Pacific and is comprised of 21 national 
member committees, including China, Russia, and the United States. An international 
Steering Committee of its members governs the organization’s activities. Each country 
has its own member committee, hosted by a national think tank. The U.S. committee of 
nearly 200 members is administered by the Pacific Forum/CSIS, based in Hawaii. The 
founder, Ralph Cossa, is currently the USCSCAP executive director. CSCAP attempts to 
provide direct support to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a governmental 
multilateral security organization. CSCAP also hosted several issue-oriented international 
working groups focusing, among other issues, on confidence and security building 
measures particularly to reduce weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and a North 
Pacific Working Group concentrating on Northeast Asian security cooperation especially 
on the Korean peninsula. 
The second case study, the Northeast Asian Cooperation and Dialogue (NEACD), 
was founded and is currently directed by Susan Shirk of the Institute of Global Conflict 
and Cooperation at the University of California at San Diego. It consists primarily of an 
annual meeting of five members from each of six countries: China, Japan, South Korea, 
North Korea, Russia, and the United States. Generally annual meetings are convened 
with each country bringing one policymaker from each of the foreign and defense 
ministries, as well as a uniformed military officer and two members from think tanks or 
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universities for a total of up to 30 attendees. NEACD has held seventeen meetings since it 
was founded in 1993. Occasional special studies are also commissioned.
The Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS) was founded in 
1997 by Celeste Wallander at Harvard University. PONARS has since moved with Dr. 
Wallander to CSIS, where it is currently organized. It consists of approximately 80 
members who study Russian and Eurasian security issues and the region’s role in 
international affairs. Most of those members teach in the United States, Russia, or 
Ukraine and/or work at think tanks in those countries but are not invited or identified by 
their country of origin. In addition to its annual meeting, which government officials and 
other interested observers are invited to attend, scholarly working papers and shorter 
policy memos are published throughout the course of the year. PONARS members also 
can communicate through an exclusive e-mail network, or listserv. 
These networks differ from each other in at least five ways. If results differ 
among networks, these variables may provide initial hypotheses about how network 
structure affects their ability to make contacts and change perceptions, effectively interact 
with government decisionmakers, change the policy issue agenda, or promote policy 
options. The variables are summarized in table 1.3:
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A greater number of nations participating may either increase the global influence of the 
network, or may encumber it with an inflexible bureaucracy which plagues many 
multilateral exercises. The number of network members or their principal occupation 
might affect network influence. Frequent and direct interaction with governments may 
improve network influence, but it may reduce their creative brainstorming, or agenda 
setting, potential. Operations other than the annual conferences—such as small, focused 
working groups or electronic networks to facilitate member interaction—may have 
effects. 
Potential Significance
Why does any of this matter? The proposed study seeks to improve the understanding of 
the potential influence of these three case studies on U.S. nonproliferation policies and 
the perceptions that shape them. In preliminary research, a number of experts were very 
interested in the results, even if they themselves frequently participated in transnational 
networks. As one expert informally explained: “we all go to these things and they seem 
useful, but sometimes I am not really sure why.”
I expect that such findings can be useful and original, even if they might be initial 
and limited. Completion of this study seeks to improve the ability to see through the fog 
of foreign policymaking by shedding some light on how these networks might change the 
policies and perceptions of either government officials directly, nongovernmental experts 
directly, or U.S. government officials indirectly through their interaction with U.S. 
nongovernmental network members. This study seeks to conclude with informed 
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hypotheses about the value of these transnational security policy networks from these 
three case studies that can be further tested. Within these potential limitations, the 
research can conceivably make three other contributions to new knowledge:
First, this study seeks to test the potential for these networks to serve not just as 
conflict resolution tools, which currently dominate the literature, but also to evaluate their 
potential as cooperative security tools to assist contemporary great powers in managing 
security challenges. 
Second, this study may derive a set of best practices for current and future 
networks. Findings may include insight into the organizational structure that would best 
serve to change policy or perceptions: the types of members who should be included; the 
outreach to most effectively include and inform government policymakers; and even 
possibly the types of issues most likely to be successfully addressed by transnational 
security policy networks. It is not necessarily the case that what may, or may not, work 
for nuclear nonproliferation will work for other security challenges or with other 
countries. Nevertheless, this study could develop recommendations for best practices that 
may be tested by other networks.
Finally, the study may serve as a model for other researchers seeking to improve 
the understanding of at least two other types of nongovernmental activities. First, how 
might U.S. think tank employees improve U.S. foreign policy? Existing literature has 
been dominated by process tracing, often without conducting interviews, and has been 
frustrated by an inability to draw a line from a think tank’s idea to an adopted policy. 
Findings in this study of U.S. think tanks’ transnational cousins may help develop 
hypotheses about the influence of think tanks to be tested by others. Second, researchers 
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with language and regional expertise may be able to apply this study’s methods to 
improve the understanding of transnational network influence in other countries. 
Although the questions that shape the methodology have already been elaborated, 
at its core, this study asks three deceptively simple things:
• How do these networks tackle nonproliferation issues?
• What value, if any, do they serve for public policy?
• How should they be structured to maximize their value?
Each of the case studies will be discussed separately in chapters 3-5, with chapter 6 
drawing conclusions across the three case studies. What remains to complete this 
framework for analysis is the literature review of the role of think tanks in U.S. foreign 
policy. Chapter two contains that literature review. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THINK TANKS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Theoretically, how might transnational security policy networks seek to influence U.S. 
nuclear nonproliferation policies or the perceptions that shape them? What might 
networks seek to do? How and when are they most likely to have influence? Does 
existing literature draw conclusions or propose hypotheses that can be tested by further 
study? Partly because transnational networks are so new, existing literature attempting to 
answer these questions is limited and was discussed in the previous chapter. Are there 
other models that might shed light on why, how, and when networks can maximize their 
influence?
As depicted in the introductory chapter, transnational policy networks might seek 
to influence U.S. policy or perceptions in two ways: either directly through the U.S. 
government or indirectly by affecting individual U.S. nongovernmental members who 
subsequently seek to change U.S. policy or perceptions. Although the limited existing 
literature on transnational networks examines the direct channel, other literature may help 
explain indirect influence. The key may lie in understanding the organizations that 
permanently employ many of these nongovernmental network members: think tanks. 
What these think tank-based members seek to do in their full-time capacity as well as 
how and when they may be most influential could help enlighten any indirect impact. 
Beyond individual member activity, what purposes think tanks organizationally
serve, as well as how and when they influence U.S. foreign policy, might also provide 
models for how transnational networks might maximize their own influence. Clearly, 
there are differences between the two types of organizations. Think tanks are more 
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established institutions, occupying buildings with full- time employees, which have 
existed for decades and are usually based in the country they are trying to influence. 
Networks are more malleable, often exist only virtually except for one annual conference, 
have fewer resources, and potentially face greater opposition from skeptical government 
officials worried about foreign penetration of national security policy. Yet both 
organizations are comprised of nongovernmental experts seeking to shape security 
policies and perceptions; may seek similar goals, channels, and timing of influence; and
even have many of the same members. At a minimum, think tanks could provide some 
useful lessons for networks to consider emulating. 
The literature on think tanks in U.S. policy, much less U.S. foreign policy, is only 
slightly larger, still emerging in its own right. Much of it has been plagued with 
difficulties trying to define what think tanks are. In their broadest sense, think tanks are 
defined as non-profit, nongovernmental organizations whose primary purpose is public 
policy research and influence,37 a definition which sufficiently helps as a guide for 
transnational networks. Despite the fact that think tanks have proliferated in recent years 
(an exhaustive study by University of Pennsylvania Ph.D. James G. McGann estimated 
that 1200-1400 think tanks existed in the United States in the mid-1990s, half of which 
were established since 1970),38 no more than eight books have been written on think 
tanks focusing exclusively or primarily on U.S. policy, with only one explicitly on U.S. 
foreign policy. Methodological problems about defining them and attempting to prove 
37 This is a hybrid of, and consistent with, definitions used by James G. McGann, The Competition for 
Dollars, Scholars and Influence in the Public Policy Research Industry (Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America, 1995): 31-32; and Howard J. Wiarda, “New Actors: Think Tanks and Foreign Policy,” ch. 8 in 
American Foreign Policy: Actors and Processes (New York: HarperCollins, 1996): 138.
38 McGann, The Competition for Dollars, Scholars and Influence, p. 4
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they caused a certain policy provide few empirical examples of the impact think tanks 
may have had and have left them otherwise neglected.39
Although limited, the existing literature does outline the purposes that think tanks 
seek to serve in U.S. foreign policy as well as how and when they might theoretically 
maximize their influence. The goal of this chapter is not to prove whether think tanks 
have actually influenced policy as the literature describes. Although it is tempting to 
investigate each speculated purpose, conduct original interviews, and examine empirical 
evidence, that would be a distinct research project on think tanks. The goal in this chapter 
is merely to provide a map of the theoretical roles, channels, and timing of think tank 
influence that can be integrated into the transnational security policy network research 
framework outlined in chapter one, and help test whether the three transnational policy 
network case studies have changed U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policies or perceptions.
To construct that map from existing literature on think tanks in U.S. policy, this 
chapter examines: 
• the purposes think tanks serve in U.S. policy; 
• what uniquely about the U.S. system may enable think tanks to have influence; 
• how, or through what channels, think tanks seek to influence U.S. policy; and
• when think tanks are most likely to be influential.
39 Donald E. Abelson, “Think Tanks in the United States,” ch. 5 in Diane Stone, Andrew Denham, and 
Mark Garnett, eds. Think Tanks Across Nations: A Comparative Approach (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1998): 123.
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Roles and Functions: What Do Think Tanks Do?
Think tanks are a heterogeneous lot. They vary in size, political orientation, policy scope, 
influence, and purpose. Yet as a group, a variety of potential roles exist, even if no single 
think tank pursues all of them. They may seek to be strategic planners, looking beyond 
political cycles, or instant analysts, explaining current events to the public. At times they 
are government’s obstreperous adversaries, criticizing priorities or policies, and at times 
they are valuable allies, serving as sounding boards for policymakers. Think tanks can 
also serve as debating societies, providing places and people to examine events or 
recommendations in depth; as houses of convalescence, for ex-officials whose political 
party has lost power; or as interdisciplinary bridges, linking various experts and interest 
groups with each other and with policymakers. 
The starting point is to dispense with the notion that think tanks only seek to 
influence final policy decisions.40 While in their most vainglorious moments they 
certainly claim that ability, there are too many factors in policymaking beyond their 
control.41 A more accurate view widens the policy lens to include, and focus on, 
40 Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Institute of Peace Press, 1993): xix, 34, 74; David M. Ricci, The Transformation of American Politics: The 
New Washington and the Rise of Think Tanks (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993): 198; James Allen 
Smith, The Power Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite (New York: Free Press, 
1993): 207, 229-30; Donald E. Abelson, American Think Tanks and their Role in U.S. Foreign Policy (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996): 74; Diane Stone, “Private Authority, Scholarly Legitimacy, and Political 
Credibility: Think Tanks and Informal Diplomacy,” in Richard A. Higgott, Geoffrey R.D. Underhill and 
Andreas Bieler, eds. Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System, (London: Routledge, 2000): 
223; and Andrew Rich, Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise (Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004): 111.
41 George, p. 133; Abelson, American Think Tanks and their Role in U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 1; Diane Stone, 
Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process (London: Frank Cass, 1996): 15; 
Rich, p. 153; and Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005): 276, 284-5. 
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informing and shaping the earlier stages of the policy process in a wide variety of ways, 
all before governments have time or the political pressure to address those issues.42
The Nature of Governance
For inherent structural reasons, the reality is that it is difficult for governments to perform 
many of the roles that think tanks seek to provide. For starters, politics make it difficult to 
plan over the horizon. Elected officials are governed by 2-6-year terms, limiting their 
ability to think strategically beyond their next election or pay much attention to long-term 
effects of policy recommendations.43
To support and advise these politicians and political appointees that come and go, 
a cadre of permanent, government employees in the executive branch provides 
experience and institutional memory, stabilizing even drastic electoral upheavals.44
Although there are times when this role is beneficial, there are others when it can be a 
liability. Employees that succeed in government positions are often risk averse,45
naturally support existing programs into which they may have invested years of their own 
career, are rewarded for their ability to build consensus before changing policy, 46 and 
risk developing a “group think” mentality among colleagues who have shared similar 
professional experiences or even have worked together directly for much of their 
42 Richard Higgott and Diane Stone, “The Limits of Influence: Foreign Policy Think Tanks in Britain and 
the USA,” Review of International Studies 20 (1994): 15.
43 Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, p. 15
44 James G. McGann, Responding to 9/11: Are Think Tanks Thinking Outside the Box? (Philadelphia, PA: 
Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 31, 2003): 9.
45 Ronald D. Asmus, “Having an Impact: Think Tanks and the NATO Enlargement Debate,” U.S. Foreign 
Policy Agenda 7:3 (November 2002): 29-30.
46 Hugh Heclo, “Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment,” ch. 3 in Anthony King, ed. The New 
American Political System (Washington: AEI for Public Policy Research, 1st ed., 1978): 120-121.
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careers.47 The advantage of such a system is that it prevents overreacting to what turn out 
to be transient problems. In times of truly radical change, such as the last fifteen years 
however, such stability can ossify governments and impede their ability to change with 
the times. 
The end of the Cold War, globalization, regional integration, and democratization 
are just some of the recent geopolitical transformations that have led to calls for 
necessary and often radical changes, straining the structural stability that governments 
traditionally provide.48 This is not the first time that think tanks have called for change 
during geopolitical transformations. Previously, at the end of World War II, think tanks 
apparently served a similar role by providing foreign policy advice to prod the United 
States to adjust its policies, at the time helping Washington navigate its way out of its 
previously more isolationist shell and into its new global responsibilities.49 During times 
of change, when an old consensus has decayed and a new one has yet to form, think tanks 
can help counter government’s inherent stability.50
The dawn of the information age has also exacerbated government’s inability to 
be agile or to look ahead. Over twenty-five years ago, Hugh Heclo was already writing 
about the end of the knowledge oligopoly—previously held in “iron triangles” by the 
executive branch, the legislature, and interest groups—and the increasing flow of 
information facilitated by emerging issue networks, discussed in chapter one. More
information requires more government staff to process it, bloating the bureaucracy even 
47 McGann, Responding to 9/11, p. 57
48 R. Kent Weaver and James G. McGann, “Think Tanks and Civil Societies in a Time of Change,” ch. 1 in 
McGann and Weaver, eds. Think Tanks & Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action (London: 
Transaction Publishers, 2002): 13; and Asmus, p. 31.
49 Donald E. Abelson and Christine M. Carberry, “Policy Experts in Presidential Campaigns: A Model of 
Think Tank Recruitment,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 27:4 (Fall 1997): 681.
50 Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, p. 92
40
further.51 The arrival of e-mail and the internet has aggravated information overload as 
interest group lobbies have more data to wield, investigative media have found more 
sources, constituents have electronic channels to register complaints more easily, and 
other actors—including think tanks themselves—produce more reports to create a 
constant onslaught of bureaucratic fires that have to be put out.52 Even without these
external responsibilities, the increasing volume of information challenges the 
fundamental ability of governments internally to process it, to decipher trends, and to 
evaluate policies.53
These massive information flows have subsequently forced government portfolios 
at all but the most senior levels to become more specialized, limiting the number of 
people and the ability of government to integrate information and understand broad 
trends or predict the effects of policy change.54 Put it all together, and a limited number 
of officials with increasing demands on their time in an era of global transformation are 
left to process a dizzying volume of information in institutions that are structured to resist 
change and by their nature are confined to the time horizons of political cycles. 
51 Ricci, pp. 41, 139-140
52 James G. McGann, Think Tanks: Catalysts for Ideas in Action: An International Survey (Philadelphia: 
Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 1999): 56-57, and Weaver and McGann. p. 1
53 Jan Martin Witte, Wolfgang H. Reinicke, and Thorsten Benner, “Beyond Multilateralism: Global Public 
Policy Networks,” International Politics and Society (Politik und Gesellschaft Online) 2/2000 
(www.fes.de/IPG/ipg2_2000/artwitte.html (accessed April 16, 2004)).
54 Maureen R. Berman and Joseph E. Johnson, “The Growing Role of Unofficial Diplomacy,” ch. 1 in 
Berman and Johnson, eds. Unofficial Diplomats (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977): 30; 
Craufurd D. Goodwin, “The Fifth Estate: Research for Informed Debate in Democratic Society,” ch. 3 in 
Jeffrey Telgarsky and Makiko Ueno, eds. Think Tanks in a Democratic Society: An Alternative Voice 
(Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1996): 24; Heclo, pp. 99, 115; and Ricci, p. 45.
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What Think Tanks Do
To help governments cope with the demands of the information age, think tanks in their 
simplest role can filter, synthesize, and systematically respond to information in ways 
that might be useful for policymakers.55 Unencumbered by the daily demands of 
governance, think tanks have the time and expertise to provide such analysis. The most 
effective think tanks at this role are ones perceived to be impartial evaluators of 
information, unbiased with a particular interest or political axe to grind.56
Beyond simple information analysis, however, think tanks inherently seek to 
improve policy by helping governments as well as the public better understand, react to, 
and shape events. Sometimes this assistance is cooperative, working with governments; 
at others, it is combative, challenging or criticizing official priorities or policy. Either 
way, think tanks can perform at least four functions: to employ experts that inject new 
ideas into the policy process; to debate policy proposals, eventually even helping build 
public support for those that meet expert approval; to serve as houses of political 
convalescence, providing time and space for former (and future) government officials to 
improve policy to be implemented in a future administration; and to convene an 
interdisciplinary variety of experts to improve or build public support for policies. 
Generate Ideas In the earliest stages of the policy process, think tanks serve to inject new 
ideas into it. They can do this through a variety of roles: sometimes proposing grand 
strategic plans; at times, providing original and unconventional thoughts; and at times 
55 Heclo, p. 99, and James G. McGann, Think Tanks: Catalysts for Ideas in Action: An International 
Survey, pp. 56-57
56 Ricci, pp. 46-47
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repackaging the ideas or proposals of others in ways that policymakers can better process 
and understand.
One way think tanks put new ideas into the policy process is by thinking ahead, or 
over-the-horizon. Political officials, as discussed earlier, are often constrained by short-
term political pressures for re-election. Think tanks can compensate for those pressures,
by serving as early warning systems,57 anticipating problems beyond political cycles, or 
as strategic planners, analyzing long-term policy implications.58 These roles can help 
transcend the political constraints of re-election by providing the time and perspective to 
look beyond immediate problems or instant effects of policy proposals. 
A second way think tanks put new ideas into the policy process is by being 
provocative, providing unconventional ideas to help balance the inherently consensus-
driven nature of governance.59 Sometimes these novel ideas are specific, detailed 
policies, designed to respond to problems differently, and are presented to lower-level 
officials for the machinery of government to consider and incorporate.60 In their grandest 
forms, provocative individuals outside government may perceive the world in a different 
way, attempting to get the most senior officials to alter the policy agenda or even grand 
strategy itself. A commonly cited example comes from the 1950s when Albert 
Wohlstetter and a team of RAND researchers were credited with using game theory and 
systems analysis to highlight American strategic bomber vulnerability, which in turn is 
attributed to be a foundation for the subsequent evolution of deterrence theory and 
57 Strobe Talbott, “The Brookings Institution: How a Think Tank Works,” U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda 7:3 
(November 2002): 21.
58 William Wallace, “Between Two Worlds: Think-tanks and Foreign Policy,” ch. 8 in Christopher Hill and 
Pamela Beshoff, eds., Two Worlds of International Relations: Academics, Practitioners and the Trade in 
Ideas (London: Routledge, 1994): 158.
59 Wolfgang H. Reinicke, “The Other World Wide Web: Global Public Policy Networks,” Foreign Policy
(Winter 1999-2000): 44.
60 Ricci, p. 194
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nuclear strategy.61 As former State Department policy planning director Richard Haass 
wrote, “[o]riginal insights can alter conceptions of U.S. national interests, influence the 
ranking of priorities, provide roadmaps for action, mobilize political and bureaucratic 
coalitions, and shape the design of lasting institutions.” He cited a Council on Foreign 
Relations project, called the War and Peace Studies project, immediately after World War 
II as helping explore the foundations for post-war peace including the creation of the 
United Nations, the occupation of Germany, and the strategy of containment itself.62
Clearly, there are political limits to how radical new ideas might be.63 Media 
attention to unconventional ideas and even financial compensation provide independent 
incentives for this creative, brainstorming role,64 but to actually influence policy, there is 
a certain undefinable political threshold beyond which some ideas are simply too radical 
for governments to consider. What may appear ingenuous to one person is an insane or 
outrageous proposal to another. This sometimes means that the most provocative ideas 
will be stranded outside political circles, left out in an intellectual wilderness. Over time, 
ideas may gain popularity in think tanks, serving as a sort of intellectual incubator until 
events change or policymakers become desperate enough to reconsider an idea that may 
have been prematurely aired before its political time.65 The most novel ideas will often 
have to wander in this political purgatory, limited to think tanks and possibly universities, 
before passing through the gates of political feasibility at some point in the future.
61 Smith, pp. 117-121, and Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, pp. 191-194
62 Richard N. Haass, “Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Policy-Maker’s Perspective,” U.S. Foreign 
Policy Agenda 7:3 (November 2002): 6.
63 Wallace, “Between Two Worlds,” pp. 159-160; Gregg Easterbrook, “Ideas Move Nations: How 
Conservative Think Tanks Have Helped to Transform the Terms of Political Debate,” The Atlantic (January 
1986); and Ricci, p. 218.
64 Heclo, pp. 120-121
65 R. Kent Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks,” PS: Political Science and Politics 22:3 
(September 1989): 568.
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Not all ideas conveyed by think tanks are novel, however. Think tanks may 
merely market or repackage ideas originally hatched elsewhere, particularly in academia. 
While certainly a generalization, professors David Ricci and James McGann separately 
characterized academics as researchers who often seek new knowledge about issues that 
may or may not be making headlines, and who convey their findings using models or a 
language intended for other academic scholars and experts that can sometimes be difficult 
for the general public or politicians to understand.66 Although the divisions vary, 
specialization and the requirements of in-depth research lead most original researchers to 
form narrow groups of experts, sometimes developing a language so technical and 
complex that communicating with the public becomes nearly impossible.67 Universities 
themselves exacerbate the problem by dividing faculty and research into departments, 
complicating their ability to be truly interdisciplinary.68 Stanford professor Alexander 
George argues that the incentive structure of academia also rewards those that 
differentiate their own ideas from others, rather than rewarding those that communicate 
to the general public, build consensus, or work well in groups. 69 The more novel and 
potentially groundbreaking the research, the greater the potential to be confined in elite, 
academic circles. 
Think tank officials, in contrast, focus on more contemporary problems and how 
to communicate them as well as their potential solutions to a broader political and public 
audience.70 In such a role, think tanks may repackage original ideas into a form that 
government can digest. This role is sometimes described as serving as “research brokers” 
66 Ricci, pp. 223-224 and McGann, The Competition for Dollars, Scholars and Influence, p. 27
67 Ricci, p. 223
68 Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, p. 211
69 George, pp. 15-16
70 Ricci, pp. 223-224 and McGann, The Competition for Dollars, Scholars and Influence, p. 27
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to translate academic findings, serving as a bridge between the world of ideas that 
universities generate and the world of action that policymakers and the media inhabit.71
In practice, this means that think tanks can serve as idea middlemen, taking complex 
theories and developing strategies to make them comprehensible and enhance their 
appeal in political and popular circles. In the field of economics, for example, public 
choice theory in academics has reportedly been translated into policy through 
privatization studies.72
Acting as research brokers to translate ideas to policymakers raises a fundamental 
question: what type of research is useful for policymakers? Professor George argues that 
policy-relevant knowledge can do two things: diagnose a problem and shape responses to 
that problem. Of these two, George argues that diagnosing problems is a more important 
potential contribution since diagnosis is a prerequisite to prescribing policy solutions. 
Although he does not cite it, one current example might be the North Korean nuclear 
issue. Why does North Korea seek nuclear weapons? Does Pyongyang seek security it 
believes a nuclear arsenal can provide, or are they North Korea’s bargaining chips to cash
in for better relations with the United States and an economic soft landing out of its 
anachronistic economic and political system? George draws an analogy to doctors, who 
must diagnose illnesses correctly before being able to treat them. He also contends that 
this role is often overlooked by those who study think tanks, concentrating instead on the 
fame generated by inventing policy ideas that governments eventually adopt.73
71 McGann, The Competition for Dollars, Scholars and Influence, pp. 13-16; Higgott and Stone, p. 28; 
Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, p. 122; Haass, p. 5; and Paul Dickson, Think Tanks (New York: 
Atheneum Press, 1972): 28.
72 Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, p. 166
73 George, pp. xx, 17, 132, 139
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Evaluate and Communicate Policy Generating or conveying new ideas, however, is 
merely the beginning of the policy process and only one role that think tanks can play. 
They also debate policy proposals after they are generated. The exact way that think 
tanks perform this role varies considerably among such a diverse set of organizations. 
Sometimes think tank experts deliberate in elite circles; at others, they set the parameters 
of policy debate for the general public and participate in that debate. Some think tanks 
approach issues with no conscious preconceived political agenda; others seek to promote 
a particular political philosophy or policy strategy. At times, think tanks criticize 
government policies, and at others, think tanks can serve as government allies, helping to 
build public support for the policy ideas that emerge with expert approval from this 
intellectual gauntlet. As policy deliberators, in other words, think tanks can act as agents 
of intellectual Darwinism, debating and refining both the analytic content and political 
feasibility of ideas in a variety of elite or public circles, so that only the fittest ideas 
survive to become policy.
Think tank experts vet policy proposals and provide opinions on policies or crises 
in a variety of forums. In public, for example, think tanks provide news stations with 
analysts, such as on the Middle East with Rachel Bronson from the Council on Foreign 
Relations on MSNBC, Tony Cordesman from CSIS on ABC, and Ken Pollack from 
Brookings on CNN. In private, if governments wish, think tanks can also provide 
intellectual sounding boards or second opinions on potential proposals before they are 
launched for public consumption. In one of the few instances in which the literature 
provides an empirical example of the role of think tanks, transatlantic expert Ron Asmus 
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relayed that think tanks became part of the government debates over NATO enlargement 
in the early-mid 1990s:
As a result, a number of think tanks became, for a period of time, an informal but 
nonetheless real part of an extended interagency process and debate within the 
U.S. government on NATO’s future. Their briefings and memos became an 
integral part of the intellectual and policy debate. Think tank analysts worked 
closely with, and were often invited in to brief, senior officials.74
In addition to their employees, think tanks can help provide a broader set of elite 
nongovernmental opinion to policymakers by convening a wider array of experts from 
related fields—such as academia, the media, legislative and executive branches—
throughout what Harvard professor Ernest May calls the “foreign policy public.”75 Such 
an extensive base of opinions can help government fine-tune proposals before officially 
offering them as policy.
Participants in these nongovernmental groups and even the think tanks themselves 
are certainly not all centrist or politically unbiased. Some think tanks can also be 
advocates, making sure that a particular political perspective, policy strategy, or even a 
particular region of the world is considered. Conservative think tanks, for example, 
emerged in the 1970s to relentlessly drive their point of view through the perceived 
liberal media after the Vietnam War broke the previous foreign policy consensus.76 These 
advocacy tanks, such as the Heritage Foundation, “transformed the terms of public policy 
debate” in the 1970s, according to at least one observer.77 More recently, Democrats have 
countered with their own think tanks—such as the Progressive Policy Institute that Bill 
74 Asmus, pp. 30-31
75 Haass, pp. 7-8 
76 Wiarda, p. 155
77 Gregg Easterbrook, “Ideas Move Nations: How Conservative Think Tanks Have Helped to Transform 
the Terms of Political Debate,” The Atlantic (January 1986).
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Clinton used during his run to the 1992 presidency or the recently founded Center for 
American Progress—to seek a similar role: to insure that their political viewpoint is 
represented in all public policy debate. Differences between these advocacy tanks and 
other types of think tanks will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter. For now, 
it is simply important to recognize that think tanks participate in elite and public debates 
with diverse objectives.
As events or policies are considered in these debates, they may either generate 
fierce disagreements or produce a general, although rarely completely universal, 
consensus. The ideas that find consensus are more likely to be influential, according to 
Yale Ph.D. Andrew Rich’s study of think tank influence in health care, 
telecommunications, and tax reform from the 1990s to 2001. Specifically, Rich found 
that although experts agreed that problems with health care existed, they could not agree 
on how to fix them. As a result, their collective influence declined in the policy debates.78
It is reasonable to assume that such a conclusion applies to foreign policy cases as well. 
On some foreign policy ideas, think tanks will collectively generate a din of controversy, 
signaling to policymakers that an idea may not be ready for policy. In other cases, near-
expert consensus should give officials more confidence that policy consensus may be 
viable.
As ideas emerge from these elite debates, think tank experts help define the 
boundaries of ever broadening circles of public debates, providing intellectual margins 
for them in a democracy. These analysts may explain global events or government 
proposals not just to other foreign policy elite or the “foreign policy public,” but also to 
the broader informed public, who watch cable news or read newspapers like The New 
78 Rich, pp. 107, 121-122, 139-141
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York Times or The Wall Street Journal, and eventually to the more general public who 
watch network news or read their major regional or local paper. If objective and 
unbiased, think tanks can perform a sort of educational civic duty, explaining events and 
policies to the public.79
Whether biased or unbiased, think tank experts may not act simply as educators in 
policy debates, but they may also serve as policy advocates. Although some advocates 
support policies for preconceived political reasons, others advocate their own conclusions 
based on the results of objective study. In either case, wittingly or unwittingly, think tank 
advocates may even test run ideas for government officials, allowing them both to 
examine elite, public, or even foreign reaction and, if the idea fails, to maintain plausible 
deniability, avoiding any subsequent political fallout. In the NATO enlargement debate 
during the mid 1990s, for example, then-Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow Ron 
Asmus states that think tank officials were asked to “cross the Atlantic and test-market 
ideas and policy options with West European allies or Central European partners in order 
to provide feedback before final decisions in Washington were made.”80 In this role, 
think tanks may be envisioned as a sort of analytical secret service, taking any potential 
diplomatic bullets from abroad or the public for policymakers if proposals are not well 
received.
To this point, roles discussed for think tanks as policy evaluators have described 
participation in debates prior to governments making policy decisions. Once these policy 
decisions are made, however, think tank experts can also help explain and communicate 
those decisions, potentially building public support for or against them. Here again, 
79 Berman and Johnson, p. 21, Shulock, pp. 226-7, 240-1, and Haass, p. 8
80 Asmus, pp. 30-31
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Asmus explained that think tank experts helped defend to the broader public the decision 
to extend NATO membership to former Warsaw Pact countries after the government 
debate had been resolved.81
Building public support can be particularly important as confidence in 
governments throughout the world wanes. In recent years, evidence has emerged that 
public confidence has declined, potentially exacerbated by the constant criticism 
conveyed through 24-hour news media and even, in some corners of the world, by the 
shocking collapse of once seemingly invincible governments in eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union. Accompanying radical geopolitical change has led the public to be 
skeptical about the ability of their representatives to cope with such a transformation and 
adequately protect their citizens or promote their interests during it. In this environment, 
think tanks can provide a perceived unbiased second opinion, sometimes legitimating 
government decisions and increasing public confidence and support.82
Provide Political Convalescence To this point, discussion has not addressed what types of 
people think tanks employ, other than assuming that they are experts at generating policy 
ideas, evaluating them, or marketing them for policymaking audiences. In practice, some 
of these employees are ex-officials who develop foreign policy strategies while their 
political party is out of power. In other words, think tanks often serve as a stop in a 
revolving door in and out of government for former (and future) officials.83
81 Asmus, p. 31
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The revolving door was facilitated, according to historian James Allen Smith, by 
the National Security Act of 1947 and other reforms in the late 1940s that created the 
National Security Council, the policy planning staff at the State Department, and the 
Central Intelligence Agency, all of which created senior advisory posts for 
nongovernmental experts.84 As a result, think tank employees were no longer dependent 
on indirect channels of influence such as the media, published reports, or briefings to 
influence government policy. They could enter government themselves and directly 
implement preferred policies. 85 These future political appointees would become 
empowered to balance inherent bureaucratic interests in preserving particular programs, 
and shake up the status quo.86
While employed at think tanks, these ex-officials can participate in studies to 
improve their knowledge of particular issues, their strategic perspective freed from the 
political pressure of re-election, and their reputation as issue experts.87 Recent examples 
include current Undersecretary of State Paula Dobriansky, the former director of the 
Washington office of the Council on Foreign Relations; Richard Haass, who went from 
director of foreign policy studies at Brookings to be the State Department’s director of 
policy planning in the first term of the current administration to now president of the 
Council on Foreign Relations; and Clinton Administration Deputy Secretary of State 
Strobe Talbot, who is now the president of the Brookings Institution. Although out of 
political power, some ex-officials find they benefit from and even enjoy the time to think 
about vexing policy issues without the demands of governance. 
84 Smith, p. 113
85 McGann, The Competition for Dollars, Scholars and Influence, p. 65
86 Weaver, p. 569
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Far beyond a small band of political aspirants, participating in this revolving door 
permeates American think tanks. Having former employees in government positions 
helps the think tank itself, anointing it with prestige and opening potential channels of 
influence when its former employees move to government.88 The Heritage Foundation 
perceived that having its alumni employed in government was so prestigious and 
important that it created a talent bank for the transition to the Reagan administration in 
1980, and expanded its efforts in 1989 to send 2500 resumes of its employees, affiliates, 
and ideological allies to the Bush transition team.89 The obvious drawback of this role as 
houses of convalescence for expert political exiles is that it takes time to see results. 
Convene Interdisciplinary Networks Nearly all of the previous discussion has highlighted 
the purposes that experts employed by think tanks seek to serve. At times, though, think 
tanks can also provide places to improve policy by serving as convention centers for 
interdisciplinary networks, or simply as a forum for officials to present their ideas. In a 
corollary to the role that individual employees may play as research brokers, think tanks 
institutionally serve to bring together experts with common interests or objectives from 
government, politics, law, the military, diplomacy, international agencies, interest groups, 
business, the elite media, academia, and other think tanks to facilitate information, idea, 
and proposal sharing.90 These interdisciplinary gatherings may make recommendations to 
refine original research, improving its political viability, or they may simply introduce 
government officials around the table to new ideas, potentially catalyzing that official to 
88 Gregg Easterbrook, “Ideas Move Nations: How Conservative Think Tanks Have Helped to Transform 
the Terms of Political Debate,” The Atlantic (January 1986).
89 Smith, p. 207
90 Diane Stone, “Think Tanks Across Nations: The New Networks of Knowledge,” NIRA Review (Winter 
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carry the idea back to the office with them.91 One way to think about it is a form of 
intellectual entropy, giving experts from one sector of the conversation entirely different 
insights on a problem or policy that enables them to add their own expertise and devise 
an approach to diagnose or solve the problem differently. At a minimum, such 
interdisciplinary meetings and networks can take place off-the-record, seeking to 
minimize the political tension that a topic may generate and facilitate its ability to be 
discussed among experts.92
Certain think tanks can also serve a political function, providing a venue for 
government to announce policy and present ideas.93 One very high-profile recent example 
is the National Endowment for Democracy, which hosted President Bush on its twentieth 
anniversary when he explained that democratization of the Middle East had been a major 
goal of the war in Iraq.94 At its most basic level, providing a podium and an audience for 
a new policy may allow officials from any political party to reach an audience of experts. 
It may simply provide the space to provoke initial reactions from the interested public, 
similar to the role that individual think tank employees play.95 More than that, in some 
cases think tanks may even provide a legitimating role for governments, helping 
policymakers reach out beyond partisan divisions if they present their ideas at a think 
tank that is perceived to be bipartisan or particularly concerned about the issue being 
addressed.96
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Altogether, these convening roles enable think tanks to transcend the talent of 
their individual employees. The organizations themselves can stimulate interdisciplinary 
connections and research, expose ideas and policies to a diverse but expert audience to be 
refined for public consumption, and introduce ideas to policymakers off-the-record 
within the walls of its meeting rooms. Its podiums and conference halls also allow 
government officials to test ideas or improve their political feasibility by convening these 
diverse but expert audiences, or even occasionally lend their reputation to government 
officials when they announce proposals.
These potential roles of think tanks have been characterized optimistically, or 
even idealistically, reflecting the majority of the literature written by scholars or members 
of the revolving door themselves who move in and out of think tanks. That does not mean 
that everyone values the roles think tanks can play. In particular, career government 
employees often believe that think tanks merely produce a cacophony of criticism that 
increases the already overwhelming demands on governance. Any fair assessment of 
think tanks can not overlook their potential negative effects, even if the literature does not 
discuss them in great detail.
Potential Drawbacks Think tanks or their employees can sometimes seek to conduct 
government policy themselves. As early as 1798, the U.S. government began its struggle 
with nongovernmental experts. At the time, diplomatic relations with France had been 
severed under President John Adams. Dr. George Logan, a Jeffersonian, went to France 
with a letter of introduction from Adams’s political rival, and met with French officials 
who had previously refused President Adams’s mission. Logan returned to Washington to 
55
report that France wanted better relations with the United States. Livid with the perceived 
interference in their right to govern, the Adams administration responded by passing the
Logan Act, prohibiting any U.S. citizen without authorization to “directly or indirectly 
commence or carry on any correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government or 
any officer or agent thereof, with intent to influence the measures or conduct of any 
foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or 
controversies with the United States.”97
Over 150 years later, President Truman faced a similar problem when a handful of 
American experts went as “diplomatic tourists” to Moscow, and others had entertained 
the visiting Soviet Deputy Premier in Washington. Truman subsequently wrote an 
editorial in The New York Times on January 19, 1959, publicly reminding readers that 
only the President made foreign policy.98 Although these are extreme examples of the 
extent to which nongovernmental experts may go if they disagree with government 
policy, they exist. In fact, they potentially may become more common now, as think 
tanks seek to serve as conflict mediators in a globalized world.99
Domestically, the criticisms that think tanks may wield in public can compound 
the inherent challenges of governance by adding more distractions that governments must 
deal with in the information age. Government officials often resent the swarms of think 
tanks that pile controversy on, complicating policymaking.100 Most media producers can 
find so-called experts from think tanks, willing to enhance their individual stature by 
97 Berman and Johnson, pp. 2-3 
98 Cited in Berman and Johnson, p. 1
99 Haass, p. 8
100 Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, p. 105
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criticizing government proposals.101 Often, the media tends to present two extremist 
views, some of which other experts would not regard seriously, elevating those that are 
willing to say or write outrageous, provocative conclusions that generate controversy, get 
their own name in lights, and raise the entertainment value of the news.102 The general 
public, however, may not always be able to discriminate between the highly regarded 
expert and the provocative extremist.103
Nongovernmental Checks and Balances In the end, one can not generalize about whether 
think tanks improve or confuse policy. It quite simply depends at least on what role the 
think tank plays, and how much is already known about the issue. Ideally, think tanks 
may improve democracy itself by generating public debate and educating the public in a 
free society.104 At other times, such debate risks confusing, undermining, or even 
misrepresenting government proposals, complicating governance and exacerbating the 
inherent conflict between governments that are structured to provide stability and think 
tanks that seek change.
On the bright side, such a tense relationship can serve to prod traditionally staid 
bureaucracies to diagnose a problem in a different way, particularly during periods of 
transformation, or to consider different policies. They can help governments cope with 
information overload by filtering information and presenting it in a useful manner, 
assisting officials who must cope with the daily demands of governance. Think tanks can 
look beyond political cycles to help plan strategically, serve as research brokers to 
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repackage theoretically obscure academic research, or convene a wide array of issue 
experts to discuss issues out of the politically charged limelight. In some instances, even 
if they may be rare, think tanks can provide experts to float trial balloons that the 
government is tentatively considering or provide a forum for officials to present their 
ideas. 
At other times, think tanks may not seek to help governments but may serve the 
public interest by injecting unconventional ideas into the policy process, complicating 
governance but potentially improving policy even if the benefits emerge long after the 
debate begins. Debates themselves may educate the public on public policy. Even 
research may be improved through interdisciplinary connections that think tanks 
convene.
Clearly, the benefits depicted in the literature on think tanks are idealized but that 
is precisely the purpose of this chapter: to explore the roles, channels, and timing that 
think tanks might play. What think tanks seek to do, however, is only half the battle. The 
other half is to consider what is unique about the U.S. system to better understand how 
think tanks, and subsequently transnational networks, may seek to influence Washington 
and how they may fit into that system. 
What Makes the United States Different?
Make no mistake about it. The literature universally concludes that think tanks are more 
influential in the United States than in any other country in the world. This could be 
either because think tanks themselves are more established institutions in the United 
States or because the U.S. system of governance is more responsive to them. Although 
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analytically distinct, the reality is that the two are intertwined and existing literature 
contends both are true. 
For starters, the funding for U.S. think tanks is more secure than anywhere else. 
From the creation of the first U.S. think tanks—such as the Russell Sage Foundation, the 
Brookings Institution, and the Carnegie Endowment, all named after their founders—
philanthropists have been willing to support policy-related research. In no other country 
have the resources for independent think tanks been so richly available.105 The fact that 
the United States has a well developed economy certainly helps; it means that the country 
can afford to have think tanks, unlike some developing countries that have had a difficult 
time.106 But the size of the U.S. economy itself or of the hearts (and wallets) of 
philanthropists are not the only financial incentives to support think tanks. The U.S. tax 
code encourages funding think tanks by making corporate and individual contributions 
tax exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Such a structural 
financial incentive helps create a massive funding source for non-profit organizations 
including think tanks in the United States.107 Partially because of these tax incentives, 
smaller gifts from corporations108 and from philanthropic foundations109 over time 
supplemented the larger financial support of individual benefactors, diversifying the 
financial pipeline for think tanks and enhancing their independence even further.
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Some of the motivations of these financial sponsors reflect the nature and history 
of U.S. democracy and its climate of fierce independence to check the potential tyranny 
of information held by governments.110 Creating think tanks and other similar institutions 
are part of a vibrant civil society to help preserve democracy.111 A free press is a 
particularly vital asset for think tanks, enabling them to criticize government without fear 
of being censored and giving think tanks access to the public, through which they can 
pressure government to change policy.112
Arguably more than other democracies, the culture of American democracy, 
including a limited role for the state and a strong culture of private entrepreneurship, 
helps diversify financial and moral support for think tanks and may help explain their 
relative influence in the United States.113 The literature points to three other aspects of 
American democracy that uniquely facilitates avenues of influence for think tanks into 
the U.S. government: the width and depth of the revolving door, the weakness of U.S. 
political parties, and the independence as well as atomization of the U.S. Congress. 
Although the revolving door was discussed earlier, its relevance here is its 
uniqueness in the United States. Even in democracies such as France and Japan, the 
ability for outside analysts to get jobs in government is limited. These other countries rely 
much more heavily on a permanent, professional civil service. Such separation reduces 
the chances that nongovernmental analysts will have personal connections to government 
officials, narrowing the channels of access to those officials from the outside. This 
110 Weaver, p. 571; James G. McGann, “Think Tanks and the Transnationalization of Foreign Policy,” U.S. 
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division also potentially reduces the substantive ability of think tank employees to advise 
governments because those employees would not have government experience 
themselves. In contrast, each U.S. political transition can mean hundreds of mid-level and 
senior executive branch personnel as well as congressional staff moving in and out of 
government, opening up positions for think tank alumni and potential avenues of 
influence to new government employees.114
Part of the reason that new U.S. government employees might actually listen to 
advice from independent think tanks can be attributed to the weakness of American 
political parties. In this context, calling American political parties weak only means that 
they do not play a strong role in policymaking itself, particularly foreign policy, and that 
party platforms are merely symbolic documents. Parties may very well raise and 
distribute campaign contributions effectively, but in between elections, their role is 
limited.115 In many other countries, such as Germany and Japan, the research and policy 
divisions of political parties provide ideas to political candidates and guidance to 
legislative and executive branch officials. In the United States, the parties do not play 
such a role, creating a void that think tanks and other nongovernmental organizations can 
fill.116
Party weakness also widens the revolving door, since parties are not powerful 
enough to require elected officials to fill senior or even mid-level positions with loyal 
party officials. Although individual candidates will certainly hire campaign staff and 
volunteers once elected, the party itself can not force officials to do so. In fact, Congress 
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reportedly provided a budget of more than $2 million for the 1992 Clinton administration 
transition to help locate and assess potential appointees, including cabinet members, 
between the election and inauguration. Such a budget demonstrates the ability that 
officials have to find the best qualified candidates, not just the most loyal ones to the 
party.117
The relative independence and atomization of the Congress are a third reason why 
even among democracies think tanks are relatively influential in the United States.118
Several dimensions of government structure open the U.S. legislature to outsiders. The 
separation of powers between the President and Congress creates a structural competition 
that leads Congressional actors, particularly relevant committee members, to search for 
independent sources of information and advice beyond the executive branch. When the 
government is divided (with the majority in Congress from a political party other than the 
president’s), as it was for most of the time from 1970-2000, both branches of government 
are even more skeptical and more anxious to find independent sources of information and 
ways to criticize the other.119 Within Congress itself, the U.S. Senate and House operate 
separately and are each powerful in their own right, unlike some democracies which 
effectively have one legislative body. 
Particularly after the 1970s, the atomization of Congress further enabled 
nongovernmental influence. After Vietnam and the Watergate scandal, Congress became 
more skeptical of the executive branch in general and instituted a number of reforms to 
become more decentralized, enabling more independent sources of oversight on future 
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administrations.120 One result was to create a variety of committees and subcommittees, 
empowering a large number of individual Congressional actors, each of whom may have 
their own relationship with nongovernmental institutions.121
The behavior of Congress also changed. Prior to the 1970s, Congressional order 
was preserved by relying heavily on seniority. New members of Congress deferred to 
senior members and followed party advice on how to vote to help secure their party’s 
support for re-election. In the 1970s, the orderly process of seniority was replaced by a 
system that dispersed Congressional authority to many individual members of Congress 
and empowered more individuals who chaired subcommittees and simply didn’t follow 
old rules to defer to senior members.122 Combined with already weak political parties, 
these structural and behavioral changes increased the number of influential Congressional 
members who think tanks could either influence directly, or who might generate their 
own initiatives that think tanks could debate.123
Another result of post-Watergate Congressional reforms increased the number of 
personal and committee staff able to provide research and guidance to Congressional 
members. Each of those staffers, in turn, became a potential person to whom 
nongovernmental organizations could reach out and advise.124 In his research on how 
Congress uses information, then-associate professor David Whiteman explained that long 
before the mid-1990s, when his study was published, members of Congress had expanded 
their own advisory councils, ceasing to make isolated decisions as individuals. Instead, he 
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called these advisors “enterprises” consisting of a member and their associated personal 
and committee staff. Each of those staff members serving on each of the 535 
Congressional enterprises might seek to diagnose problems differently or consider 
alternative policies to respond to those problems. 125 Think tanks, then, could essentially 
act as intellectual mercenaries to a number of Congressional members and employees.126
Although other nongovernmental institutions, such as interest groups, seek to reach out to 
Congress, those groups carry obvious biases, leading their information and advice to be 
viewed skeptically by many. Think tanks, in contrast, may uniquely be perceived to have 
no ulterior motives and be able to provide the objective information Congressional actors 
seek.127 Although some of this independence and atomization may have declined in more 
recent years under a united government (with Republicans controlling the executive 
branch and legislative majorities) and as the current administration has sought to 
recentralize executive power, the U.S. system remains more independent and atomized 
than most other countries.
Although the independence, behavior, and atomization of Congress describe how 
nongovernmental analysts might gain access to one branch of government, they do not 
explain how Congress might use think tanks. In the late 1980s, Harvard education 
professor Carol Weiss published a study that looked at precisely that question, detailing 
the ways that the legislative branch uses external analysis.128 Based on an array of 
interviews with Congressional staff, Weiss concluded that Congress does not use external 
analysis to set broad policy, relying instead on political guidance for that purpose. 
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Congressional members and their staff did, however, use external analysis to help justify 
policy decisions after they were already made, as a source of warning to make sure that 
they or their bosses were not caught off guard by pending policy crises, and even 
occasionally to evaluate the details of specific policies.129
The primary use of external analysis, based on the interviews, was to find 
seemingly independent sources that supported conclusions already reached by the 
Congressional member. In other words, think tank studies could be used as ex post facto
justifications for policy conclusions already reached. This role clearly casts think tanks as 
pawns in a grand political chess game, rather than as the knights or major advisors that 
some may see for themselves.130 Although Weiss’s study was limited to Congress, and 
speculated that the broad policy guidance think tanks seek to provide was more likely to 
influence the executive branch, Congress may not be the only institution that seeks to use 
think tanks to justify decisions already made. 
Weiss found other ways that Congress sought to use nongovernmental analysis. 
Seeking warning about veiled policy problems was the next most common use. 
Congressional staff, according to the study, was aware of many of the publications or 
proposals by think tanks to help insure that their member was not caught off guard by any 
looming policy problem. Finally, think tanks might also provide specific, expert guidance 
about how to write legislative details like what mathematical formula to use to guide 
funding distribution. Other more recent studies have also concluded that Congress is 
influenced by think tanks, or at least that Congressional staffers perceive that think tanks 
are somewhat, although not necessarily very, useful and influential. None of the 
129 Weiss, “Congressional Committees as Users of Analysis,” pp. 426-429
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subsequent studies have looked into foreign policy specifically and frequently sought a 
more general evaluation of whether, not how, think tanks were valuable to Congress.131
Altogether, these are the major reasons explaining why think tanks are credited 
with being more influential in the United States than in other countries. They are both 
stronger institutions and the U.S. government is more permeable to nongovernmental 
organizations. The institutions themselves have been supported by a philanthropic 
tradition, motivating individual donors and further encouraging them with a tax code that 
makes donations to think tanks tax-exempt. That provides a stable supply of funding for a 
variety of competitive think tanks that have been able to operate within the U.S. system. 
Meanwhile, as a democracy, the U.S. system of government has provided a steady 
demand for think tanks to perform the functions outlined in the first section of this 
chapter while they help strengthen U.S. civil society and democracy itself by providing 
informed, free, and independent voices to evaluate government policy. Furthermore, the 
active revolving door into and out of U.S. government service, the minimal role in 
policymaking that American political parties play, and the independence as well as 
atomization of the U.S. Congress all provide opportunities for nongovernmental 
organizations to contribute policy advice and influence.
How Think Tanks May Wield Influence
Equipped with a better understanding of the purposes that think tanks may seek and the 
U.S. system of governance that may uniquely enable them to influence policy, the next 
step is to try to understand how they step into these opportunities provided by the U.S. 
system to achieve various goals or, in other words, how think tanks operate. The 
131 See Whiteman, p. 186, Shulock, pp. 226-244, and Rich, p. 77
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literature discusses it both in broad terms—depicting three different models or general 
types of think tanks—and in specific terms—describing the products, such as reports, and 
channels, such as the Congress, through which these organizations seek to influence 
government. These models and channels may each be useful to serve as precedents or to 
provide maps that might explain how transnational networks can seek to influence U.S. 
policy.
Models of Influence
To this point in the chapter, think tanks have been generalized as diverse actors, 
describing a variety of functions that they could perform while trying to make clear that 
no one think tank necessarily pursues all these goals or uses all the available tactics to 
influence government policy. With this diversity in mind, Brookings scholar R. Kent 
Weaver nevertheless usefully divided think tanks according to how they seek to influence 
policy into three different patterns of behavior or models: so-called “universities without 
students” that seek to provide objective and usually public policy advice, consultant think 
tanks that directly and proprietarily respond to government requests for policy analysis, 
and advocacy tanks that promote a particular perspective on policy issues in public 
debate.132 Although it is possible to generalize that certain think tanks behave more 
frequently like one of the three models, the same think tank could act like an objective 
public analyst on one project (particularly if funded outside the government) and act like 
a consulting tank on another (for a government contract). 
132 Weaver, pp. 564-567; and Andrew Rich and R. Kent Weaver, “Advocates and Analysts: Think Tanks 
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The first model, “universities without students,” probably represents the most 
common stereotype for how think tanks behave. It certainly is how the existing literature 
assumes that they do.133 These first think tanks, such as the Brookings Institution, 
emerged after World War I as the global demand for U.S. involvement in foreign affairs 
increased but the public remained more isolationist. A small foreign policy elite set out to 
educate the public, and to a lesser extent policymakers, about foreign policy.134 In this 
model, think tanks perform independent, non-partisan research and help to define the 
middle ground for what foreign policies are politically feasible. In some ways, its 
employees act like professors without the teaching responsibilities required at 
universities.135 Another way to envision their role is to think of these think tank 
employees as private investigators, seeking to find the truth.
Philosophically speaking, this model assumes that some form of truth does exist, 
in the scientific tradition that Francis Bacon maintained, and could be found if experts 
were simply empowered with time to research and access to inform policymakers. In an 
extremely idealized form, think tank employees in this role might be envisioned as part of 
a Platonic Republic, acting as the advisers that could inform public officials, helping 
them become philosopher-kings and rationalize the often inefficient democratic 
societies.136
In less philosophical terms, think tanks in this model depend on being perceived 
as independent analysts, relatively free of ulterior motives or inherent biases.137 Their 
133 See, for example, Smith, p. 213.
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independence notionally enables them to find and deliver the truth, not obscure it for 
other objectives. Behaving in this manner, think tanks are able to determine their own 
agenda, constrained only by the ability to draw on an endowment or find specific 
funding, and identify topics that they believe experts should be thinking about.
In contrast, think tanks behaving as consulting tanks set their agenda in response 
to requests from a particular branch of the government. This role for U.S. think tanks 
emerged after World War II, when the international system once again placed new 
demands on the U.S. government. It sought help and direct advice from particular think 
tanks on questions that the government asked without the intervening media pressure that 
the “universities without students” generated.138 The most frequently cited example of a 
think tank that often behaves in this fashion is RAND.139
In this model, think tanks literally perform like consulting firms.140  They respond 
to requests directly from a client (such as the government or, in other countries such as 
Germany, a political party) to research a particular problem.141 As a result, think tanks 
that predominantly perform a consulting role do not use the media to pressure the 
government; they have a direct channel of access.142 Although the bulk of the literature 
implicitly or explicitly assumes that think tanks behave as independent actors similar to 
the first model, at least one recent study has concluded that government officials actually 
pay more attention to research conducted by consulting tanks than either of the other 
models discussed here.143 Although this result may initially seem surprising because the 
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media generally pays less attention to consulting tanks or research conducted for a 
proprietary contract, it also makes sense that the government would heed the result of a 
study that it funded without the accompanying public furor.
Because of the financial resources available to the U.S. government, consulting 
contracts are unusually large. On the bright side, this potentially means a large source of 
revenue for tanks behaving in this fashion,144 in addition to the direct channel of 
influence for its findings. On the other hand, it also can limit the intellectual freedom of 
research performed under consulting contracts. The questions asked, or the agenda, is 
determined by the client (the government) not the think tank.145 The answers themselves 
may also be restricted. A consulting tank may believe that the client seeks a particular 
answer which, if not provided, could jeopardize future work and the large revenue 
streams that pay for it.146 Whether future contracts would actually be jeopardized is 
another matter, but the potential conflict of interest exists. 
The third and final model, advocacy tanks, dispense entirely with the idea that 
some form of objective truth exists. Instead, when they behave as advocacy tanks, think 
tanks act like interest groups.147 What these tanks advocate varies, ranging from attention 
to a particular issue such as human rights, to a region of the world such as Africa, or a 
political philosophy such as libertarianism. The think tank most frequently cited in the 
literature as behaving in this fashion is the Heritage Foundation although others such as 
Amnesty International or the Cato Institute also fit.
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This model emerged in the United States in the 1960s in response to ideological 
divisions and a societal call for greater values, not just objective science, in public policy 
debates.148 The sources of these greater ideological divisions in the 1960s are not relevant 
for this study. What is relevant is that this model emerged in response to these societal 
pressures, in part because new funding for nonprofit organizations began to go to specific 
projects that supported one side or another of an emerging ideological debate, rather than 
the institutions more generally.149
If other, investigative tanks are based on a Platonic-Baconian premise that truth 
exists and can be found, advocacy tanks are philosophically based on the ideas of John 
Stuart Mill, who rejected the idea that some absolute truth exists. Instead, Mill conceived 
of a marketplace of ideas.150 Guided by their philosophical principles, think tank 
employees chose their product in this market and engaged in debates to defend it. Rather 
than having the institution itself act as a private investigator to find the truth, think tanks 
in this model behave like lawyers in a public hearing, arguing for their perspective in 
front of a judge (in the analogy, either the public or a government official).
The practical application of this philosophical foundation is that advocacy tanks
devote relatively more of their resources to working through the media, particularly 
compared to consulting tanks that would rely much more on private channels of 
influence.151 Because they use the media and have greater (although still financially 
limited) freedom to choose their own agenda, advocacy tanks are more similar to 
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“universities without students,” but they seek to promote a particular viewpoint, not to 
find an objective truth.
At this point, it is only important to know that these three models for think tanks 
exist and that their characteristics, particularly who determines the agenda and how direct 
the channels of influence might be, could be useful for later discussion of transnational 
networks. In the meantime, examining in more detail the specific ways and times that 
think tanks may most successfully seek to influence the policy process in the existing 
U.S. system may also be useful.
Channels of Influence
Many more sources in the available literature examine the specific channels, or medium, 
that think tanks may use to seek to influence policy. Although it is nearly impossible to 
find direct evidence proving that ideas originating outside government migrated their way 
into public policy, the opportunities through various channels, such as briefings or 
reports, do exist. Through these channels, think tanks might approach the executive 
branch directly, the legislative branch, or use the media to seek indirectly to inform, 
influence, and ultimately shape policy. 
One set of channels think tanks use targets government officials directly. A 
particular channel, the revolving door, has already been discussed. What is noteworthy 
here is its depth. While some may serve as cabinet officials, others also rotate into mid-
level positions, expanding the range of potential jobs into which think tanks employees 
might move. Although the revolving door started with the 1947 National Security Act, it 
developed through the late 1940s and 1950s during the Truman and Eisenhower 
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administrations as more policy advisers were appointed to the NSC, the CIA, the Council 
of Economic Advisers, or the State Department, particularly in the policy planning 
office.152 In the early 1960s, President Kennedy then took the influence of outsiders to 
new heights by flooding middle levels of the bureaucracy with outside appointees in an 
attempt to have more influence over policy, circumventing the perceived stasis of career 
civil or foreign service officers.153
The revolving door allows nongovernmental experts at least two different ways to 
influence policy. The first, and more obvious, is that think tank employees could be hired 
into government themselves. The second, more subtle, channel of influence is that 
employees that remained outside the government had new contacts rotating through 
public service. This increased the chances that a colleague may be in a position of 
influence within the government or, at least, that a friendly ear that might heed advice 
from outside government would hold influence somewhere.154 The U.S. government has 
also set up a number of advisory boards, such as the President’s Foreign Intelligence 
Advisory Board (PFIAB) or the Defense Policy Board, that enable nongovernmental 
employees to have a direct channel to the White House.155 How influential such boards 
are undoubtedly varies from administration to administration, but the point here is that 
they exist.
The revolving door and advisory boards are transparent means of potential 
influence, opened by government itself; other channels are more subtle and initiated by 
think tanks. Government officials from either the executive or the legislative branches are 
152 Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, p. 42
153 Smith, p. 125
154 Smith, p. 113. Also see Mitchell B. Reiss, Remarks to the German Marshall Fund, Washington, D.C.,
December 6, 2004. Available at http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/39495.htm (accessed February 17, 2005).
155 Abelson, American Think Tanks and their Role in U.S. Foreign Policy, pp. 72-75
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invited to attend various conferences or lectures to speak or listen to the proceedings, 
taking in whatever they may, or even to participate in more intimate seminars and 
working groups.156 Warwick University lecturer Diane Stone argues that exclusive 
groups in particular, requiring invitations to attend, facilitate the potential for influence 
by promoting contacts among a variety of people working on similar topics from inside 
government and out, building trust among them over time.157 Stone even goes so far to 
argue that such groups are the “primary means by which think tanks make ideas 
matter.”158
Participation in such groups might not only build trust, but also might give 
government officials a sense of ownership over the ideas. Congressional staffers or 
members, for example, may be more likely to translate those ideas into legislation that 
they sponsor or support.159 Such a process of directly including government staffers or 
senior officials in studies can increase the likelihood that such ideas will become policy 
even as it reduces the likelihood that think tanks will get credit for them, creating some of 
the research dilemmas about how to assign credit for ideas becoming policy identified in 
the first chapter. At the end of the day, think tanks actually serve their own long-term 
interests by shedding credit for original policy ideas, instead giving it to political 
officials. In this way, think tanks may gain a powerful and potentially valuable political 
ally for the long run even if deprived of public credit in the short run.160
156 Abelson, American Think Tanks and their Role in U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 67
157 Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, pp. 122-134
158 Stone, p. 126
159 Carol Matlack, “Marketing Ideas,” The National Journal 23:25 (June 22, 1991).
160 Nelson W. Polsby, Policy Innovation in America: The Politics of Policy Initiation (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1984): 171-172.
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The more traditional, and transparent, way that think tanks are believed to seek 
influence is through the books and papers that they publish. It is a fair question, though, 
to ask how often these publications are read by busy policymakers. The busier the official 
is, the less time available to read, particularly books. Some written products produced by 
think tanks may garner additional influence by generating subsequent debate among 
experts or being condensed into op-eds more likely to be read.161 But the think tank 
community has evolved to adjust to the limited time available for policymakers to read. 
Since the mid- 1970s, and the arrival of advocacy tanks more geared toward public 
debate, longer reports have been supplemented or even replaced by shorter, often one 
page, reports or by oral briefings.162
The compressed amount of time available to read may be more pronounced in 
Congress, where officials have much wider portfolios than most executive branch aides 
with narrower, deeper sets of responsibilities.163 Even staffers, who have relatively more 
narrow sets of responsibilities than Congressional members, reportedly prefer briefings, 
which can be more concise and quickly followed up with direct questions to authors.164
The most efficient briefings for Congress, testifying in hearings, offer an intellectual 
economy of scale, potentially reaching all the subcommittee or committee members at 
once.165
In addition to all these direct channels, think tanks seek to influence policy 
indirectly through the media. Appearing on television or writing op-eds puts indirect 
161 Smith, p. 193
162 Smith, p. 121; Louise Diamond and John McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to 
Peace (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1996): 157; and Abelson and Carberry, p. 682.
163 Smith, p. 194
164 Weiss, “Congressional Committees as Users of Analysis,” p. 414
165 Abelson, American Think Tanks and their Role in U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 71, and Haass, p. 6
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pressure on policymakers to change policy.166 Particularly if an array of experts expresses 
concern about a developing crisis or supports a policy response, it becomes more difficult 
for government to ignore the problem or oppose the policy which that apparent consensus 
of experts publicly supports. In other words, think tank experts help the media define the 
parameters, and even the terms, of public policy debate.167
Particularly with the development of the internet and the emergence of 24-hour 
cable news channels,168 a constant stream of news programs and outlets request experts 
from think tanks to comment on current events and debate policy responses.169 There is a 
danger that frequent media appearances can be overestimated, however, leading some to 
mistake prevalence for policy influence.170 Nevertheless, it may be possible for think 
tanks to generate support for broad approaches or attention to overlooked issues through 
the media. 
In other words, the media can act as a force multiplier, not just defining the limits 
of public policy debate but improving the ability of think tanks to help set the policy 
agenda itself.171 The cliché is that the media may not be successful in telling people (or 
the President or Congress) what to think, but they are successful in telling them what to 
think about. This often means the earliest, agenda-setting stages of the policy process
before policymakers have made decisions and commitments, allowing think tanks and the 
166 Rochelle L. Stanfield, “The Golden Rolodex,” The National Journal 22:10 (March 10, 1990).
167 Goodwin, pp. 25-29
168 Ricci, p. 101
169 Abelson, “Think Tanks in the United States,” p. 119
170 Donald E. Abelson, “Policy Experts and Political Pundits: American Think Tanks and the News Media,” 
NIRA Review (Summer 1998).
171 Abelson, Do Think Tanks Matter?, p. 82
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media to draw attention to issues, diagnose problems, propose policies, and frame the 
boundaries of public policy debate.172
When Think Tanks May Have Influence
The heightened impact in the agenda-setting stage begs the broader question about when 
think tanks are influential in the policy process. Two studies may shed some light on the 
answer. In his previously described study of health care, telecommunications, and tax 
policy, Yale Ph.D. Andrew Rich concluded that “the role of experts tends to be greater in 
debates that take on a high public profile, that move at a relatively slow pace, and that do 
not elicit the mobilization of organized interests with much to lose in the decisions under 
consideration.”173 In the telecommunications case specifically, he found evidence that 
even when special interests are heavily invested in debates, a consensus among experts 
can still be influential in the early stages of agenda setting, confirming the relative 
opportunity available at that time.174
It is, Rich argues, “during agenda setting that think tanks and experts generally 
can often have their greatest substantive influence.”175 Although it may take “years, if not 
decades, to become evident” and “be diffuse and difficult to trace,” Rich concludes that 
experts can make a difference when they warn about problems and recommend solutions 
to them, playing “a critical role in how issue debates take shape and are initially 
defined.”176 Once nongovernmental experts have drawn sufficient attention to a problem, 
they subsequently become invaluable sources of information on that problem for 
172 Weiss, “Helping Government Think,” pp. 10-11
173 Rich, p. 107
174 Rich, p. 148
175 Rich, p. 28
176 Rich, pp. 108, 138-139
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lawmakers or other policymakers who face pressure to learn about this unfamiliar subject 
and then do something about it. In particular, Rich found evidence that experts on health 
care were sought out by policymakers once the issue had developed a high public 
profile.177
The longer that an issue is debated among policymakers however, Rich found, the 
more difficult it becomes to actually influence them. As deliberations proceed, officials 
become committed to positions and external expertise increasingly shifts from being truly 
influential to become ammunition justifying decisions that have already been taken.178
This conclusion is identical to the one that Carol Weiss reached in the late 1980s, 
although Rich takes the additional step of specifying the timing of the shift from experts 
being truly influential in the agenda-setting phase to simply providing ex post facto 
justifications in the policy deliberation phase. Rich certainly acknowledges that it is still 
possible for think tanks to be influential in later phases, but it is more difficult.179
By the time a policy decision is being made, Rich concludes that “the 
opportunities for contributions of policy research were minimal. Frequently, the minds of 
policymakers had been made up. Even more often, though, the specific issues that 
remained to be resolved tended to be narrow provisions that had the greatest 
consequences for interests heavily vested in the outcomes.”180 In other words, the power 
of interest groups becomes greater as policy deliberation proceeds, likely overwhelming 
the ability of think tanks with more limited resources to influence the final decision itself. 
177 Rich, p. 143
178 Rich, pp. 108, 139
179 Rich, pp. 197, 202
180 Rich, p. 146
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In the final stages of the policy process, as decisions are being implemented, Rich 
found that experts become useful to evaluate those decisions, providing “assessment and 
further guidance.”181 In essence, experts once again become agenda setters, raising the 
profile of issues that may have seemed to have been addressed but, in fact, are not solved. 
The policy cycle starts all over again, and the influence of experts is heightened in setting 
the agenda, particularly if interest groups are not opposed.
A second study highlights a particular time in the policy process when think tank 
influence is maximized: during presidential election campaigns and the transition period 
that follows an election. In a sense, every presidential election is an exercise in agenda 
setting. Political opponents raise issues that have not successfully been addressed by an 
incumbent president or their party. In his study of think tank influence on U.S. foreign
policy particularly, University of Western Ontario associate political science professor 
Donald Abelson even concluded that “the best opportunity for think tanks to influence 
U.S. foreign policy is during a presidential election and the transition period that 
follows.”182 (emphasis added) Abelson contends that American presidential elections 
uniquely open up channels for think tank influence not just because of the depth of the 
revolving door and the weak policy influence of U.S. political parties, but also because 
the United States has a predictable electoral cycle, unlike other countries where elections 
may be called by votes of no confidence or, conversely, by the incumbent during the 
181 Rich, pp. 108-109
182 Donald E. Abelson, “Trends in Search of Policy Influence: The Strategies of American Think Tanks,” 
NIRA Review (Spring 1998). See also Abelson, American Think Tanks and their Role in U.S. Foreign 
Policy, pp. 66, 122.
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height of their popularity.183 This allows more time for think tanks to organize and 
engage in the extended pre-election debates.
Specifically, Abelson argues that two characteristics of presidential candidates 
can help predict whether they will use think tanks extensively during the campaign: 
whether they are Washington outsiders, increasing their use of think tanks, and whether 
they are strongly ideological, increasing the likelihood that candidates will rely on 
employees of think tanks if they are, particularly ideologically similar advocacy tanks.184
He found that “Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and other presidential candidates who 
spent little time in Washington before assuming the presidency recognized the enormous 
benefits of relying on think tanks that had many former high-profile policymakers and 
leading policy experts.”185 Anecdotally, former U.S. State Department policy planning 
director Richard Haass also cited the perceived impact of the 1980 Heritage Foundation 
publication, Mandate for Change, which provided a blueprint for the incoming Reagan 
administration, and 1992 publications by a number of think tanks proposing a National 
Economic Council, which was adopted by the Clinton administration, as evidence of the 
influence of think tanks during and immediately after presidential elections.186
In their most basic role during campaigns, experts may identify potential 
problems or suggest solutions to aspiring presidential candidates to consider highlighting. 
Alternatively, the relationship may work in reverse, with candidates proposing the ideas, 
particularly in the early stages of a campaign, and running them by subject experts in 
informal, private settings. Depending on the candidate, experts might be consulted widely 
183 Abelson, Do Think Tanks Matter?, pp. 162-163 and Ricci, p. 123
184 Abelson and Carberry, pp. 679, 684-685
185 Abelson, Do Think Tanks Matter?, p. 125
186 Haass, p. 7
80
or might be limited to campaign staff loyal to a particular candidate. Even doors to the 
incumbent administration itself may open if a think tank’s ideas are co-opted to prevent 
an opposing candidate from using them. In addition to these behind-the-scenes roles, 
perceived experts can play a more public role, endorsing a candidate’s ideas to provide 
expert credibility and validation for them.187
Once the campaign has completed, the floodgates may open up for think tank 
staff, particularly those that volunteered for a victorious candidate, to become part of the 
revolving door either on a transition team or in the administration itself.188 Scholars can 
also recommend other like-minded colleagues from outside government to fill out the 
ranks of hundreds of positions throughout the U.S. government in a new 
administration.189
Other than the agenda-setting stage of the policy process and presidential 
campaigns, a third time when think tanks might be influential is during crises.190 There is 
no question that think tank experts get greater media exposure as they comment on 
developing events. These public appearances, however, may not necessarily mean they 
are influencing policy. Unlike other times when media appearances help raise issues for 
governments to consider, the crisis itself has already set that agenda, particularly in 
national security crises. It seems instead that think tanks turn to the media in a crisis to 
help explain rapidly unfolding events to the public. Although that may boost their long-
term notoriety and credibility in public and policy circles, none of the think tank literature 
speculates on any short-term impact on crisis management. In security policy in 
187 Abelson and Carberry, pp. 679-684
188 Abelson, “Think Tanks in the United States,” p. 120
189 Abelson, Do Think Tanks Matter?, p. 63
190 John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: Harper Collins, 2nd ed., 
1995): 85-88.
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particular, this seems to make sense as governments retreat into classified circles during 
security crises. 
Think Tanks as Models for Transnational Networks
Collectively, think tanks act as public investigators, private consultants, and issue 
advocates to convene interdisciplinary networks, inject new ideas into the policy process, 
debate issues in-depth, and provide over-the-political-horizon perspective through the 
media or directly to legislative or executive branch officials to shake up the inherently 
stabilizing nature of governance. Their potential influence is maximized, although 
potentially overlooked, during the early, agenda-setting phase of the policy process and 
particularly during presidential election campaigns, especially through the revolving door 
if the incumbent loses. The facts that such a revolving door is uniquely deep, that U.S. 
political parties are weak, and that Congress is relatively independent and atomized may 
uniquely empower U.S. think tanks—supported by tax exempt, independent, 
philanthropic funding sources—more than in other countries, even democracies.
These roles, channels, and timing of think tank influence may serve either to 
describe the indirect impact that their transnational cousins, policy networks, have 
through individual nongovernmental members, or serve as precedents to predict how U.S. 
policy or perceptions might be influenced by networks, as another policy-oriented 
nongovernmental organization. Plugged into the four-part research framework devised in 
chapter one, the literature on think tanks both reaffirms a potential agenda-setting role 
(the third part of the research framework) and presents three particular questions about 
the channels of access to government policy (the second part) that may be useful:
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• How do networks incorporate and engage the U.S. Congress? 
• How do networks utilize the media to inform the U.S. public and put 
policy pressure on the U.S. government? and
• How do networks use the revolving door to influence U.S. policy?
Beyond the research framework, the literature on think tanks also points to four 
broad positive roles that networks might serve—to convene interdisciplinary (and, in 
their case, global) networks; to inject new ideas into the policy process; to debate the 
diagnoses of problems and their potential solutions; and to provide strategic, over-the-
horizon perspective—as well as to ask if networks adversely affect or complicate U.S. 
policy. What remains is to test the theoretical framework constructed in these first two 
chapters with three case studies—CSCAP (chapter 3), NEACD (chapter 4), and 
PONARS (chapter 5)—focusing on nonproliferation policy activity within each network, 
and to review the results in a concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE COUNCIL ON SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC
The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) was formally 
established in June 1993 “to contribute to the efforts toward regional confidence building 
and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultations, and cooperation.”191
Originally founded by nongovernmental representatives from ten countries throughout 
the Asia Pacific region, it has since expanded to over 1,000 individual members192 from 
21 national committees, represented by a think tank from each country including 
Australia, China, India, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, each of the ASEAN 
countries, Canada, Europe, and the United States, among others, to become “the broadest 
Track II security organization in the world.”193
CSCAP (commonly pronounced see' skap) has a relatively formal and well-
developed infrastructure that holds four different types of meetings and produces or 
distributes a small number of written products. Business is coordinated and guided by an 
overarching international steering committee, with one or two representatives from each 
national member committee meeting semiannually. A second, larger or general 
international conference has been convened biannually since 1997 to broadcast individual 
views as well as provoke thought and discussion on regional security among all CSCAP 
members in attendance and, in recent meetings, the general public. A third type of 
191 “The Kuala Lumpur Statement establishing the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 
(CSCAP),” June 8 1993, available at http://www.cscap.org/kl.htm (accessed October 29, 2004).
192 Electronic message from Brad Glosserman to author, October 31, 2005
193 Sheldon Simon, “Evaluating Track II Approaches to Security Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific: the 
CSCAP Experience,” The Pacific Review 15:2 (2002): 173. For further details on its history, see also 
Desmond Ball, The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP): Its Record and 
Prospects, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense 139 (Canberra: Australian National University, 2000): 
5-32.
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meeting, working groups “to undertake policy-oriented studies on specific regional and 
sub-regional political-security problems”194 conduct the bulk of CSCAP’s international 
substantive work.
International working groups on maritime cooperation, concepts of cooperative 
and comprehensive security, the North Pacific, and confidence and security building 
measures (CSBMs) were established in 1994 with a fifth working group, on transnational 
crime, added in 1997. Of particular relevance to this study, the bulk of work on 
nonproliferation was conducted in the North Pacific (almost exclusively on North Korea) 
and CSBM groups. In 2004, all five working groups were dissolved with six new 
working groups taking their place: capacity building for maritime cooperation, prospects 
for a multilateral security framework in Northeast Asia, countering WMD proliferation, 
human trafficking, regional peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and enhancing the 
campaign against international terrorism. These and subsequent groups now have two 
years to complete their work unless the international steering committee extends them.
Unlike the first three types of international meetings, the fourth is held within a 
single country. USCSCAP meetings are convened once or twice a year in Washington to 
inform members about CSCAP activities and address any national administrative matters, 
while simultaneously gathering about 40-50 USCSCAP members to listen to one or two 
government briefings and discuss recent events. As of 2004, U.S. membership had been 
granted to about 200 people who expressed interest in joining and were asked to pay a 
$75 annual membership fee.195 U.S. members include nongovernmental analysts from 
universities or think tanks, some of whom are former government officials, and current 
194 CSCAP Charter, Article VIII, section 1, available at http://www.cscap.org/charter.htm (accessed on 
October 29, 2004)
195 Author’s interview with Brad Glosserman, Washington, D.C., December 14, 2004
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government officials in their private capacity, formally labeled “ex officio.” A typical 
USCSCAP meeting itself will start with a briefing on the year’s CSCAP activities, 
followed by a briefing by a State Department official on ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
activities, continue with one or two roughly one-hour panel discussions on recent events 
(often China or North Korea), and conclude with an off-the-record lunch presentation and 
discussion led by a senior government policymaker, usually an assistant secretary or 
deputy assistant secretary (DAS). 
Funds to cover meeting costs have come from a variety of sources, with each 
working group, principally its cochairs, and national committee responsible for raising 
their own funds. Initial money from the United States around 1993-94 was provided by 
the Pew Foundation, and $75,000 a year by the Ford Foundation from about 1994-2000 
to cover both the costs of the U.S.-cochaired CSBM working group and, in addition to 
members’ dues, USCSCAP meetings. More recently, the U.S. Department of Energy’s 
Office of Nonproliferation and National Security has become the primary funder of the 
CSBM working group, “accounting for 90% of support” with an additional $15,000 
provided by the Asia Foundation. A new grant from the Carnegie Foundation was 
provided in 2005 to supplement the DoE funding and cover roughly one-third of the 
countering WMD proliferation working group’s expenses.196
CSCAP also produces or distributes a handful of written products. Eight CSCAP 
memos, the network’s most formal product, have been issued, most recently in April 
2004. Typically reporting a working group consensus, memos are approved by the 
international steering committee and are usually intended for the ARF, although they are 
publicly distributed. Two other products, PacNet and Comparative Connections, are also 
196 Electronic message from Ralph Cossa to the author, August 12, 2005
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electronically distributed to over 3,000 recipients worldwide.197 Both compiled by the 
Pacific Forum, PacNet is a series of weekly editorials and Comparative Connections is a 
quarterly publication systematically reviewing many of the region’s key bilateral 
relationships. PacNet, in particular, was frequently raised in interviews conducted for this 
study and will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Twenty-two original interviews were conducted for this study. As outlined in the 
introductory chapter, interviews were initially sought with staff, funders, participants 
(nongovernmental and governmental), and senior government policymakers. Participants 
(either nongovernmental or governmental) were targeted for interviews if they attended 
two or more North Pacific or CSBM working groups or international steering committee 
meetings, or had presented remarks at two or more USCSCAP meetings.198 Although 
some candidates participated in multiple CSCAP events, such as working groups and the 
international steering committee, table 3.1 outlines the potential interview candidate list 
according to my assessment of their primary CSCAP participation, with no candidate 
counted in more than one category (or box). Some interviews were not conducted either 
because candidates had retired or otherwise could not be found, declined to be 
interviewed (usually because they felt they did not have enough experience with 
CSCAP), or did not respond to requests to be interviewed.
197 Author’s interview with Brad Glosserman, Washington, D.C., December 14, 2004
198 Participants lists at USCSCAP meetings are not collected, so presenters were identified through agenda 
for all USCSCAP meetings from 1997-2005 (including semiannual meetings in 2001 and 2003) which 
were provided by USCSCAP staff.
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Table 3.1 CSCAP Interview Candidates NGO USG Total
CSCAP staff 4 - 4
CSCAP funders 2 0199 2
CSCAP participants 17 10 27 
Attended 2 or more working groups 9 5 14
Attended 2 or more steering committees 4 1 5
Presented at 2 or more USCSCAP mtgs 4 0 4
DASs who participated once200 - 4 4
Senior government policymakers201 - 3 3
Referrals from other interviews 3 5 8
Total 26 18 44 
Table 3.2 presents a matrix of descriptions of the subjects actually interviewed. 
Ten of the 22 conducted were with U.S. government officials, five of whom were 
members of the revolving door but were in government either during the bulk of their 
affiliation with CSCAP, or were in policymaking positions (deputy assistant secretary or 
higher) during at least part of their affiliation. The other twelve interviews were with 
members of nongovernmental organizations, although six of those twelve were also 
members of the revolving door who had government experience before their affiliation 
with CSCAP. In other words, of the 22 interviews conducted, five were with permanent 
government employees (civil or foreign service), eleven with members of the revolving 
door, and six with nongovernmental employees who had not been employed in 
government. Throughout this chapter, opinions expressed in only a single interview will 
199 Although the Cooperative Monitoring Center of Sandia National Labs, and subsequently DoE, funded 
some CSCAP activities, those interview subjects are already accounted for as either government 
participants in CSCAP or as NEACD funders. Although the box in which a candidate is placed is 
somewhat arbitrary, the exact placement is less important since the purpose is simply to systematically 
determine whom to interview.
200 Because of their position in the policymaking chain, deputy assistant secretaries were sought for 
interviews even if they only attended one meeting.
201 Senior government policymakers were defined as senior directors of the NSC staff or Assistant 
Secretaries of State for East Asia and the Pacific. 
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be specifically noted as one person’s opinion (whether cited anonymously or 
specifically). 
Table 3.2 CSCAP Interviews Conducted NGO USG Total
CSCAP staff 2 - 2
CSCAP funders 0 0202 0
CSCAP participants 8 5 13
Attended 2 or more working groups 5 3 8
Attended 2 or more steering committees 1 1 2
Presented at 2 or more USCSCAP mtgs 2 0 2
DASs who participated once - 1 1
Senior government policymakers - 2 2
Referrals from other interviews 2 3 5
Total 12 10 22
In addition to the interviews conducted and a handful of secondary sources 
(bibliography is included in appendix A) that have evaluated CSCAP for their own 
purposes, primary written materials analyzed for this chapter include relevant PacNet
publications; CSCAP memos; a summary of the fourth general conference (the only one 
of the four available); publications from, and the summaries of, meetings from the North 
Pacific and CSBM working groups; and summaries of USCSCAP meetings.203 The North 
Pacific working group held eleven meetings between its first meeting in Tokyo in April 
1995 and its last in Seoul in 2003 with detailed summaries for four, participants lists for 
six, and a detailed agenda for eight meetings either available from the CSCAP website or 
obtained from the Canadian or Japanese cochairs. The CSBM working group held 22 
meetings between its first in Washington in October 1994 and its last in Hanoi in May 
202 Government funders for CSCAP, providing part but not all of its support, who also funded the second 
case, NEACD, were interviewed and are counted in that chapter because of their principal funding role for 
that network but not here to avoid redundantly counting their participation in the study.
203 Notes from the international Steering Committee meetings are not publicly available and generally only 
include administrative matters and condensed summaries of the working groups.
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2004, with detailed summaries for fourteen, participants lists for ten, and a detailed 
agenda for fifteen meetings either available from the CSCAP website or obtained from 
the U.S., Singaporean, or South Korean cochairs. Brief, one sentence summaries 
identifying the primary agenda of all working group meetings are available on the 
CSCAP website. In addition to these interviews and written materials, the author was 
able to attend three of the international steering committee meetings between 2001 and 
2004, and most of the ten USCSCAP meetings between 1998 and 2005.
Having introduced CSCAP’s infrastructure and the primary materials utilized, the 
subsequent three parts of this chapter will present the issues the network has covered 
from 1993-2004, when the original working groups were dissolved; an evaluation of the 
network based on the four-part framework established in the introductory chapter; and 
finally a series of observations and conclusions about CSCAP. The concluding chapter 
(chapter six) will include further discussion comparing the network to the other two case 
studies. This chapter will be limited to CSCAP itself, starting with the issues the network 
has addressed.
Issues CSCAP Has Addressed
A mere eighteen months after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, CSCAP began to 
tackle a multilateral security agenda for the Asia-Pacific. A quick glance at the issues that 
consumed the network’s initial deliberations and the fact that China did not even 
officially join CSCAP until 1996 are reminders of how fluid the Asian security agenda 
has been over the last 10-15 years. Although this study is focused on the influence on US 
nuclear nonproliferation policies and the perceptions that shape them, overlooking 
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CSCAP’s other work would distort the view of its efforts. The first part of this section 
briefly reviews that other work, with a more detailed discussion of the network’s 
nonproliferation agenda following. 
In the early-mid 1990s, the regional security landscape was dominated by 
concerns about how to accommodate the rise of Japan and China, tensions between China 
and Taiwan, and the future of the Korean peninsula. Those issues generally remain today 
but others, such as the potential for conflict in the South China Sea and whether the 
United States would remain engaged in Asia without the Soviet enemy, have significantly 
faded, at least for now.204
In this environment, CSCAP first and foremost simply sought to help build the 
infrastructure for multilateralism in Asia, which didn’t yet exist. Now part of the 
institutional landscape, organizations like APEC (1989) and particularly security fora like 
the ARF (1994), were only just being established. In part, CSCAP sought to provide 
analytical support to the ARF, subsequently struggling throughout the network’s history 
with the question of how closely it should align itself with the official forum,205 a topic 
which will be discussed in greater detail in the observations section of this chapter.
As it mentioned in its charter, CSCAP initially sought simply to establish its own 
multilateral forum for dialogue and to increase regional transparency which could 
“provide reassurance and help build trust and confidence,” as a 1994 CSCAP memo 
204 For early CSCAP-sponsored surveys of the regional security scene and concomitant potential 
confidence and security building measures, see Ralph A. Cossa, “Asia Pacific Confidence and Security 
Building Measures,” (ch. 1, pp. 1-18) and Robert A. Manning, “Building Community or Building 
Conflict?,” (ch. 2, pp. 19-40) in Cossa, ed. Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures, 
Significant Issues Series 17:3 (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995); as 
well as Desmond Ball, “CSCAP: Its Future Place in the Regional Security Architecture,” (pp. 289-325) and 
Jusuf Wanandi, “The Future of the ARF and CSCAP in the Regional Security Architecture,” (pp. 281-288) 
in Bunn Nagara and Cheah Siew Ean, eds. Managing Security and Peace in the Asia-Pacific (Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia: ISIS Malaysia, 1996).
205 Wanandi, p. 284
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argued.206 Dialogue was uncommon at the time, but a necessary foundation for this 
broader agenda of allaying regional suspicions and fears derived from misperceptions.207
Just talking at least initially “may be as (or more) important than the product,” as the 
1994 memo put it. Even in its founding stages, however, CSCAP itself recognized that 
soon “dialogue without a focused, defined purpose can be difficult to sustain and a waste 
of precious resources and effort.”208
To extend transparency further, CSCAP initially tried to promote two particular 
confidence-building efforts: a regional arms registry and the publication of national 
Defense White Papers. The former efforts sought an independent regional initiative, but 
eventually settled for promoting regional accession to the UN Conventional Arms 
Register.209 For White Papers, CSCAP drafted a template, adopted by the ARF’s 
Intersessional Group (ISG) on CBMs, that countries could use as a model for their own 
efforts. Mongolia, Vietnam, and Taiwan subsequently used the draft, and China even 
partially used it for its second and third white papers.210
As the 1990s progressed, CSCAP continued to seek to promote regional 
transparency in two other specific areas, working with the ARF in both cases: maritime 
206 “Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures,” CSCAP Memorandum No. 2 (June 1995): 4. 
See also “The Security of the Asia-Pacific Region,” CSCAP Memorandum No. 1 (April 1994): 3; as well as 
Brad Roberts and Robert Ross, “Confidence and Security Building: A USCSCAP Task Force Report,” ch. 
8 in Cossa, ed. Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures, Significant Issues Series 17:3 
(Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995): 145 for early CSCAP arguments 
in favor of transparency.
207 Ball, “CSCAP: Its Future Place in the Regional Security Architecture,” p. 295; Roberts and Ross, 
“Confidence and Security Building: A USCSCAP Task Force Report,” p. 140; and Paul M. Evans, 
“Assessing the ARF and CSCAP,” ch. 10 in Hung-mao Tien and Tun-jen Cheng, eds. The Security 
Environment in the Asia-Pacific (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2000): 165, 170.
208 CSCAP Memorandum 2, p. 3
209 See Cossa, “Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures,” pp. 10-11; as well as CSCAP 
Memorandum  2, pp. 4-5 for initial CSCAP efforts. Reviews of those efforts include Desmond Ball, The 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP): Its Record and Prospects, Canberra Papers 
on Strategy and Defense 139 (Canberra, Australian National University, 2000): 15; and Simon, “Evaluating 
Track II Approaches,” p. 188.
210 Simon, “Evaluating Track II Approaches,” p. 188. Also see CSCAP Memorandum 2, p. 8.
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cooperation and preventive diplomacy. The network has ventured into a wide variety of 
regional, particular Southeast Asian, maritime concerns such as territorial disputes, law 
and order at sea, smuggling, and piracy,211 working with the ARF, and in one case with 
APEC, to help develop regional maritime cooperation.212 But CSCAP’s greatest success 
has arguably been in the field of preventive diplomacy, where the network’s tangible 
effect is most evident, at least on the ARF. Itself a new concept in the 1990s, little 
agreement existed on what preventive diplomacy actually meant. Some in Southeast Asia 
even feared that this new-fangled idea was simply a way to justify interfering in another 
country’s domestic affairs. Over three days in the early spring of 1999, CSCAP convened 
a workshop in Bangkok with many of its participants immediately attending a subsequent 
ARF CBM ISG on preventive diplomacy. The CSCAP workshop produced a statement 
on “Preventive Diplomacy: Definitions and Principles” to define the concept in a regional 
context, and forwarded it to the ARF meeting.213 Subsequently, the ARF formally agreed 
to a three-stage road map toward comprehensive security for Asia, starting with 
confidence-building, moving through a stage of preventive diplomacy, and concluding 
with conflict resolution.214 Despite the initial success in helping the ARF reach consensus 
211 Simon, “Evaluating Track II Approaches,” pp. 179-180
212 For a description of CSCAP’s efforts working with the ARF on maritime cooperation, see Summary of 
Discussions, USCSCAP general membership/board of directors meeting (Washington, DC, June 14, 1999): 
2; and Ball, The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), p. 50. For APEC, see 
Summary of discussions, USCSCAP meeting, USCSCAP Special Report 10 (Washington, DC, October 24, 
2003).
213 Ball, The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), pp. 49-50. For primary 
summaries of the concerns about preventive diplomacy and the original CSCAP work, see Summary of 
Discussions, Ninth meeting, CSCAP CSBM International Working Group (Manila, Philippines, 12-13 
December 1998): 2; and Summary of Discussions, CSCAP Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy (Bangkok, 
Thailand, 28 February-2 March, 1999): 4.
214 Sheldon W. Simon, “The ASEAN Regional Forum Views the Councils for Security Cooperation in the 
Asia Pacific: How Track II Assists Track I,” Managing Security Challenges in Southeast Asia, National 
Bureau of Asian Research Analysis 13:4 (July 2002): 9. 
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on the terms of preventive diplomacy and adopt it as a regionally desirable goal, 
subsequent implementation by the ARF has disappointed at least some observers.215
Finally, it is worth mentioning recent efforts on terrorism. Within months of the 
September 11 attacks, the CSCAP international steering committee convened a special 
study group on terrorism with the intent of preparing a memo for an ARF Senior Officials 
Meeting (SOM).216 Subsequent efforts, including a March 2003 workshop in Laos,217 and 
a panel as part of the 2003 general international CSCAP conference in Jakarta,218
concluded that CSCAP might best focus its efforts on long-term issues, not short-term 
operational recommendations. Based on this evidence, it seemed that CSCAP’s working 
group on enhancing the campaign against international terrorism may focus on 
investigating, and ideally defining and building consensus around, the root causes of 
terrorism and how to address them. 
Proliferation Issues
Although CSCAP has tackled a range of Asian security issues, the proliferation of 
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction has been on its agenda since the network’s 
inception, particularly because U.S. participants have put it and kept it there. CSCAP’s 
very first memo, “The Security of the Asia Pacific Region,” identified the North Korean 
nuclear issue, a nuclear weapons-free zone in Southeast Asia, and “cooperative measures 
215 Simon, “Evaluating Track II Approaches,” p. 190. See also Ball, The Council for Security Cooperation 
in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), pp. 81-82 for earlier skepticism.
216 Joyce Kallgren, letter to USCSCAP members, “Summary of 2001 CSCAP and USCSCAP Activities,” 
(January 2002): 2.
217 Co-chairs’ Summary Report of the Workshop on “Countering the New Terrorism: Options and 
Strategies for Policy-Makers,” Vientiane, Lao, 25 March 2003, particularly p. 4.
218 See Summary of Discussions, CSCAP Steering Committee (Jakarta, Indonesia, December 6-7, 2003), 
sent as electronic message to all USCSCAP members, USCSCAP Special Report #1, January 12, 2004, p. 
4.
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to control new technologies and weapons of mass destruction, especially ballistic 
missiles, nuclear and chemical weapons” as potential areas to develop confidence and 
security-building measures.219 Those initial efforts were led by U.S. members, however, 
and faced resistance from regional participants. 
CSCAP initially scoped out the potential confidence and security-building agenda 
through a U.S. task force, coauthored by Brad Roberts and Robert Ross, whose findings 
were then presented to the first CSCAP international CSBM working group in 1994. That 
USCSCAP task force even explicitly noted that, “We recognize that many in the Asia 
Pacific do not share the sense of urgency about [unconventional weapons proliferation, 
arms races, and their attendant instabilities] that prevails in the United States.”220 Initial 
efforts focused on getting all regional states to vote to indefinitely extend the NPT in 
1995 as well as join and support other global arms control regimes such as the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR).221 Proponents of CSCAP’s nonproliferation 
efforts, however, discovered that there was little regional support for going beyond 
existing global efforts, just as they had encountered with efforts to go beyond 
conventional transparency measures such as the UN Conventional Arms Registry.222
Roberts recalled that despite the initial regional reaction that nonproliferation was 
“America’s job,” the ARF had by 1997 “adopted a communiqué that gave strong praise 
to nonproliferation well beyond what the U.S. delegation had gone there expecting or 
219 CSCAP Memorandum 1, pp. 1, 5. Discussion of nuclear weapon free zones in both the Korean peninsula 
and Southeast Asia continued in CSCAP Memorandum 2, p. 6.
220 Roberts and Ross, “Confidence and Security Building: A USCSCAP Task Force Report,” p. 152
221 Roberts and Ross, “Confidence and Security Building: A USCSCAP Task Force Report,” pp. 152-155; 
and Brad Roberts, “Evaluating Global Non-Proliferation Instruments,” ch. 3 in Ramesh Thakur, ed. 
Keeping Proliferation at Bay (Jakarta: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998): 60-74; and 
CSCAP Memorandum 2, p. 5.
222 Ball, “CSCAP: Its Future Place in the Regional Security Architecture,” p. 294
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even hoping to promote. Out of this came an even stronger ARF interest in nuclear 
nonproliferation and a decision by the CSCAP working group to focus in on the nuclear 
question: one, because we saw the interest; two, because we saw less interest in the rest 
of our [CSBM] agenda; and, third, because we saw money” available to fund those 
efforts.223
To this day, regional resistance still exists, at least partially because of perceptions 
that nuclear powers need to go beyond nonproliferation and make more progress toward 
their own disarmament, or so-called Article VI issues of the NPT, specifically including 
objections to: U.S. opposition to ratifying the comprehensive test ban treaty, its 
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty as well as subsequent national missile defense 
deployment, and its nuclear modernization.224 The final CSBM working group in May 
2004 even speculated that “indeed, it can be asked if nonnuclear states really see 
proliferation as a problem, at least as far as their national security is concerned. They 
seem more focused on the inequalities in the NPT, rather than the nuclear threat per se.” 
Nevertheless, the report concluded that “states may question the ‘inequities’ in the [NPT], 
but they still appreciate the benefits—both direct and indirect—they get from it.”225
Although CSCAP subsequently has focused its nuclear nonproliferation efforts on 
North Korea, nuclear energy transparency, and export controls, the network initially 
223 Interview with author, Arlington, VA, December 20, 2004. For subsequent U.S. efforts to raise the 
profile of nonproliferation in the region, also see Ralph A. Cossa, “Proliferation and Regional Security,” 
ch. 7 in Ramesh Thakur, ed. Keeping Proliferation at Bay (Jakarta: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 1998): 107-120.
224 Report on First CSCAP CSBM Working Group (Washington, DC, October 11-13, 1994): 6; Summary 
of Sixth Meeting of the CSCAP North Pacific Working Group (Ulaanbaator, Mongolia, 14-16 June 2000): 
4-5; and Report of Twenty-second meeting, CSCAP CSBM International Working Group (Hanoi, Vietnam, 
May 25-28, 2004): 1-2.
225 Report of Twenty-second meeting, CSCAP CSBM International Working Group, p. 4. For earlier 
opposition to the inequity embedded in the NPT, see Summary of Fourth Meeting of the North Pacific 
Working Group (Beijing, November 8-10, 1998): 2.
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considered tackling missile defense, particularly after the August 1998 3-stage North 
Korean missile test but before the September 11, 2001 attacks and subsequent U.S. 
withdrawal from the ABM treaty. In at least June 2000 and June 2001 sessions of the 
North Pacific working group, Chinese participants expressed concerns that U.S. plans for 
national missile defense were actually targeted at China, not at rogue states such as Iran 
and Iraq as the United States had declared.226 Citing the absence of government dialogue 
on the subject, CSCAP considered holding a workshop exclusively on missile defense,227
although it was not held before the 9/11 attacks. At least one participant believed that 
CSCAP was reluctant to focus significant effort on missile defense because they believed 
that major governments, presumably the United States, would not be receptive to the 
network’s advice on the subject.228 Cossa replied that the network did not avoid missile 
defense but put the issue in a broader context about regional missile proliferation until it 
just stopped being an issue.229
CSCAP also had to deal, at least tangentially, with the 1998 Indian and Pakistani 
nuclear tests. Although CSCAP had always been reluctant to bring India or Pakistan into 
the network for fear of expanding the scope of its activities into South Asia, India and 
Europe had both joined as associate members in 1994, and seemed to be on track for full 
membership in 1998. After India’s May 1998 nuclear tests, the CSCAP Steering 
Committee condemned the nuclear tests at their June 1998 meeting, subsequently leading 
226 Summary of Sixth Meeting of the CSCAP North Pacific Working Group, p. 5; and Summary of Eighth 
Meeting of the CSCAP North Pacific Working Group (Paris, France, June 27-29, 2001): 3. Also see 
Summary of Discussions, USCSCAP general membership meeting (Washington, DC, May 8, 2001): 4.
227 Summary of Sixth Meeting of the CSCAP North Pacific Working Group, pp. 6, 8; and Summary of 
Discussions, Sixteenth meeting, CSCAP CSBM International Working Group (Washington, DC, October 
29-31, 2001): 4.
228 Simon, “Evaluating Track II Approaches,” p. 189
229 Electronic message to author, February 28, 2006
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India not to come to CSCAP meetings for a year. Although Europe was granted full 
membership in December 1998, India’s was delayed until June 2000.230
More recently, significant parts of the CSBM working group’s final two meetings, 
including a May 2004 joint meeting with the CSCAP maritime working group, debated 
the origins, effectiveness, international legality, and implications for regional security of 
the proliferation security initiative (PSI), which President Bush had announced in May 
2003.231 CSCAP brought in Lew Dunn, a U.S. nonproliferation expert from SAIC, to give 
a presentation about the origins and intentions of the PSI. Following the presentation, a 
North Korean participant strenuously objected to being targeted by U.S. hostility, a South 
Korean speaker discussed Seoul’s concern that the PSI targeted Pyongyang as well as its 
own technical ability to implement PSI, and other participants expressed their skepticism 
about the initiative’s international legality, including whether it was authorized by April 
2004’s UN Security Council Resolution 1540.
North Korea’s Nuclear Program 
Beyond their work on nonproliferation generally—including promoting accession to 
global regimes, missile defense, India’s nuclear tests, and PSI—CSCAP’s work on 
nuclear nonproliferation until 2004 focused on three areas: North Korea, nuclear energy 
transparency, and export controls. 
230 Summary of Discussions, USCSCAP annual meeting, Washington, DC (May 21, 1998): 2, and author’s 
interview with Ralph Cossa, Washington, D.C., December 16, 2004.
231 For CSCAP’s work, see Ralph A. Cossa, ed. Countering the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
the Role of the Proliferation Security Initiative, Issues and Insights 4: 5 (Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, 
July 2004). Also see Report of Twenty-first meeting, CSCAP CSBM International Working Group 
(Singpaore, December 10-11, 2003): 3; and Report of Twenty-second meeting, CSCAP CSBM 
International Working Group, pp. 6-7.
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A nascent CSCAP was not able to meaningfully engage in the initial 1994 North 
Korean nuclear crisis, when Pyongyang announced its intention to withdraw from the 
NPT and the Agreed Framework was subsequently reached. North Korea (which joined 
CSCAP in 1994) and China (1996) were not CSCAP members yet, and the network was 
dispersing its focus across the spectrum of Asia-Pacific security issues to scope out and 
determine where it might best add value. Subsequently, the initial work on North Korea 
was conducted in the North Pacific working group. Cochaired by Canada and Japan, this 
working group did not hold its second meeting until 1997, after North Korea (which did 
not attend the inaugural 1995 working group meeting) and China had joined CSCAP. The 
group was always “less confident about its capacity to produce policy recommendations,” 
as its own background statement declared, and “tasked with promoting the 
institutionalised dialogue necessary for the development of cooperative policies.”232 It 
was the only one of the initial CSCAP working groups never to put forward findings as a 
memorandum.233
In 2002, North Korea’s nuclear program returned to the headlines with President 
Bush calling North Korea part of the “axis of evil” in his January State of the Union 
address. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly also confronted North Korea in early 
October with evidence of a secret DRPK highly-enriched uranium (HEU) program, 
violating at least the spirit if not the letter of the earlier Agreed Framework, which the 
United States subsequently terminated later that month. Although a U.S. administration 
official expressed frustration that “everybody and their mother has something to say 
232 “Background,” CSCAP North Pacific Working Group, available at http://www.cscap.org/pacific.htm
(accessed October 31, 2004)
233 Evans, “Assessing the ARF and CSCAP,” p. 164, as well as interview B37
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about North Korea,”234 CSCAP’s work shifted from the North Pacific to the CSBM 
working group in 2003 which began, without North Korean participation, to look into the 
network’s possible role including: establishing a working group (which was subsequently 
held) to evaluate progress in each round of the six-party talks; conducting case studies of 
denuclearization in South Africa or the former Soviet republics to evaluate their potential 
application to North Korea; recommending ways to sequence the potential incentives to 
North Korea and their concomitant obligations; or studying and proposing potential 
verification mechanisms.235
At a 2004 CSBM working group at Hanoi, North Korean representatives attended. 
One delivered a presentation, explaining their perception that U.S. hostility had caused 
the current crisis, with subsequent group discussion including questions from Americans 
about what Washington could do to convince Pyongyang that it was not “implacably 
hostile” to the DPRK. Other discussion focused on how to structure a potential grand 
bargain, or package deal, to solve the nuclear crisis including a Chinese participant’s 
suggestion to explore complete, verifiable, irreversible assurances (CVIA) as incentives 
to parallel U.S. demands for complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament (CVID) as the 
formula to solve the nuclear problem.236 After 2004, when the CSCAP working groups 
were restructured, work on North Korea continued in a new working group investigating 
prospects for a multilateral security framework in Northeast Asia.
234 Interview A14 
235 Report of Twenty-first meeting, CSCAP CSBM International Working Group, pp. 3, 5
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Nuclear Energy Transparency (PACATOM)
Throughout the 1990s, along with their work on preventive diplomacy, nuclear energy 
transparency dominated the CSCAP CSBM agenda. Out of CSCAP’s CSBM scoping 
work, nuclear energy had emerged as a regional concern that potentially lent itself to 
multilateral solutions. Unlike most of the rest of the world at the time, Asian countries 
including China, India, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and of course North Korea as well as 
Taiwan were and are heavily investing in nuclear power. Among each country’s 
neighbors, these investments raised a variety of concerns such as operational safety, the 
environment, vulnerability to terrorism, and long-term options for the spent fuel that 
nuclear power produces, particularly if it was plutonium. A common concern was that 
countries might use spent fuel to build their own nuclear weapons.237
Funding was available from the U.S. government, first through Sandia National 
Laboratories and eventually the U.S. Department of Energy, for CSCAP to address these 
concerns “without [the U.S. government] trying to direct the answers,” according to 
Cossa.238 At the time, the U.S. government was not seized with the problem. Bob 
Manning, one of the codirectors of U.S. efforts in PACATOM who subsequently went to 
work in the U.S. State Department, speculated that it was such “a difficult issue 
bureaucratically…. It intersects Asian security, proliferation, and a whole range of 
237 Roberts and Ross, “Confidence and Security Building: A USCSCAP Task Force Report,” pp. 149, 155,
Kazuko Hamada, CSCAP’s NEEG: Exploring Nuclear Energy Transparency as a Regional Confidence and 
Security Building Measure, Issues and Insights 3:7 (Honolulu: Pacific Forum/CSIS, September 2003): v, 7. 
Ralph A. Cossa, PACATOM: Building Confidence and Enhancing Nuclear Transparency (Honolulu, HI: 
Pacific Forum Occasional Papers, October 1998): 7. For specific concerns about Japan’s plutonium 
program, see Robert A. Manning, “PACATOM: A Nuclear Cooperation Regime as Asian CSBM,” ch. 3 in 
Cossa, ed. Asia Pacific Multilateral Nuclear Safety and Non-Proliferation: Exploring the Possibilities
(Honolulu, HI: Pacific Forum Occasional Papers, December 1996): 30-31.
238 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., December 16, 2004
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technical nuclear issues that sort of complicates it bureaucratically.”239 Although CSCAP 
was not the only organization to begin investigating the problem at the time, it did believe 
it could provide a unique forum with “a policy-oriented perspective” where “all current 
and prospective nuclear energy producers can meet together to discuss security-related 
concerns in an unofficial but highly-informed setting.”240
Although managing spent fuel was the ultimate ideal, CSCAP limited its sights at 
the outset. Simply raising policymakers’ and the nuclear energy community’s awareness 
about regional security concerns was the first step.241 More ambitious objectives would 
be sought over time. CSCAP formally defined the PACATOM’s project goals as:
• to identify and articulate, and then help to address or alleviate, nuclear 
energy-related regional concerns;
• to identify and help institute both information collection and dissemination 
and a series of confidence building measures aimed at reducing current 
nuclear energy-related concerns while setting the stage for more 
formalized multilateral cooperation; and
• to assess the feasibility and define the likely parameters of an 
institutionalized regional regime aimed at promoting greater safety, 
security, and transparency in nuclear energy production and research 
operations.242
To begin its work, the CSBM working group identified six potential areas of 
cooperation—safety, energy, research, regional safeguards, the front end of the nuclear 
fuel cycle, and the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle—and concluded that CSCAP should 
concentrate its efforts on safety cooperation and the back end of the fuel cycle, or the 
239 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., December 20, 2004
240 Cossa, PACATOM, pp. 1-2, 13-14
241 Summary of Discussions, Sixth meeting, CSCAP CSBM Working Group (Washington, DC, May 21-23, 
1997): 2; Summary of Discussions, Seventh meeting, CSCAP CSBM Working Group (Fukushima, Japan, 
October 30-31, 1997): 1; and Cossa, PACATOM, pp. v-vii.
242 Cossa, PACATOM, p. vi
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nuclear fuels and other waste by-products that nuclear power produces. Of those two, 
safety was a much less controversial area to begin.243 The goal, however, was to build 
confidence among CSCAP’s participants and, more generally, in CSCAP’s efforts to 
enable it to return to the more controversial and strategically significant back end 
issues.244
At the same time, Sandia National Laboratory’s Cooperative Monitoring Center 
(CMC) had been investigating various technologies that could be used to improve 
regional transparency and security. According to CMC’s John Olsen, who was working 
on Northeast Asian issues at the time, he became aware of CSCAP’s work and contacted 
Ralph Cossa about introducing network members to Sandia’s findings. Although the 
CMC funded these outreach efforts, Olsen said that Cossa and other CSCAP members 
advised the Sandia team how to give the presentation in a regionally appropriate way that 
would not be too pushy. The partnership essentially capitalized on mutual interests in 
improving nuclear energy transparency by marrying Sandia’s technical work with 
CSCAP’s political connections.245
The increasingly technical discussions became a subset of the CSCAP CSBM 
working group known as the Nuclear Energy Experts Group (NEEG). By March 2000, 
the group had designed and posted a website (www.cscap.nuctrans.org) to provide a 
single virtual forum for as much relevant data as they could post, enhancing regional 
nuclear energy transparency. According to Olsen, the site started by displaying airborne 
radiation data, following the CSCAP formula to begin incrementally with nuclear safety 
243 Cossa, PACATOM, pp. vi-vii. For initial scoping efforts, see Manning, “PACATOM,” pp. 29-40; and
Roberts and Ross, “Confidence and Security Building: A USCSCAP Task Force Report,” p. 150.
244 Hamada, pp. vi, 2, 27
245 Author’s interview with John Olsen, Washington, D.C., April 1, 2005, as well as B3
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data that infringed on no country’s national security concerns. In this case, Japan was 
already displaying some form of this data in local communities, while South Korea and 
Taiwan were also planning on displaying similar data on national internet systems. 
CSCAP stepped in to provide a single site combining the data, seeking eventually to add 
other relevant information, such as on research reactors, to enable interested parties to 
learn what was really going on in neighboring countries and try to establish a regional 
habit, or norm, of transparency that others would follow.246 Within three years, the site 
contained at least some data on nuclear energy producers and programs from Australia, 
Canada, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the United States as well as 
Taiwan, including virtual tours of several Japanese and U.S. nuclear facilities.247
Among the website’s contents, the NEEG also developed and placed a template 
for an “Asia Pacific Nuclear Energy Data Book,” which would promote transparency 
among nuclear energy producers.248 Resembling CSCAP’s previous initiative to 
encourage countries to produce defense white papers, these nuclear energy white papers 
went one step further, as they were designed so that they could also be produced by 
interested nongovernmental parties including businesses themselves.249 To this point, 
however, that is as far as the nuclear energy transparency efforts have gone.
Despite continuing efforts to return to spent fuel concerns, such as an 
internationally monitored retrievable storage system (IMRSS) or a regional spent fuel 
246 Author’s interview with John Olsen, Washington, D.C., April 1, 2005. For expansion plans, see also 
Summary of Discussions, Sixteenth meeting, CSCAP CSBM International Working Group, p. 4.
247 Hamada, p. v; and Summary of Discussions, Seventeenth meeting, CSCAP CSBM International 
Working Group (Winnipeg, Canada, May 22-25, 2002): 1.
248 Simon, “Evaluating Track II Approaches,” p. 179
249 Hamada, p. 20; and Summary of Discussions, Thirteenth meeting, CSCAP CSBM International 
Working Group (Washington, DC, May 22-24, 2000): 2.
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disposal site, CSCAP has not been able to reach agreement on how to proceed,250 at least 
not yet. One obvious problem is that no country wants to volunteer to collect potentially 
hazardous spent fuel in their country. In early discussions, China had apparently 
considered offering a potential regional spent fuel disposal site in the Gobi desert, but by 
1998 that option was off the table.251 John Olsen contends that the group was beginning 
to make progress when Taiwan apparently granted permission to have a low-level waste 
site monitored. Although low-level waste is not a proliferation concern, Olsen argued that 
the project would have been “a toehold into the back end of the fuel cycle,” but its 
funding was terminated in 2003.252
One fairly compelling reason why the funding was cut off is that the September 
11 attacks heightened concerns about putting any sort of nuclear reactor information on 
the web,253 although participants protested that none of the information on the CSCAP 
site is uniquely sensitive at all. One CSCAP member argued that 9/11 simply gave 
organizations that were used to being secretive an excuse to withdraw their participation. 
The same member argued that the post-9/11 environment did lead Chinese, North 
Korean, Russian, and Vietnamese participants to be denied visas for a 2003 NEEG 
workshop at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, despite having apparently received approval from 
even the State Department Korea desk.254 Other governmental officials familiar with 
CSCAP, including one previously involved in funding decisions, argued that the NEEG 
250 See, for example, Brad Roberts and Zachary Davis, “Nuclear Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: A Survey 
of Proposals,” ch. 1 in Cossa, ed. Asia Pacific Multilateral Nuclear Safety and Non-Proliferation: 
Exploring the Possibilities (Honolulu, HI: Pacific Forum Occasional Papers, December 1996): 4; and 
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251 Summary of Discussions, Eighth meeting, CSCAP CSBM International Working Group (Washington, 
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was not making enough progress, questions were continuing to be raised about whether 
regional governments would ever allow CSCAP to step into the back end of the fuel 
cycle, and nuclear energy transparency simply seemed to have run its course.255 Interest 
had shifted to a range of other issues like export controls, halting enrichment and 
reprocessing overseas, and counterterrorism.256
Whatever the reason, or combination of reasons, may have been for terminating 
the funding, two of the original leaders of CSCAP’s PACATOM work independently 
volunteered that the broader spent fuel and back end of the nuclear fuel cycle concerns 
are not going away, predicting that the PACATOM concept would be resurrected, 
although presumably not with as much focus on nuclear safety and reactor 
transparency.257 In the meantime, some of the technical experts involved in the NEEG’s 
safety transparency efforts began to put their expertise to work to try to design a 
verification scheme for North Korea as a contingency, if political agreement is 
reached.258
Export Controls
Export controls appeared on the CSCAP agenda as early as the initial 1995 USCSCAP 
task force’s scoping effort on CSBMs,259 but the issue did not really gain traction until 
relatively recently, after the September 11 attacks raised fears of WMD terrorism, the 
August 2003 public revelations of the extent of the A.Q. Khan network and its links 
255 Interviews A20 and B33
256 Interviews B3, B33, and B38
257 Author’s interviews with Bob Manning, Washington, D.C., December 20, 2004; and Brad Roberts, 
Arlington, VA, December 20, 2004
258 Brad Glosserman, “A Verification Regime for the Korean Peninsula,” PacNet Newsletter 19 (May 15, 
2003), available at http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0319.htm (accessed March 9, 2005); and Hamada, pp. vi, 
33-35.
259 Roberts and Ross, “Confidence and Security Building: A USCSCAP Task Force Report,” p. 151
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through Malaysia, and April 2004’s UN Security Council Resolution 1540 required all 
states to put export controls in place.260 In addition, Ed Fei, the former director of DoE’s 
Nonproliferation and National Security office and original funder of CSCAP’s 
nonproliferation and nuclear energy transparency efforts, had moved within DoE to work 
on export controls beginning in 2002.261 The Department of Energy subsequently has 
funded CSCAP to look into promoting Asian export controls even though, as one CSCAP 
staff member put it, “frankly we didn’t know diddly about it at the time.”262
Much of the initial work has been consciousness-raising exercises about the value 
of export controls generally and the specific systems put in place, including presentations 
by participants from the United States, Europe, India, China, Japan, Singapore, and 
Thailand about their country’s export control systems.263 At the May 2004 meeting, 
CSCAP also brought in experts from the University of Georgia’s Center for International 
Trade and Security to outline a potential CSCAP action plan, including potentially 
producing an export control template outlining the elements of an effective regime, 
similar to the model CSCAP had applied to defense white papers and nuclear energy 
transparency. Beyond enabling participants to learn from one another’s efforts, the 
multilateral initiative also sought to ensure that no country would economically benefit 
by implementing weaker export controls or not implementing them at all.264
260 Report of Twenty-second meeting, CSCAP CSBM International Working Group, p. 1
261 Author’s interview with Ed Fei, Washington, D.C., July 18, 2005, as well as B33
262 Interview A11 as well as A20
263 Brad Glosserman, “Export Controls: Fighting Proliferation and Building Confidence,” PacNet 
Newsletter 2003-35A (August 22, 2003), available at http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0335A.htm, accessed 
on March 9, 2005; Report of Twenty-first meeting, CSCAP CSBM International Working Group, p. 5; and 
Report of Twenty-second meeting, CSCAP CSBM International Working Group, p. 4
264 Executive Summary and Report of Twenty-second meeting, CSCAP CSBM International Working 
Group, pp. 1, 4-5 
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Future Efforts 
After the June 2004 working group restructuring, CSCAP planned to continue and 
expand ongoing work in the back end of the fuel cycle, export controls, PSI, and the six-
party talks on North Korea through its new working groups.265 CSCAP also planned to 
consider initiating work on increasing regional accession to the NPT Additional Protocols 
and on developing an East Asian Action Plan for Nonproliferation, loosely modeled after 
a similar EU Action Plan, both of which will be discussed further in this chapter.266
Results
Contacts and Perceptions
Whether CSCAP participation established valuable new networking connections, or 
useful new information or perceptions, often depended on the previous experience of the 
individual participants. The effect it may have had on a think tank researcher is very 
different from a State Department employee who interacts with foreign officials 
regularly. For that reason, this section separately reports the experiences of 
nongovernmental members from government participants, also distinguishing between 
regionalists who focused on East Asia from experts on functional issues such as 
nonproliferation. 
Nongovernmental Contacts Regional experts on East Asia comprise the bulk of CSCAP 
members, with functional or issue experts brought in on particular topics such as 
265 Summary of Discussions, CSCAP Steering Committee, Jakarta, Indonesia, December 6-7, 2003, sent as 
electronic message to all USCSCAP members, USCSCAP Special Report 1, January 12, 2004; and Report 
of Twenty-first meeting, CSCAP CSBM International Working Group, p. 5.
266 Executive Summary and Report of Twenty-second meeting, CSCAP CSBM International Working 
Group, pp. 2-4, 11
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nonproliferation or very specific issues like export controls. A few experts, either 
regional or functional, participate in working groups or even international steering 
committee meetings, but most U.S. members do not attend any meetings or only attend 
the USCSCAP meetings. Nevertheless, even infrequent participants cited a number of 
benefits from simply being members or attending those U.S. meetings.
For some, membership or USCSCAP participation is a way to get credibility 
within the community of American experts on East Asia. In separate interviews, a former 
military officer and a young, rising regional expert said that CSCAP membership and 
participation helped them be accepted into the community and, in one case, even affirmed 
in their own mind that they belonged.267 For the majority of regional experts, however, 
CSCAP has not established new contacts among Americans but helped maintain old 
ones.268 One member said that when they were an academic outside Washington, the 
USCSCAP meetings were particularly important to get up to speed on U.S. politics and 
policy toward Asia.269 But this benefit seemed to be rare because travel funds are not 
available, and most attendees end up being those already based in Washington. 
Occasionally, those members said they would get to know someone from government 
better, or meet a young, rising scholar. Mostly, CSCAP has provided a network to meet 
periodically with old friends. 
CSCAP distributes the Pacific Forum’s PacNet weekly newsletter, which was 
cited as a useful tool to create a virtual network.270 One cited its utility to enable members 
from either the United States or Asia to share their findings and impressions of recent 
267 Interviews A8 and A9
268 Interviews A2, A3, A5, A7, A12, and A18
269 Interview A5 
270 Interviews A6, A12, and B37
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trips in the region, or their perceptions of recent developments, with the whole PacNet
network on a weekly basis without having to be physically in the same room or even city 
together. The key to a piece’s value, in their mind, was who wrote it, with a small set of 
well-respected authors being the most worthwhile.271 Another cited the ability to keep up 
on other parts of the region, particularly Southeast Asia, which they did not follow as 
closely and could get from very few other places, such as the Asia Times or the Far 
Eastern Economic Review.272 Both these members also cited PacNet’s role in facilitating 
regional security debates, such as whether President Clinton should have gone to North 
Korea at the end of his administration, by sparking responses and subsequently printing 
dissenting pieces for the entire, 3,000-person audience. 
For functional specialists who do not focus on East Asia, CSCAP’s overall value 
is different: they do meet new people, mostly the Asian regional experts. One member 
described it as an opportunity for “one-stop shopping for getting up to speed on what the 
currents in the region are, [and] what the concerns in the region are,”273 while another 
cited CSCAP uniquely as the only venue they have seen “that compels the regionalists to 
come together with the security generalists.”274 Some generalists simply benefited from 
meeting American experts on Asia, but others also had the opportunity to meet people 
from the region itself. For example, after CSCAP’s May 2004 CSBM working group 
meeting on export controls, one nonproliferation expert said they not only learned about 
Southeast Asia’s efforts, which they did not know existed, but they began to think of 
271 Interview A12 




Singapore “taking the lead in helping their neighbors strengthen their export controls…as 
an interesting model that you could try in other regions…”275
While some CSCAP benefits are different for regional and functional experts, 
other values are cited by nongovernmental participants generally, including the network’s 
role facilitating connections across the Pacific. Both regional and functional members 
cited CSCAP as the vehicle through which they met many government and pseudo-
government, or think tank, officials from Asia. Although it varies from country to 
country, Asian think tanks typically behave more like the consulting tanks described in 
chapter two, more similar to an organization like RAND in the United States, which 
receive significant amounts or even all its money and projects from a part of that 
country’s government. Many of the host think tanks that make up the 21-member CSCAP
network are the national foreign ministry’s think tank, giving CSCAP members some 
access into Asian governments and their perspectives, at least in their foreign 
ministries.276
In particular, members valued CSCAP’s ability to introduce them to Chinese 
experts.277 In the early 1990s such contact was rare to nonexistent. As China has engaged 
the region, CSCAP has provided a base through which China’s security policy experts 
can reach out to both Asians and Americans, with CSCAP activities actually serving as a 
catalyst for additional follow-on opportunities. John Olsen from Sandia’s CMC, for 
example, cited the years of interaction through CSCAP as the reason why a Chinese 
visiting fellow was subsequently allowed to do a six-month study on counterterrorism 
275 Interview A22 
276 Interviews A14, A16, and A22
277 Interviews A15, A16, and A27
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cooperation at CMC.278 An annual bilateral Sino-US nongovernmental security affairs 
network, co-hosted by CSCAP director Ralph Cossa and a Chinese scholar, has also been 
established. In addition, Brad Roberts said that he was able to use his CSCAP 
connections to invite Chinese scholars to participate in a global security cooperation 
project among analysts from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, 
held at Wilton Park from 1999-2001.279
Nongovernmental Perceptions and Information Even when CSCAP helped establish 
some connections, the question remains: why are they valuable? One benefit cited by 
CSCAP members was that it gave them a forum to explain U.S. policy and its intent to 
analysts from Asian think tanks. In some cases, such as PSI, this was the explicit purpose 
of CSCAP’s work: to further explain the U.S. initiative to the region, CSCAP brought 
Lew Dunn to brief a CSBM working group.280 In other cases, individual U.S. members 
took the initiative themselves. One former military officer, for example, felt that after the 
2000 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was released “in Asia and the United States, 
people had missed some of the key elements of what the QDR was saying in so many 
words about Asia.…I was essentially in the mode of instructing, or giving my 
interpretation, of what the administration was thinking about Asia.”281
A second value cited was that CSCAP enabled members to integrate views from 
across the region, building a broader picture of Asian security threats and challenges. It 
enabled members to transcend countries—broadening those who generally attended 
278 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., April 1, 2005
279 Interview with author, Arlington, VA, December 20, 2004
280 Interview A16 
281 Interview A8
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bilateral meetings on just Korea, Japan, China, Taiwan, or Southeast Asia—and issues—
such as maritime security, nonproliferation, or even more specific issues like the nuclear 
industry or export controls. Country or issue specialists could therefore use CSCAP to 
help look outside their issue and put it in a larger context, while regional or global 
security generalists could use the network to help them see how certain security 
challenges interrelate and construct those bigger pictures.282
The third benefit was simply the bits of information derived from attending 
CSCAP events in Asia for those who were able to travel. To some, the connections 
enabled members to elicit regional perceptions. At a CSBM working group, for example, 
a Chinese member gave a presentation about the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO)—a multilateral organization founded by China, Russia, and four Central Asian 
states—that had been perceived to seek to balance U.S. influence in the region. The 
presentation sought to explain the history and purpose of the SCO, presumably to assuage 
some of the U.S. concerns.283 One member also recalled a discussion with a Chinese 
nongovernmental participant about North Korea, leading them to conclude that Beijing 
ultimately might live with a nuclear DPRK.284
Beyond those few who were able to travel for CSCAP events, members also cited 
the USCSCAP meetings as useful places to gather information by discussing and 
comparing notes on recent events,285 particularly three types: crises, regional domestic 
political changes such as elections or generational transfers of power, and high-level 
government visits including summits. Ten USCSCAP meetings were held from 1998, 
282 Interviews A1, A9, and A16 
283 Report of Twenty-first meeting, CSCAP CSBM International Working Group, p. 3
284 Interview A11 
285 Interview A9
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when discussion panels were first convened in this forum, through the summer of 2005, 
with each holding one or two discussion panels usually on China or Korea. Table 3.3 
shows that all 10 USCSCAP meetings included panels on crises (4 of 10), the foreign 
policy implications of domestic political changes in the region or the United States (6 of 
10), or recent or upcoming summits, high-level meetings, or negotiations (5 of 10). 
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Table 3.3
USCSCAP Meetings Panel Title(s) Crises Political Changes High-Level Visits
1998 China roundtable
Korea roundtable
Deng died (PRC) 286
Impact of Asian 
financial crisis287




After Jiang to US but 
before Clinton to PRC288




2000 Cross-Strait Relations ROC elects Chen Shui-
Bian
May 2001 Implications of “Spy 
Plane Incident”
EP-3 incident
Nov 2001 Implications of War on 




PRC 2002 transition289 Bush keeps trip to 
APEC after 9/11
2002 US Asia Policy after the 
Bush Visit
Bush’s Asia Trip: How 
Successful Was It? 
(Non-US Views)
Bush visit to Asia
May 2003 Developments on the 
Korean Peninsula
US-China Relations: 
Impact of Domestic 
Developments
ROK elects Roh
Hu Jintao (PRC) 
acceded 
Political impact of 
SARS in PRC290
Roh (ROK) to US
Oct 2003 Recent Developments on 
the Korean Peninsula
First six-party talks
2004 US-China Relations: 
Impact of Taiwan and 
Korea 
Changes in Japanese 
Defense and Security 
Policy
ROC re-elects CSB
May 2005 Nationalism in Northeast 
Asia
Anti-Japanese riots in 
PRC
286 Summary of Discussions, USCSCAP annual meeting (Washington, DC, May 21, 1998): 3
287 Summary of Discussions, USCSCAP annual meeting (Washington, DC, May 21, 1998): 3
288 Summary of Discussions, USCSCAP annual meeting (Washington, DC, May 21, 1998): 2
289 Summary of Discussions, USCSCAP general membership meeting (Washington, DC, November 2, 
2001): 2
290 Summary of Discussions, USCSCAP general membership meeting (Washington, DC, May 15, 2003): 2
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Why these discussions may be valuable to members is another story. One reason 
cited is because the USCSCAP meetings serve as a clearinghouse for members who had 
recently traveled to the region to share their perceptions and experiences, relaying 
perspectives from the region to other U.S. members.291 One expert on China particularly 
remembered a 1999 USCSCAP discussion where attendants compared their impressions 
from visiting China after the Belgrade embassy bombing with others who had traveled at 
about the same time, with experts reaching different conclusions about how people in 
China perceived the bombing, namely whether it was accidental or deliberate.292 Others 
cited the value of the opportunity simply to debate recent events with smart people and 
learn from them.293 Although many interviewed seemed to believe that CSCAP provided 
a uniquely valuable forum for these debates, either because of the intellectual quality of 
the participants in USCSCAP meetings or the breadth of the network,294 a few questioned 
whether these types of exchanges didn’t happen around town all the time, even if CSCAP 
was valuable.295
What experts may do with the information varies. In fact, when pressed, most of 
those interviewed could not spontaneously come up with specific examples of 
information they gathered or how that information may have changed projects they 
worked on or their perspectives on issues. Although some did—such as the recollection 
of the 1998 Belgrade embassy bombing debate or the nonproliferation expert who 
thought about exporting Singapore’s model of leading regional export controls to other 
areas of the world—members seemed to believe that the threads of information from 
291 Interviews A6 and A7
292 Interview A7
293 Interviews A6, A7, A11, and A14
294 Interviews A1, A11, and A15
295 Interviews A6, A12, and A14 
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regional contacts, peers’ recent trips to the region, and thoughtful debates about recent 
events such as crises, political changes, and summits weaved their way into a 
professionally useful tapestry for those nongovernmental members. 
A final, significant value mentioned by U.S. nongovernmental members is the 
opportunity to be briefed at USCSCAP meetings by U.S. government officials about 
regional policy and recent events, as well as the opportunity to ask them questions in an 
off-the-record setting among about 40 experts.296 Some cited the unique opportunity to be 
briefed by a State Department official about ARF activities or policy toward Southeast 
Asia, which gets very little attention elsewhere.297 One member recalled gaining greater 
insight into U.S. government perceptions, remembering a State Department official 
presenting a fairly benign impression of a Chinese-sponsored vice defense minister’s 
meeting among Asian countries, which had previously raised concerns in Washington 
because it excluded the United States.298 Another member simply valued meeting some 
U.S. officials in person, in at least one case gaining new respect for an official with 
whom they nevertheless disagreed.299 Overall, however, subjects valued the opportunity 
to get beyond talking points, which government officials used with the media, to 
understand the intent and process behind U.S. policy. USCSCAP essentially provided a 
halfway house between the bland policy statements for public consumption and the gold 
mine of information potentially generated from private one-on-one conversations with 
government officials if they personally knew and trusted individual analysts.300
296 Interviews A1, A7, A8, A11, and A12 
297 Interviews A6, A7, and A9 
298 Interview A7 
299 Interview A12 
300 Interviews A7 as well as A1
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U.S. Government Participants From its conception, CSCAP viewed including 
government participants in their private capacities as particularly important, both to 
increase the influence of network activities and to secure government funding for 
them.301 As it turns out, these government participants also valued CSCAP, but for 
different reasons than their nongovernmental counterparts. For some permanent 
government employees (in the civil or foreign service), CSCAP introduced them to 
experts outside the U.S. government, either from the United States or other countries, and 
even in some cases to foreign diplomats, particularly for U.S. government officials who 
were not in the foreign service.302 Within the United States, while one U.S. official cited 
the value of subsequently being able to call on individual analysts for “ideas and 
input,”303 another conversely cited that USCSCAP was the only opportunity they had to 
interact with U.S. nongovernmental regional experts.304 Either way, the contact was 
perceived to be valuable.
Although one might think that criticism from nongovernmental experts might be 
perceived as annoying or frivolous, some officials valued the sanity check on U.S. policy, 
soliciting smart opinions and feedback on how it is perceived outside of government.305
One former deputy assistant secretary said that even hearing the types of questions that 
U.S. experts were asking at a USCSCAP meeting gave them a sense of what concerns 
existed outside government.306 Government officials interviewed also believed that the 
experience of many USCSCAP members who were former government officials, or part 
301 Ball, The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), p. 6
302 Interviews A20, A28, B1, and B36
303 Interview A28 
304 Interview A20 
305 Interviews A17, A18, A20, A22, and A28 
306 Interview A18 as well as B1
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of the revolving door, made them more useful either because they still had security 
clearances or because they understood what type of information and ideas were relevant 
to government officials as well as the political constraints they operated within.307
A second value cited by government officials is that these nongovernmental 
experts have become informal extensions of the U.S. intelligence and diplomatic services, 
conveying opinions and feedback from the region to U.S. government officials that those 
officials cited as useful, in some cases even better than what they received through 
official government channels.308 One former deputy assistant secretary explained “you’re 
overestimating intelligence….Actually getting out and having a lot of conversations with 
people is very valuable, and it’s remarkable how little of it is done in government….They 
just don’t do as much of these things as they should do.”309 In other words, as another 
former deputy assistant secretary elaborated, CSCAP members provide human 
intelligence: 
[A] lot of these people have very good contacts and channels of 
communication, and are certainly experienced and skilled enough to put 
analysis into their communication in a way that even people in the 
intelligence community can’t.…[E]veryone is capable of human 
intelligence if they have a good conversation with somebody who is 
actually in the know and is willing to come back and report it in some 
fashion. Certainly a lot of the participants in CSCAP are able to do that.310
One nongovernmental member reasoned that CSCAP members can get beyond 
foreign ministry contacts that the diplomatic corps seem to rely on, going deeper into 
society to the foreign policy elite at think tanks and universities, the military, influential 
307 Interviews A4 and A28 
308 Interviews A3, A4, A5, A18, A20, B36, and B301 
309 Interview B36
310 Interview A18 
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interest groups, the party in countries like China, or the younger generations that are 
increasingly shaping foreign policy throughout Asia.311 Why the foreign service does not 
have contact with these people is unclear, but one former government official suggested 
that the “transaction cost”—such as filling out clearance forms and receiving approval 
before official meetings, and then filing reporting cables after—of formal contacts is so 
burdensome that officials become “myopic.”312 USCSCAP members have stepped into 
that void, relaying their findings back to U.S. government officials without all the 
clearance and reporting requirements. One career government official, however, argued 
that e-mail has helped government officials break down those narrow corridors to other 
countries, enabling U.S. officials to “have offline conversations with people in other 
countries, in other agencies, without going through the embassy.”313
A second potential value to the intelligence provided is that nongovernmental 
CSCAP members can also provide a wider regional array of information, integrating the 
perceptions of countries throughout Asia not just from one U.S. bilateral relationship. 
One former government official explained that the Department of “State and embassies 
are organized to bilaterally approach problems which are increasingly global and 
regional.”314 Those in CSCAP that focused on the whole region were cited as being able 
to see the big picture and integrate, for example, Chinese and Korean perceptions on 
U.S.-Japanese bilateral issues to U.S. officials focusing on Japan.315
Beyond providing deeper and wider intelligence, a third value cited is that 
nongovernmental members can provide blunter, or more honest, perceptions than that 
311 Interview A7 
312 Interview A5 
313 Interview A4 
314 Interview A5 
315 Interview A4 
120
available through official channels. This information might be relayed either directly 
from the region at CSCAP events or, more often, indirectly through U.S. 
nongovernmental members. One member of the revolving door said that they would “get 
a certain presentation of the facts” when they were in government. “[P]eople will tell you 
things that you want to hear or, a better way to put it, avoid telling you things you don’t 
want to hear….You’re more likely to hear it when you’re out of government.”316 In at 
least one other case, a government official felt that their own participation in CSCAP 
helped them really understand regional concerns about U.S. policy: “I mean I had read 
things and heard things but it was really…you could feel it. It came across very clearly. I 
had heard it previously through press reports. I had not heard it through official channels. 
Officially, countries downplay that kind of stuff. You don’t get in people’s faces 
officially.”317
U.S. Government Regional Engagement At its most basic level, CSCAP can even 
provide a forum to demonstrate U.S. engagement in the region.318 In other words, 
government officials do not just passively listen at CSCAP meetings, but some have also 
actively used CSCAP as a forum: to conduct public diplomacy, clarifying and explaining 
U.S. policy to help shape the regional security agenda; to test run ideas or unofficially 
develop contingency plans for regional relations; and to help manage relations with North 
Korea and to a lesser extent Taiwan, neither of which have had official diplomatic 
relations with the United States. 
316 Interview B36
317 Interview A20 as well as B36
318 Interviews A13 and A14
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Although at least one senior government policymaker felt that official diplomatic 
interactions made track-two public diplomacy superfluous,319 others at lower levels felt 
that government messages could usefully both be expanded to overseas elite foreign 
policy scholars and even reinforced directly with officials through unofficial contacts. 
CSCAP allowed U.S. participants to explain existing U.S. policy, such as Lew Dunn’s 
presentation on PSI. Clearly, any U.S. nongovernmental experts would have to generally 
agree with U.S. policy to be useful to the U.S. government but, in cases where they do, 
CSCAP provides an opportunity to clear up misconceptions, such as whether the PSI 
violates international law, and in some ideal cases even hopefully to get others to agree 
with it.320 Although CSCAP has not eliminated initial regional opposition to the PSI, it 
can be, as Dunn said, “one more drop of water on the rock” of those perceptions.321
In South Korea, there is even a circumstantial paper trail that CSCAP might have 
affected Seoul’s deliberations. Several weeks after the May 2004 CSCAP CSBM 
working group in Hanoi discussed PSI, a South Korean government-affiliated think tank, 
IFANS (the Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security) published a paper 
encouraging Seoul to join.322 The author that wrote the paper had attended the CSCAP 
meeting and, according to one CSCAP staffer, “there are many parallels” between the 
CSCAP discussion and the South Korean document.323 Although this is far from 
definitive evidence that CSCAP changed the mind of the South Korean author, much less 
Seoul which has yet to officially fully support PSI, it seems that the CSCAP meeting 
319 Interview A17 
320 Interviews A18 and A20 
321 Interview with author, Arlington, VA, February 2, 2005
322 "Recent Developments in PSI and Key Issues," IFANS Policy Brief No. 3 (Seoul, South Korea: October 
2004).
323 Interview A13 as well as A11
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might have provided at least additional ammunition or an opportunity for the author to 
preliminarily test his own thinking on the subject. 
Occasionally, U.S. government officials themselves may even use the forum to 
brief about U.S. policy. In May 1997, for example, Secretary of Defense Cohen used a 
CSCAP CSBM working group meeting in Washington with about 100 participants to 
brief the recently-concluded Quadrennial Defense Review to a foreign audience for the 
first time.324 Cossa emphasized that although CSCAP does not necessarily defend U.S. 
policy all the time, the key is that it does provide a forum to explain it and to elaborate on 
U.S. policy, dispelling rumors and misconceptions: “if they don’t like it, it’s at least for 
the right reasons.”325 In some cases, government participants even mentioned that 
CSCAP provided an opportunity to brief its own domestic nongovernmental experts at 
USCSCAP meetings, particularly on issues like ASEAN or the ARF which do not get as 
much public attention,326 although another former government official argued that those 
opportunities were not as unique with the advent of electronic communications.327
Government support, however, is primarily geared toward the region itself. As a 
particularly ambitious form of public diplomacy, one CSCAP staffer explained that the 
network provides a mechanism to help set the regional security agenda and frame issues 
for regional consumption: “What we see as our role at Pacific Forum and what CSCAP is 
as far as we’re concerned is a vehicle to get these agenda issues on….How do you get 
that [issue] to the right people’s attention, and how do you keep their attention once 
324 Summary of Discussions, USCSCAP Board of Directors Meeting (Washington, DC, October 22, 1997): 
1.
325 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., December 16, 2004
326 Interviews A4 and A17 
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123
you’ve got them…”328 While at first this may sound sinister to some, that is neither its 
intent nor its apparent result. The key for CSCAP staff is to see if the network can help 
frame the issue in a way that truly addresses regional concerns.
One example is the basics of nonproliferation itself: while many regional 
governments and analysts want to talk about nuclear disarmament among the declared 
nuclear powers, the United States may want to talk about counterproliferation options to 
deter new proliferating states. The solution: CSCAP provided a regional forum to take a 
step back and discuss WMD threat perceptions, helping to build a consensus among U.S. 
and regional foreign policy elite on the threat so that further action can be taken later. 
While that example is obviously broad, other more specific empirical examples emerged, 
such as CSCAP’s work on developing a contingency plan if the six-party talks were 
successful for North Korean verification measures, raising awareness of their difficulties 
or investigating what it might mean to apply the “Libyan model” to North Korea. While 
ideally the role CSCAP plays is to help clarify misperceptions or to build a regional 
consensus, in some of these other cases the network might simply more precisely define 
areas of disagreement so that alternate solutions could be found.329
Although this study did not include interviews with foreign subjects, what is 
remarkable is that there is almost no evidence that Asian participants dismissed CSCAP 
as a U.S. tool despite the transparency of U.S. government funding, giving it plenty of 
potential to be perceived as controlling the network’s agenda. Although one U.S. 
nongovernmental participant expressed some concerns about whether the region was 
328 Interview A11 as well as A20
329 Interview A11 
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actually interested in the U.S. agenda,330 most did not. In fact, at least one U.S.
governmental participant believed that because Cossa was so transparent about the 
funding source, he helped build trust in the network and in Cossa himself, assuaging any 
concerns about government cooption while pre-empting the nightmare that the funding 
source might somehow be revealed later, destroying trust in the network.331 One CSCAP 
staffer pointed out that the funding actually also gave participants confidence that 
network findings were more likely to be influential in the U.S. government, since they 
had a captive (paying) audience.332 Another CSCAP staffer said that the fact that the 
number of Americans attending meetings was not disproportionately larger than other 
countries, and that those Americans rarely agreed with each other, probably helped 
assuage concerns that a U.S. agenda was being forced on the region.333 Another former 
governmental participant explained that CSCAP was careful to have two cochairs, one 
from Southeast Asia and from another country, who rotated, helping to reinforce the 
perception that CSCAP was led by its members, not by Washington.334 Perhaps most 
importantly, every indication is that Cossa does actually control the agenda within broad 
Department of Energy-defined parameters such as nonproliferation or export controls, 
allowing him to more specifically set the agenda with input from regional participants 
while avoiding some subjects that are simply too controversial to yield agreement.335
Finally, at the end of the day, the reality is that CSCAP does not have the capability to 
brainwash members. In fact, as the previously-mentioned Chinese presentation on the 
330 Interview A9 
331 Interview A20
332 Interview A11 
333 Interview A13 
334 Interview A1 
335 Interviews A11 and A20 
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Shanghai Cooperation Organization demonstrates, public diplomacy is a two-way street, 
allowing the regional foreign policy elite from countries like China and South Korea to 
explain as well as clarify their perceptions and policies to its neighbors and the United 
States,336 while providing participants on both sides of the Pacific the opportunity to 
engage in discussion and debate no matter who funds the network’s operations.
Beyond public diplomacy and regional issue framing, CSCAP also provided a 
forum for U.S. government participants to unofficially discuss and test ideas, as the 
theory in chapter two predicted. Although no government officials interviewed for this 
study offered specific examples that they injected into the network, many mentioned that 
CSCAP allowed them to “float ideas in a much more informal atmosphere,”337 “to test 
the art of the possible” that higher-level officials “don’t have the time or interest” to 
consider,338 “to brainstorm,” or as a forum for “exploring ideas that are not ready for 
prime time.”339 At face value, the inclination might be to believe that these officials are 
referring to previews of dramatic changes in U.S. policy, such as whether to bilaterally 
engage North Korea or to consider changing the U.S. one-China policy.340 The reality is 
much more incremental and might better be described as contingency planning for future 
political changes, such as the work that CSCAP did on what verification regimes or 
security assurances for North Korea could specifically look like if general political 
agreements were reached. One government participant explained that:
It relieves the doom and gloom a little bit and allows people to imagine 
that there could be a solution….That’s where you have people daring to 
336 Interview A20 
337 Interview A28 
338 Interview A2 
339 Interview A20 as well as A28 and B33
340 Interview A18 
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imagine what if we could solve this mess: how would we implement it, 
what would it look like, who would pay what, how would you verify it, 
what would be the nature of the security assurance, would it be a treaty, 
would it be multilateral, would it be bilateral, would it be a UN blessed 
thing or not, would it involve the IAEA or not. That’s where the concrete 
visioning is going on: to imagine a brighter future.341
Finally, some government participants also valued their ability to use CSCAP to 
manage relations with entities with whom the United States has no official diplomatic 
relations, particularly North Korea. Although Taiwan is another possibility and one 
government policymaker even mentioned that they thought they met the man who would 
eventually become Taiwan’s Foreign Minister at a CSCAP meeting,342 Taiwanese 
participation at CSCAP has been limited. By the terms of China’s 1996 agreement to join 
CSCAP, only a few individuals from Taiwan have been allowed to participate in working 
groups with subsequent network participation to be decided by all members of the 
CSCAP Steering Committee, including China.343
In contrast, North Korean participation is encouraged and sought by CSCAP. 
Although some government officials had misgivings about CSCAP providing North 
Korea a public diplomacy forum (a potential drawback which will be discussed later in 
this chapter), one government official who worked on nonproliferation explained that the 
tenor of the discussions and the absence of the invective rhetoric that Pyongyang uses in 
public gave them hope, at least at the time, that North Korea really did simply hold on to 
nuclear weapons because they perceived a hostile world around them, particularly from 
341 Interview A21 
342 Interview A18 
343 Exchange of letters from SC-CSCAP co-chairs Jusuf Wanandi and Nobuo Matsunaga to Ambassador Li 
Luye, June 6, 1996; from Ambassador Li Luye to Wanandi and Matsunaga, November 15, 1996; and from 
Wanandi to all members of the CSCAP Steering Committee, November 21, 1996. Also see Ball, The 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), pp. 7, 14; and Evans, “Assessing the ARF 
and CSCAP,” p. 163, as well as interview B37
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the United States.344 Assistant Secretary of State Jim Kelly was more pessimistic. 
Although he felt it was useful to have these unofficial sessions to help “bring familiarity, 
at least at some level, with the issues to the general public,” he also cautioned against 
expecting too much candor from the North Koreans:
[Y]ou really have to realize that there is a serious fatuous nature to track-
two diplomacy as pursued by academics who, with incredible naivete, 
continue to believe that, in the informal sessions, they are likely to get 
North Korean track-two participants to say ‘what they really think.’ This 
simply does not resonate with the reality of what the DPRK is, and the 
interchangeable nature of Foreign Ministry officials and people from the 
Institute of Disarmament and Peace [the North Korean think tank] who 
essentially have two sets of business cards…any participants that got off 
the track would be subject to terrible things, even worse for example than 
loss of tenure, such as loss of life and limb and, given that punishments in 
North Korea tend to be visited on three generations, the punishment would 
be rendered on children and the parents too.345
Rather than focusing on whether North Koreans would say something different at 
these meetings, Cossa relayed that “State has been appreciative of the opportunity to be 
able to sit on the sidelines and talk with the North Koreans” at occasional CSCAP 
meetings without much public furor when there were no formal channels or diplomatic 
contacts. One particular example was a March 2003 North Pacific working group 
meeting at Berkeley, held just days before the United States invaded Iraq to oust Saddam 
Hussein, weeks after South Korea had elected Roh Moo-Hyun as its new president, two 
months after Pyongyang had withdrawn from the NPT, and five months after Assistant 
Secretary Kelly had confronted North Korea with U.S. evidence of its highly-enriched 
uranium program.346 A member of the North Korean delegation, which included their 
344 Interview A20 
345 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., January 21, 2005
346 Interviews A13 and B37 
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ambassador to the UN as well as employees of the DPRK’s Institute for Disarmament 
and Peace, gave a presentation blaming the hostile U.S. policy toward North Korea as the 
source of the proliferation problem, and called for bilateral talks and a nonaggression 
treaty with the United States as the way to solve the nuclear crisis.347
U.S. nongovernmental members who attended the meeting reported that the new 
government in Seoul sent a higher-level delegation than their predecessors had previously 
sent, including the new director of policy planning from the South Korean Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. He gave a presentation, in his private capacity, declaring for the first 
time that the North Korean nuclear crisis needed to be addressed in a multilateral forum, 
not bilaterally between North Korea and the United States as the previous Seoul 
government had supported. The next morning, the Chinese attendants changed their 
position to also support the six-party format. According to U.S. members present, the 
North Koreans were visibly upset by the pressure from the South Koreans and the 
Chinese.348 Five months later, the first round of the six-party talks was held.
U.S. Government Access and Interaction
While CSCAP has been appreciated for its utility as a forum to conduct public 
diplomacy, to shape the regional agenda, to develop contingency plans for different 
political circumstances, and to manage relations with North Korea, as well as an 
347 See “North Koreans to Join Berkeley Nuclear Meetings: Unofficial Talks Aim to Jump-Start 
Communications,” San Francisco Chronicle, March 14, 2003, p. A12 (http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin-
article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/03/14/MN259349.DTL, accessed July 18, 2005); “North Korean 
Official Explains Rationale for Nuclear Arms,” San Francisco Chronicle, March 15, 2003, p. A6 
(http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/03/15/MN155609.DTL, accessed 
July 18, 2005); and “North Korea Fears U.S. Attack, Say Delegates at Talks at UC,” San Francisco 
Chronicle, March 16, 2003, p. A18 (http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/03/16/MN252963.DTL, accessed July 18, 2005).
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intelligence channel to provide information and feedback to U.S. government 
participants, government participants including former Assistant Secretary Kelly himself, 
previously the director of USCSCAP, were much more pessimistic about its ability to 
influence U.S. policy.349 With the exception of a mid-level government official (usually 
NSC Director, Senior Director, Deputy Assistant Secretary or Assistant Secretary of State 
or Defense) who speaks at USCSCAP lunches and the 1997 QDR address by Secretary of 
Defense Cohen, actual U.S. government participation in CSCAP activities since 1993 has 
been limited to a handful of desk officers and office directors. 
At higher levels, government officials simply seem too busy to participate at all. 
Bob Manning, a member of the revolving door who is on the policy planning staff in the 
current Bush administration and the former co-director of CSCAP’s efforts on nuclear 
energy transparency, said that since he went back into government, he has hasn’t been 
active in the network because “it’s hard to get that much time: too many meetings in this 
town.”350 Presumably, policymakers at the deputy assistant secretary and assistant 
secretary levels are at least as busy as the policy planning staff, if not more so. The 
question then is whether government officials who do not participate in CSCAP meetings 
receive the intelligence benefits the network might provide. Three channels—the 
PACNET weekly newsletter, briefings from Ralph Cossa, and revolving door members 
who participate in CSCAP before entering government—seem to be the answer.   
Despite the very real sense of information overload among government officials, 
who ignored the longer (usually 20-page) CSCAP memos,351 a surprising number of 
current and former government officials interviewed said they received and read, or at 
349 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., January 21, 2005 as well as interviews A2 and A4
350 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., December 20, 2004
351 Interviews A4 and A21
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least scanned, the weekly one-page PACNET opinion piece.352 Some said that they 
looked to see who the author was to decide if they wanted to read the piece, reading those 
written by American analysts they knew and generally viewing the pieces written by 
foreign analysts as inferior.353 Others sought generally overlooked issues not discussed 
elsewhere354 or to monitor how policy debates were moving in the nongovernmental 
community.355 One Hill staffer specifically said they looked for information on bilateral 
or multilateral contacts among other countries in the region that did not include the 
United States, such as between China and Japan or Korea and Japan, that therefore did 
not make it into U.S. papers.356 One former government official quite simply said, 
“Frankly, I’m not mesmerized by the quality of government intelligence….if a piece is 
well-written, sometimes it’s superior to government analysis.”357 But no government 
official suggested that anything in PACNET changed U.S. policy, and even Cossa 
concluded that although recommendations were made through PACNET “that have ended 
up coinciding with policies that were taken, whether or not they were driven by it 
[PACNET recommendations] would be too hard [to prove].”358
Cossa himself provides a second channel into government. Many subjects 
interviewed expressed personal affinity and respect for Cossa, his writing, and the advice 
he gave because of the number of miles he travels, the diversity of issues he monitors, the 
quality of his analysis, his engaging style, and the regional and U.S. government 
connections he has developed. To many, he is the reason, or the catalyst, that has enabled 
352 Interviews A2, A4, A5, A12, A17, A18, A21, A28, B1, B34, and B36 
353 Interviews A3, A5, A12, A18 , B34, and B36
354 Interviews A17 and A18 
355 Interview A2
356 Interview A21 
357 Interview A5 
358 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., December 16, 2004
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CSCAP to exist, arguably to succeed, and to provide any influence it may have.359 Yet 
while Cossa grew CSCAP, the network has also synergistically helped empower him by 
facilitating those connections and the flow of ideas through its meetings.360 As Cossa 
himself said, “It would be hard to come up with something that I’ve written that didn’t at 
least in some part draw from what I’ve gotten in these various meetings.”361 Because they 
trusted and respected him, being briefed saved those government officials the time and 
travel of sitting through CSCAP meetings.362 Although at least one nongovernmental 
member had concerns about how much power that channeled to the director or the small 
set of Americans that could participate internationally,363 Brad Glosserman, a CSCAP
staffer, maintained that it was essential for at least one person, as dedicated as Ralph is, to 
understand the history and full scope of CSCAP activities to avoid duplication of work in 
an underfunded, nonprofit organization.364
As a result of its activities, CSCAP in general and Cossa in particular have 
become a resource to brief U.S. government officials cycling into new positions on East 
Asian security affairs.365 Cossa was asked in 2004 to brief the new director of regional 
affairs in the State Department’s East Asia bureau, who had previously been working on 
economic issues, and apprised newly-appointed ambassador to South Korea Chris Hill, 
who subsequently has become the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, of some 
359 Interviews A1, A4, A5, A7, A11, A12, A18, A20, A27, B3, and B36
360 Interview A7
361 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., December 16, 2004
362 Interview A9 
363 Interview A12
364 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., December 14, 2004
365 Interview A16 
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regional issues for which the ambassador later thanked Cossa because he had not heard 
them in his transitional briefings through government channels.366
CSCAP’s potential for policy influence was arguably never better than during the 
first term of the Bush administration when the network’s previous director and Cossa’s 
former boss, Jim Kelly, served as the Assistant Secretary of State. Kelly’s move through 
the revolving door from CSCAP into government provides a tailor-made test of the 
advantages that a personal connection might provide. Although numerous subjects 
interviewed cited the continuing good relations between the two men and the frequency 
with which they either assumed or knew that Cossa e-mailed or briefed Kelly,367 the 
CSCAP staff downplayed the uniqueness of the connection to Kelly. Both Glosserman 
and Cossa emphasized that Cossa reached out to many other policymakers—such as 
deputy assistant secretary of defense Richard Lawless, then deputy assistant secretary of 
state Randy Schriver, and then policy planning director Mitchell Reiss—in the current 
administration (which was in its first term at the time of these interviews), and to Kelly’s 
predecessors, assistant secretaries of state Stanley Roth and Winston Lord, as well as 
other officials such as deputy secretary of defense Kurt Campbell in the Clinton 
administration.368
Cossa did, however, concede that “Jim [Kelly] and I are very close and we e-mail 
back and forth a couple times a week. If I’m somewhere and hear something I think he’d 
be interested in, I pass it along to him and we share information…”369 On policy 
influence, however, Kelly began the interview for this study quite directly saying he was 
366 Author’s interview with Ralph Cossa, Washington, D.C., December 16, 2004
367 Interviews A6, A7, A8, A20 
368 Author’s interviews with Brad Glosserman, Washington, D.C., December 14, 2004, and with Ralph 
Cossa, Washington, D.C., December 16, 2004
369 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., December 16, 2004
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“pretty negative about the effect [on U.S. policy].” He continued that “the fact is that 
we’ve seen each other remarkably little. I really don’t have a lot of time and he’s 5,000 
miles away and I’m not that good of an e-mail correspondent so I read these things, 
but…[Ralph’s] speaking much more for himself [to CSCAP audiences], I suspect, than 
some people think.”370
Still, that does not necessarily mean that the revolving door connections are 
useless. For one thing, Kelly’s professional experience presiding over CSCAP and his 
personal connection to Cossa both may have made him more likely to read PACNET, 
which he claims he did, and to listen to briefings from CSCAP members, particularly 
Cossa, for information and feedback more generally, even if policies were not adopted 
because they were recommended by CSCAP. The effect, therefore, may exist but be 
much more marginal than a direct policy recommendation, or the policy equivalent of the 
magic bullet. Second, that previous connection between Cossa and Kelly may have led 
unclassified information to travel more readily from government, or Kelly, through Cossa 
to CSCAP members. As one nongovernmental CSCAP member speculated:
What I tend to see is looking the other way. If I read something that Ralph 
has written on PACNET or something, you can always see the 
understanding of the situation, like what’s going on in the six-party talks is 
coming from Jim or somebody who works for Jim. He’s getting 
knowledge from them and putting that into what he’s writing, but it’s a big 
black box to me as to how much impact what he’s writing or sending off 
to the government is being accepted or used in any way.371
Kelly himself also pointed to a third advantage of the revolving door and his role in 
CSCAP prior to government service: 
370 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., January 21, 2005
371 Interview A7
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It enabled me to be a lot more familiar with the issues. My presence at 
those sessions was of considerable benefit to me and I’m struck now, as I 
finish up four years, that…I don’t think I could have possibly been more 
familiar with the issues. And I think I was more familiar with the range of 
issues than any of my foreign service colleagues who were here. Just as in 
a lot of other things, they really know a great deal about the particular 
countries they’re involved in, but sometimes the interactions with other 
countries are way down there. The CSCAP process, even aside from 
working groups, bring a broad familiarity with what people are interested 
in, not interested in, and worried about throughout the region. At least for 
me, it was great preparation.372
Although an unhealthy obsession to separate interrelated, synergistic forces into 
dependent and independent variables can sometimes exist, it does seem that CSCAP’s 
ability to get information and feedback to government officials and policymakers may be 
more dependent on how much those officials want to turn to the network, based on their 
personal experiences and preconceived notions, than not. In other words, CSCAP seems 
dependent on government to open its doors to the network’s input. While Cossa and 
CSCAP appear to have been able to prove their value to some previous administrations 
and officials, some members and analysts have suggested that the network’s influence in 
government may vary on the individual official—including their willingness to listen to 
outsiders in general or their perceptions of Cossa or CSCAP in particular,373 whether 
cooperative processes are perceived to be able to address the challenges and threats that 
dominate an administration’s attention,374 and an administration’s general attitude toward 
multilateralism in Asia.375
372 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., January 21, 2005
373 Interviews A7, A12, and A16 
374 Ball, “CSCAP: Its Future Place in the Regional Security Architecture,” p. 311
375 Interviews A8, A16, and A27 as well as Simon, “The ASEAN Regional Forum Views the Council for 
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific,” p. 8
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Agenda Setting in the United States 
Glosserman described the CSCAP method as a continual process of agenda setting, 
option development, and evaluation, similar to the framework that John Kingdon 
proposed for government policymaking in general. For example, Glosserman said, “once 
you get the discussion on a) the need for transparency, and b) how you do it, and then c) 
now that you’ve done it, let’s evaluate that process. For each of those [issues], you can 
continually move this forward.”376 As discussed before, that process seems to be about 
setting issues like nonproliferation, nuclear energy transparency, and export controls on 
the regional agenda by the United States government, or by CSCAP’s nongovernmental 
members, but not in the United States. 
There are a couple of potential exceptions. One government official claimed that, 
through their participation in CSCAP, a Chinese foreign ministry employee expressed 
interest in developing a bilateral export control agenda: “We had an inkling therefore 
they wanted to do something on export controls and I was able to follow up on that.”377
PACATOM is another potential exception. Because the issue did not neatly fit into any 
one U.S. government portfolio, as the project’s co-director Bob Manning pointed out, 
CSCAP’s work not only raised the issue within the region but, as it developed, Cossa and 
project co-director Brad Roberts both felt that the United States also advanced its own 
nuclear energy transparency: “Actually, when we started doing this transparency stuff, 
we started discovering that the U.S. wasn’t all that transparent either. We were able to get 
some of the labs to start providing more radiation data onto the CSCAP website just 
based on the argument that we’ve got the Japanese, and the Koreans, and the Taiwanese, 
376 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., December 14, 2004
377 Interview A20 
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and even the Chinese considering it, and we need to have the same example.”378
Similarly, Roberts contended that, “I think the nuclear-related work didn’t change a 
policy but it created an opportunity to formulate a policy.”379
There is little other evidence in this study that CSCAP successfully engaged in, or 
even facilitated, agenda-setting in the U.S. government in any of its nonproliferation, 
missile defense, North Korea, nuclear energy transparency, PSI, or export control efforts. 
Although it is possible to contend that CSCAP feedback from the region served an 
agenda-setting role in the United States by drawing policymakers’ attention to regional 
reactions that might need to be addressed, no specific example was raised in this research. 
One nonproliferation expert argued that even within the region, CSCAP played more of a 
regional agenda setting role ten years ago, when the network first sought to raise the 
regional commitment to nonproliferation in Asia during the campaign to indefinitely 
extend the NPT in 1995. Since then, they argued that CSCAP activities, such as nuclear 
energy transparency and export controls, had become increasingly technical.380
Ultimately, a case can be made that CSCAP’s connections to, and influence in, 
government have led the network to behave more like a consulting tank than a traditional 
public think tank. This is not entirely surprising as analysts, including Cossa himself, 
have previously written about the potential trade-off between gaining influence with 
government and publicly criticizing them.381 One possible explanation lies in the 
experience of CSCAP members. Those with government experience may be more 
hesitant than career academics or other nongovernmental analysts to publicly criticize 
378 Author’s interview with Ralph Cossa, Washington, D.C., December 16, 2004
379 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., December 20, 2004
380 Interview A15 
381 Ball, “CSCAP: Its Future Place in the Regional Security Architecture,” p. 309; and Ralph Cossa, “Track 
Two Diplomacy: Promoting Regional Peace, Stability,” U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda (January 1998).
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government policy because they either understand the constraints on government 
policymaking or because they are more pessimistic about the media’s potential effect. 
Another possibility is that the two roles trade off with one another, leaving think tanks 
and transnational networks with a potentially difficult balancing act to manage: between 
advising the government and publicly criticizing it. 
In CSCAP’s case, one nongovernmental member speculated that Cossa’s close 
relationship with Kelly may have come at the expense of the network publicly pushing 
the U.S. government—and either directly or by implication criticizing its chief regional 
policymaker, Kelly.382 But more fundamentally, CSCAP as an institution has never used 
the media to draw attention to overlooked issues, the primary tool of agenda-setting 
public think tanks. Cossa said that is a conscious decision:
Our view has generally been that everything we do in CSCAP is off-the-
record. We don’t have public meetings; we don’t have press conferences 
at the meeting. We prefer to do things quietly behind the scenes. Many of 
us in CSCAP write op-eds and things like that, but I’m not representing 
CSCAP when I write an op-ed, although I may, in the course of the op-ed, 
talk about conclusions that I’ve drawn based on conversations there.383
Some have criticized this habit, arguing that the lack of publicity hurts CSCAP’s 
influence.384
Ultimately, the reality is that CSCAP has not really tried to set an agenda in the 
U.S. government. Instead, Cossa and the CSCAP staff have served more as brokers 
between network members, both in the region and the United States, and the U.S. 
government to explore areas of mutual interest. 
382 Interview A6 
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Even though CSCAP’s members include many former government officials, the network 
has produced very few policy recommendations (although it may have shaped the 
recommendations that some individuals made on their own), with even fewer directed at 
the U.S. government. Some general exceptions exist, such as the preventive diplomacy 
recommendations to the ARF. In other cases, as one government member recalled, 
CSCAP participants may have conveyed specific suggestions from the region, such as 
trying to get the United States to be more involved in developing a code of conduct on 
the South China Sea.385 Even in this case, however, it was an individual or small group in 
their capacity as CSCAP participants approaching the government attendants, rather than 
the entire network as an institution seeking to get government to change its policies. 
Another possible example was the May 2004 effort by a Chinese analyst to link 
the U.S. CVID formula with similar security assurances to North Korea. At least one U.S. 
nongovernmental nonproliferation expert interviewed for this study remembered that 
statement as an interesting and innovative proposal. Over the subsequent months, 
Washington even appeared to publicly drop its emphasis on the CVID formula. The 
September 2005 joint statement released after the fourth round of the six-party talks also 
juxtaposed “the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclarization of the Korean 
peninsula in a peaceful manner” with a security assurance that “the United States 
affirmed it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to 
385 Interview A28 
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attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.”386 Although the 
CSCAP discussion may have had some effect, and little incentive exists for government 
officials to acknowledge any, it does not appear that this was the only forum through 
which such a linkage was being discussed. Kelly stated that similar messages were also 
being relayed through official channels,387 and even Cossa admitted that although these 
points were discussed in CSCAP meetings “it is hard to tie any specific conversation or 
meeting to a point in the statement.”388 At a minimum, though, it seems that CSCAP was 
a forum through which the idea was first broadcast to some nongovernmental members 
for their consideration and in turn might shape their thinking as well as elite and public 
U.S. debates.
The 2003 North Pacific working group meeting at Berkeley is another example of 
potential policy impact, although in this case the South Korean government apparently 
used CSCAP as a forum to encourage the six-party format. Their actions may have 
provoked China also to shift its position to support six-party talks, even if CSCAP as a 
network recommended neither. In either case, the policy options developed or changes 
made were outside of the United States. Finally, other working groups have sought 
contingency plans, such as the types of verification provisions for North Korea, but those 
are plans for the future if the political conditions are right, rather than recommendations 
for the present.
Meetings such as USCSCAP have not even tried to come up with U.S. policy 
prescriptions, focusing instead on “analysis or diagnosing problems rather than coming 
386 Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,” Beijing, September 19, 2005, 
http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/ARchive/2005/Sep/19-210095.html (accessed February 16, 2006)
387 Telephone interview with author, March 1, 2006
388 Electronic message to author, February 28, 2006
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up with solutions.”389 Even some of the international working groups, including the North 
Pacific working group,390 have not produced policy recommendations, relying instead on 
developing a better understanding of the perceptions of other countries that attended the 
meetings, and enabling individual members to subsequently develop their own ideas 
based on that information, as Cossa himself cited. It is beyond the scope of this study, 
however, to attempt to track the op-eds published by individual members and attempt to 
trace what individual ideas developed from what CSCAP meetings, if any. There are 
simply too many members with too many ideas and op-eds. When pressed during 
interviews, most could not cite specific examples on the spot to help limit the search. 
Rather, they emphasized the value CSCAP has contributed to them individually in broad 
terms, as drops of information within a broader sea of their knowledge.
Clearly, CSCAP tries to develop recommendations as an institution, or as 
individuals if that fails, that are useful for the government. It is a source of pride that 
Cossa cites and part of the network’s utility to the government, helping the network to 
secure funding, influence, and access to government officials. As one government 
participant emphasized, the 2004 restructuring of CSCAP networks has this goal in mind: 
to enhance its relevance to governments, at least in the region if not Washington.391 But 
ultimately, the policy options developed are much more likely to be promoted by 
individual members in their full-time jobs, as employees of whatever think tank or 
institution pays their salary, or to evolve from CSCAP activities, such as the general 
support for six-party talks, than to get consensus recommendations from CSCAP as an 
organization. Efforts, such as attempts to get members from so many different countries 
389 Interviews A6 as well as A7
390 Interviews A9 and A20
391 Interview A20 
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to agree on how to structure security assurances to North Korea and how to sequence 
those assurances with DPRK commitments to dismantle their nuclear program, have not 
reached agreement and are unlikely to do so. 
In fact, as other analysts have previously noted, part of the strength of CSCAP as 
an information-sharing network is that it has such a diverse membership of “insiders and 
outsiders, generalists and specialists, those close to government and those more 
independent in their orientation”392 that “there are more differences than similarities 
among the participants,”393 maximizing the potential for individuals to learn something 
new but usually reducing recommendations such as CSCAP memoranda to become more 
bland. Clearly the network strives to overcome these impediments, but it is an uphill 
battle. In the end, as Arizona State professor Sheldon Simon previously concluded, 
“CSCAP dialogues may be less important for the recommendations they generate…than 
for the suspicions they allay and the norms they reinforce.”394
Observations
Beyond the structured part of this study, a number of other issues related to the network’s 
operations emerged during interviews. Rather than ignore them entirely or leave them 
unreported, they will be briefly mentioned here for others who may examine different 
aspects of the network’s utility. Although many of these issues have already been touched 
upon earlier, six will be discussed further here: the network’s potential drawbacks, its 
U.S. membership, effects during a crisis, the focus on regional multilateralism, potential 
392 Evans, “Assessing the ARF and CSCAP,” p. 164
393 Simon, “The ASEAN Regional Forum Views the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific,” 
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socialization of Chinese and North Korean participants over time, and the possible impact 
on other countries’ policies.
Drawbacks?
Although every subject interviewed for this case study was directly asked whether 
CSCAP was harmful in any way, not one came up with any examples or even suspicions 
of past problems. That being said, a few subjects raised some theoretical concerns to 
watch. One that no one expressed, but one nongovernmental member pre-emptively 
addressed, is that U.S. analysts might be duped by propaganda, presumably from North 
Korean or Chinese participants, such as the justification and explanation for the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO). That argument, however, assumes that U.S. 
participants are pretty malleable, not the critical experts that this member had 
encountered.395
A second potential concern is whether U.S. nongovernmental members might be 
perceived as representing official U.S. views when they actually were not. In some cases, 
CSCAP invited an expert to give a presentation on the PSI or export controls; in other 
cases, members took the initiative themselves such as the former military officer who 
wanted to explain the regional implications of the 2001 QDR. One U.S. government 
official raised this hypothetically,396 but since foreign subjects were not interviewed, this 
study did not test whether signals were misperceived. Although even government 
officials attend these meetings in their private capacity, making it clear they are speaking 
as individuals not for governments, misperceptions are always possible. Presumably, the 
395 Interview A15 
396 Interview A2
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burden is on all U.S. members, governmental or nongovernmental, to be clear that they 
express their own views not those of the U.S. government (except when they directly cite 
government statements). In one case, a former U.S. military officer went even further to 
guard against potential misperceptions claiming that: “I go there mindful that most of the 
other people around the table are official sort of representatives of their government. I 
may not be particularly happy of some of our government’s views but I’m not going to 
highlight that. Generally I try to be in sync with where our government is.”397
A third, related but more nuanced, potential concern is whether USCSCAP 
members might be perceived to be floating a trial balloon for the U.S. government when 
they are actually not. As previously mentioned, former Assistant Secretary Kelly himself 
suspected that others might have guessed that Cossa spoke for Kelly much more often 
than he did. But when asked during the interview for this study if that concerned him, 
Kelly responded that: “Frankly, I hadn’t thought about it that much.”398 A former deputy 
assistant secretary went one step further, recalling that “I can’t produce a specific 
instance but it’s not just hypothetical. I know that we have faced that a couple of times” 
with China. Still, that official concluded that the networks were “not harmful,” and 
although you had to “be mindful” of the potential for foreign participants to think they 
see a trial balloon where one does not exist, “the value of having these types of contacts 
outweighs the potential downside.”399 One nongovernmental member wondered how 
likely such a misperception really was. For one thing, they argued that the fear was more 
likely with interlocutors who had limited contacts with the United States, which was true 
of very few CSCAP members. They also argued that the actors the United States would 
397 Interview A16 
398 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., January 21, 2005
399 Interview A18 
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be most worried about were very tightly controlled autocracies, who because of their own 
system, “would never see a policymaker deigning to float some precious idea out through 
some venue where they’re not in control.”400
A fourth and the most commonly voiced concern is that CSCAP and similar 
venues might provide North Korea with an outlet when the U.S. government was seeking 
to isolate and pressure Pyongyang. In other words, the very role that CSCAP could 
serve—to continue dialogue with North Koreans—might be counterproductive. As 
mentioned earlier, the State Department had previously asked that North Korea not be 
invited to a May 2003 CSCAP nuclear energy experts group meeting held at Yucca 
Mountain in Nevada. After the October 2002 diplomatic confrontation over North 
Korea’s HEU program and subsequent U.S. withdrawal from the 1994 Agreed 
Framework, State did not want North Korea to get the impression that the United States 
supported North Korea receiving nuclear energy assistance.401 Whereas the theory says 
that the value of track-two diplomacy is to provide an opportunity to reach out to a 
country like North Korea with whom Washington has no official diplomatic contact, four 
separate government officials interviewed for this study said that either inviting the North 
Koreans or sending U.S. government officials to sit on the margins of unofficial meetings 
when North Koreans were present was, at some point, counterproductive.402
Given that the bulk of CSCAP interviews for this study were conducted 4-6 
months after North Korea had suspended its participation after three rounds of the six-
party talks, U.S. frustration was clearly high. Compounding that frustration, Selig 
Harrison, a senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center who had independent contacts 
400 Interview A15 
401 Author’s interview with Ralph Cossa, Washington, D.C., December 16, 2004
402 Interviews A2, A3, A14, and A17
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with the North Korean government, had published a controversial article right around the 
time of the interviews in the January-February 2005 edition of Foreign Affairs, accusing 
the United States of having distorted information on North Korea’s uranium enrichment 
program to exaggerate the threat. One government analyst complained that “they go to 
Sig Harrison and all these people and say one thing, and then these guys [like Harrison] 
go out [and help the North Koreans].”403 Although Harrison had not met the North 
Koreans through CSCAP, the U.S. concern was that North Korea would use track-two as 
a propaganda tool. 
Cossa felt that North Koreans sought to do just that, since they “have always seen 
[CSCAP] as an opportunity to get their views out and to get feedback about whether 
anyone is buying a particular story or a particular angle of attack. I think that’s been one 
of the real values. It’s continued to keep the North Koreans engaged. Even when they 
don’t go to six-party talks, they still go to CSCAP meetings.”404 At least two of the 
government officials405 specifically did not have a problem with Cossa’s efforts, which 
they speculated had been used to pressure North Korea and make it clear that their 
approach was not supported in the region such as the March 2003 Berkeley meeting 
which increased support for the six-party talks. Nevertheless, even at those meetings, the 
concern was that other members attending the meeting might confuse the message and 
403 Interview A14. For the article, see Selig S. Harrison, “Did North Korea Cheat?” Foreign Affairs
(January/February 2005), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050101faessay84109/selig-s-
harrison/did-north-korea-cheat.html (accessed July 27, 2005) and the bipartisan response it provoked from 
former Bush administration policy planning director and former Clinton administration lead negotiator of 
the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea, respectively, Mitchell B. Reiss and Robert L. Gallucci, 
“Red-Handed,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2005), available at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050301faresponse84214/mitchell-b-reiss-robert-gallucci/red-handed.html
(accessed July 27, 2005).
404 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., December 16, 2004
405 Interviews A2 and A14
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loosen the pressure on North Korea at a critical time.406 As it turns out, participants at the 
Berkeley meetings reportedly sought to assure North Korean participants that Iraq, which 
was on the verge of having its regime changed by U.S. military force, was different from 
North Korea. Some delegates apparently even reminded the North Koreans that, as the 
San Francisco Chronicle reported, their “ability to strike South Korea and Japan, two 
U.S. allies in the region, poses a great deterrent to pre-emptive American military 
action.”407 Presumably, those are exactly the types of messages that the U.S. government, 
particularly at the Pentagon, did not want sent. In essence, what some view as a valuable 
outlet to help bring North Korea back to negotiations is, at least at certain times, viewed 
as a way for North Korea to undermine U.S. isolation and pressure. Put another way: one 
analyst’s safety valve is another’s leak. 
U.S. Membership 
Although about 3,000 people receive the PACNET newsletter, CSCAP meetings other 
than the biannual conference are limited to about 35-40 people to enhance interaction 
among members. Getting the right participants at those meetings is therefore important to 
the network’s value. Chapter two highlighted the significance in the U.S. system for think 
tanks to use the revolving door, which CSCAP clearly did; the media, which CSCAP 
intentionally does not; and the Hill. When asked, CSCAP staff acknowledged that Hill 
participation was rare but they were not particularly concerned.408 Although theory says 
406 Interview A2 
407 “North Korea Fears U.S. Attack, Say Delegates at Talks at UC,” San Francisco Chronicle, March 16, 
2003, p. A18 (http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/03/16/MN252963.DTL, accessed July 18, 2005)
408 Author’s interviews with Brad Glosserman, Washington, D.C., December 14, 2004, and with Ralph 
Cossa, Washington, D.C., December 16, 2004
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they should be, one Congressional staff member interviewed for this study agreed with 
the CSCAP staff, emphasizing that “Congress is not operational in the management of 
foreign affairs. We set broad policy guidelines…”409 Because CSCAP has focused more 
on regional agenda setting, not in the United States, and because it has gotten 
increasingly more technical into issues like nuclear energy transparency and export 
controls, the value of Hill participation actually seems more limited for CSCAP, at least 
to this point. If the network were to become more active in setting the U.S. foreign policy 
agenda, Hill participation would theoretically be more important at that time. A separate 
membership issue that did concern at least two members is whether CSCAP is getting 
enough young members and whether younger, rising experts even knew about CSCAP, 
an issue which the network will have to address over time.410
What Happens in a Crisis? 
Although the theories about epistemic communities and policy windows discussed in 
chapter one predicted a heightened role in a crisis for these networks, the reality is that 
CSCAP does not try to predict crises, and no subjects interviewed for this study 
expressed any confidence that CSCAP could or should play such a role. Those with 
government experience discouraged it, arguing that crises were the wrong time to attempt 
to get involved.411 Although one former government policymaker stated that questions 
they were asked at a USCSCAP meeting focused their attention on a potential 
approaching crisis over a proposed referendum associated with Taiwan’s spring 2004 
409 Interview A21 
410 Interview A11 and B36
411 Interviews A4 and A5. Also see Simon, “Evaluating Track II Approaches,” pp. 191-2.
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elections,412 other CSCAP experiences are less promising. For example, over half the 
experts present at an October 2003 USCSCAP meeting predicted that North Korea would 
test a nuclear weapon before the 2004 U.S. elections, which obviously turned out to be 
wrong. 413 For now, it will just be noted that crises focused discussion within USCSCAP 
meetings and sometimes stimulated network activities, such as the working group on 
terrorism after the 9/11 attacks, but they were not predicted by the network. The 
concluding chapter will contain further discussion on the role of networks during crises, 
after examining NEACD and PONARS. 
Limits of Multilateralism 
CSCAP’s founding purpose has been to foster multilateral approaches to Asian security 
issues—an approach which may ironically impede its ability to influence policy. 
Fundamentally, trying to coordinate the perceptions, attitudes, and recommendations of 
21 different people, much less from different countries, is complicated. Particularly when 
dealing with Northeast Asian issues such as North Korea, a format that automatically 
includes so many countries from Southeast Asia provides little apparent value. Added to 
that challenge is the culture of ASEAN, embodied in the so-called ASEAN way which 
emphasizes an opaque, unstructured decisonmaking process that emphasizes 
noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries and requires unanimity to take 
action.414 Regardless of other merits of that approach, it makes decisionmaking difficult. 
In addition to these macro-structural challenges, many countries are represented at a 
412 Interview A18 
413 Summary of Discussions, USCSCAP meeting (Washington, DC, October 24, 2003), sent as electronic 
message to all USCSCAP members, USCSCAP Special Report #10, November 7, 2003
414 Wanandi, p. 281, and Evans, “Assessing the ARF and CSCAP,” p. 158
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micro-level by nascent think tanks that at least one U.S. government official 
characterized as not experienced or helpful.415 Taken together, CSCAP’s charge to seek 
multilateral solutions to Asian security problems has been daunting.
Set against this background, CSCAP has struggled with its relationship with its 
official counterpart, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).416 At times, especially during 
its early existence, CSCAP tailored all its work to seek to support the ARF, starting with 
CSCAP structuring three of its four initial working groups on subjects of interest to the 
official forum, and submitting its first memo to the inaugural ARF meeting in July 
1994.417 There is some evidence that CSCAP has been sporadically successful in its 
efforts, such as the definition of preventive diplomacy and work on transnational 
crime.418 Among U.S. members, some support even exists for CSCAP’s efforts to 
influence the ARF,419 with one government official going so far as saying that CSCAP 
helped sustain existential support for the ARF.420 Yet at various times, especially more 
recently, CSCAP has debated whether it should follow ARF’s agenda, try to lead it, or 
even how important it is for CSCAP to influence the ARF at all.421 For many reasons, 
including the ARF’s inability to implement the preventive diplomacy work that CSCAP 
provided and a general regional decline in confidence in multilateral institutions after 
415 Interview A4 
416 For a review of the connections between CSCAP and the ARF, see Simon, “The ASEAN Regional 
Forum Views the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific,” pp. 11-20.
417 Ball, “CSCAP: Its Future Place in the Regional Security Architecture,” pp. 289, 310.
418 Ball, The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), p. 49, and Simon, “Evaluating 
Track II Approaches,” pp. 193, 198 (fn43), as well as interviews A6 and A14. Also see Summary of 
Discussions, USCSCAP general membership/board of directors meeting (Washington, DC, June 22, 2000): 
1.
419 Interviews A4, A15, and A16 
420 Interview B1
421 Simon, “The ASEAN Regional Forum Views the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific,” 
p. 13 as well as interview A13.
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their perceived helplessness in response to the Asian financial crisis in 1997-99, 422 the 
ARF is frequently viewed as an ineffective institution.423
If that perception continues to exist, there may be a danger for CSCAP associating 
too closely with it. Then-University of Northern British Columbia Associate Professor 
Lawrence Woods, in his research on other nongovernmental efforts to build Asian 
regional institutions, warned that NGOs might be dragged down or even scapegoated by 
the declining reputation of an official body it sought to influence.424 That being the case, 
maintaining an informal linkage425 that has persisted between CSCAP and the ARF may 
turn out to be to CSCAP’s benefit, enabling it to continue to seek to influence the ARF, 
insulate itself from ARF’s potential ineffectiveness, and free it to pursue the network’s 
initiatives through other channels.
Socializing China and North Korea 
One of the other benefits ascribed to organizations like CSCAP is that they may have 
been able to socialize China during the mid-late 1990s and now, hopefully, be able to 
lead North Korea to follow in their neighbor’s footsteps. To socialize simply means that 
by involving participants in these networks from initially reluctant countries, they may 
become familiar both with the interests of other countries and with the practice of 
working with them in a multilateral framework, changing their own interests and 
422 Ball, The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), p. 45
423 Interviews A1, A8, A9, A14, and B1 as well as Report of Twenty-first meeting, CSCAP CSBM 
International Working Group, p. 1
424 Lawrence T. Woods, “Learning from NGO Proponents of Asia-Pacific Regionalism: Success and its 
Lessons,” Asian Survey 35:9 (September 1995): 816.
425 See letter from Saroj Chavanaviraj, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, to 
CSCAP Co-Chairs, 28 January 2000, cited in Desmond Ball, The Council for Security Cooperation in the 
Asia Pacific (CSCAP), p. 52.
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practices in the process.426 In some particularly difficult bilateral relationships—such as 
the United States and North Korea, or South and North Korea, or China and Taiwan—the 
unofficial status of networks like CSCAP allows a unique opportunity for both 
nongovernmental and governmental participants in their private capacities to interact and 
exchange views when a country or political entity is not recognized.427 A problem with 
socialization is that it is extremely difficult to prove what increment one network or 
organization may provide, if any. This study also did not interview foreign participants or 
attempt to observe their individual participation over time, although some U.S. 
participants had their own observations about the potential socialization of Chinese 
and/or North Korean participants. Although this study focuses on their effects in U.S. 
policy, others have asked the question: Do networks really socialize?428
Socialization might arguably have more potential with governments like China 
and North Korea because the linkages between their think tanks and governments are so 
tight.429 These think tanks are essentially tied to a particular ministry, such as the Foreign 
Ministry or, in China’s case, the State Council, and provide advice to the government 
directly. They effectively serve as a consulting tank, as defined in chapter two, rather 
than a traditional public or advocacy think tank. As a result, CSCAP experiences may 
feed more directly into their government deliberations. One U.S. member who 
participated in CSCAP international working groups over some period of time noted that 
nongovernmental participants from those countries tended to stay on, providing a base of 
426 Wanandi, p. 284
427 Interview A11 
428 For an excellent example of one effort to study socialization in general, see Alastair Iain Johnston, 
“Socialization in International Institutions: the ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory,” ch. 3 in 
G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, eds. International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2003): 107-162.
429 Simon, “Evaluating Track II Approaches,” p. 186
152
familiarity and linkages among nongovernmental members even if the government 
officials in both countries changed jobs.430
In CSCAP’s case, although interaction between China and Taiwan has existed, it 
is limited by the conditions of China’s accession. China’s broader interaction with the 
region has been another matter. U.S. nongovernmental and governmental participants 
mentioned during interviews that, in their experience, the nature of Chinese participation 
was both much more open at these unofficial sessions than government negotiations, and 
had rapidly increased and become even more open in less than a decade,431 to the point 
where Chinese participants in CSCAP publicly disagreed with one another over at least 
CSCAP matters, such as the workability of a multilateral spent fuel regime.432
 Although the ability to prove that CSCAP participation made any difference in 
Chinese regional security policies or even its attitudes toward multilateralism remains 
beyond this study, the apparent Chinese use of CSCAP over the network’s first twelve 
years yields some potential insight into Beijing’s perception of the network’s value. One 
U.S. participant felt that China’s interaction with CSCAP went through three phases. 
First, China wanted to coopt the organization to make sure that it did not become a forum 
to criticize Beijing, and sent a set of experienced diplomats as its representatives. Second, 
in the late 1990s, that set of members began to use CSCAP to help construct a 
cooperative agenda, including trying to flesh out exactly what a strategic partnership with 
the United States would look like. Finally, and most recently, as those initial members 
have gotten older, China may have sought to reinvigorate its network participation with a 
430 Interview A9 
431 Interviews A8, A11, A27, and A28. See also Evans, “Assessing the ARF and CSCAP,” pp. 167-170.
432 Summary of Discussions, USCSCAP annual meeting (Washington, DC, May 21, 1998): 1
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younger generation of analysts.433 One other frequent U.S. participant was not as 
generous about China’s view of CSCAP, arguing that Beijing may have been using 
CSCAP as a retirement pasture to place its aging diplomats, while integrating its younger 
generation more swiftly into government itself.434 While this study does not shed 
additional light on China’s use of CSCAP, there is no doubt that China’s engagement in 
CSCAP and multilateralism in Asia more generally has rapidly changed over the last 
decade. 
Some seek to lead North Korea through a similar process. Some nongovernmental 
CSCAP participants believe that North Korea is already being socialized, although they 
freely admitted there was no way to prove it,435 or at least that North Korean participants 
in CSCAP were beginning to elaborate on talking points more than they previously 
had.436 Scott Snyder, an expert on North Korea and a frequent nongovernmental CSCAP 
participant, argued that North Korea initially used informal dialogues like CSCAP when 
it did not have direct contact with the United States to prepare and train its diplomats for 
official contacts in the future. Once direct contacts opened up with Washington after the 
1993-94 nuclear crisis and the Agreed Framework, Pyongyang de-emphasized the 
informal networks. Similarly, Snyder argued that North Korea has subsequently used 
CSCAP to train its younger diplomats, allowing them to take the lead at network 
activities while older, more experienced North Korean officials observed their 
performance.437 In the end, it is too early to tell whether North Korea will integrate more 
closely into East Asia as China did before it, much less whether CSCAP would facilitate 
433 Interview A15 
434 Interview A11 
435 Interviews A9 and A11 
436 Interview A22 
437 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., December 13, 2004
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North Korean socialization. Although Pyongyang joined CSCAP earlier, it has only 
joined the ARF in 2000 and the six-party talks are still proceeding.
Experiences with China and now North Korea do raise two questions about 
CSCAP’s role and future. First, does a trade-off exist between CSCAP’s potential role 
socializing North Korea and its other purposes, such as policy coordination and 
discussion among other participants? Two CSCAP participants separately mentioned that 
the agenda of any meeting that North Korea attended was substantially diluted to 
facilitate DPRK attendance, even if the conversation became somewhat more pointed 
once they were actually in the room. Some topics were not raised when North Koreans 
did attend, for fear of offending them or sparking an unproductive response from DPRK 
participants.438
Second, if North Korea is integrated into East Asia, as China has been, will 
CSCAP still have a purpose or will its function be served, having helped establish a 
regional multilateral forum and practice? As far back as the mid-1990s, Southeast Asian 
governments were already reportedly beginning to question the utility of CSCAP once 
the ARF was set up.439 Many of CSCAP’s nongovernmental participants, including Cossa 
himself, acknowledged that the initial premise of CSCAP had been served: to create a 
security community of nongovernmental analysts in the Asia-Pacific, and that simply 
meeting for the sake of building contacts was probably no longer a sufficient goal.
Ultimately, CSCAP decided it could evolve and adapt to those new goals. 440 The 
438 Interviews A9 and A17
439 Ball, “CSCAP: Its Future Place in the Regional Security Architecture,” p. 310
440 Author’s interview with Ralph Cossa, Washington, D.C., December 16, 2004 as well as interviews A9, 
A11, and A15
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working groups were reorganized in 2004 precisely to refocus the network on having a 
regional policy impact, not just meeting.441
CSCAP’s Influence in Other Countries 
There is no question that CSCAP tries to influence the agenda in other countries. One 
former U.S. ambassador even said that, while they served as the ambassador overseas, 
they separately sought to engage and diplomatically influence other countries through 
Asian CSCAP members because think tanks were so close to their governments.442
Although no foreign participants were interviewed for this study, a number of American 
participants in and out of government believe that CSCAP has made more of a difference 
overseas than it does in the United States.443
Some specific examples in nonproliferation such as the six-party talks format 
were previously cited. South Korean attitudes toward joining the PSI may also have been 
affected by CSCAP. In January 2006, not long after the May 2004 CSCAP working 
group on the subject, Seoul “partially” joined PSI.444 More generally, CSCAP’s initial 
efforts tried to get regional governments to care about nonproliferation at all, including 
China which only joined the NPT in 1992. Twelve years later, the network was seeking 
ways for the region to strengthen the NPT and get any emerging ASEAN security 
community to take up nonproliferation as well.445 John Olsen believes that CSCAP’s 
441 Summary of Discussions, CSCAP Steering Committee (Jakarta, Indonesia, December 6-7, 2003) sent as 
electronic message to all USCSCAP members, USCSCAP Special Report 1, January 12, 2004, as well as 
author’s interview with Ralph Cossa, Washington, D.C., December 16, 2004.
442 Interview A28 
443 Interviews A3, A12, A15, and A16 
444 “New Obstacle to Nuclear Talks: Inter-Korean Relations Likely to Face Serious Setback,” Korea Times, 
January 25, 2006
445 Report of Twenty-second meeting, CSCAP CSBM International Working Group, p. 4 as well as 
interview A17
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PACATOM project that he developed may have helped develop a regional norm toward 
nuclear transparency in China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,446 while a 
nongovernmental member with government experience asserted that CSCAP’s export 
controls project “is not designed to influence [U.S.] government policy but to figure out 
how to use CSCAP to push ideas abroad.”447
CSCAP over time has also sought to transfer lessons to Asia from Europe, mostly 
through U.S. and European CSCAP members. In its initial meetings, Asian participants 
deeply resisted any lessons that might be applied from the continent which had 
previously colonized many Asian states.448 Within the network’s first decade, Europe had 
joined as a CSCAP member and hosted activities analyzing the relevance of European 
cooperative security experiences—including CSBMs, the OSCE, and even German-
Polish reconciliation after World War II—for Asia.449 Within nonproliferation, 
EURATOM’s lessons for PACATOM followed a similar course, facing initial resistance 
in Asia.450 Nevertheless, at least one Japanese participant teased out lessons from 
EURATOM that might be useful for Asia’s efforts.451 Experts brought in to discuss 
export controls included lessons from EU efforts to overcome many obstacles that Asian 
446 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., April 1, 2005
447 Interview A6 
448 CSCAP Memorandum 2, pp. 2-3, 7; Report on First CSCAP CSBM Working Group (Washington, DC, 
October 11-13, 1994): 3, as well as interview A16
449 Summary of Discussions, USCSCAP general membership/board of directors meeting (Washington, DC, 
June 22, 2000): 4, and Summary of Eighth Meeting of the CSCAP North Pacific Working Group, pp. 1-2 
450 Roberts and Davis, p. 5; Summary of Discussions, Sixth meeting, CSCAP CSBM Working Group, p. 2; 
Cossa, PACATOM, p. 14; and Simon, “Evaluating Track II Approaches,” p. 178.
451 Tatsujiro Suzuki, “Lessons from EURATOM for Possible Regional Nuclear Cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific Region (ASIATOM),” ch. 2 in Cossa, ed. Asia Pacific Multilateral Nuclear Safety and Non-
Proliferation: Exploring the Possibilities (Honolulu, HI: Pacific Forum Occasional Papers, December 
1996): 21-22. Also see Summary of Discussions, Sixth meeting, CSCAP CSBM Working Group, p. 2.
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governments encountered while constructing their own systems.452 Most recently, the 
CSBM working group began to analyze whether Asia could adopt a nonproliferation and 
export controls action plan similar to the EU’s.453
A former foreign service officer explained that papers from these international 
CSCAP meetings served in Asia as the functional equivalent of “non-papers,” or a 
diplomatic name for non-binding, idea-exploring documents shared among governments. 
The key is that they explore ideas, not agree on them, among think tanks in other 
countries which serve as extensions of the government.454 CSCAP might also influence 
foreign governments through PACNET. Anecdotally, Cossa and Glosserman have both 
heard from the region about articles they wrote on PACNET, or seen the principles 
resurface in other media. Cossa relayed that he has been told that op-eds he has written 
have been sent to the South Korean leadership, while Glosserman got an e-mail from the 
ASEAN head secretary of the ASEAN+3, assuring him that U.S. concerns that 
Glosserman had expressed in PACNET were being addressed in the forum. The PACNET
also seemed to help shape regional debates. In one, Cossa coined a term ‘Japan 
surpassing,’ playing on the terms ‘Japan bashing’ and ‘Japan passing,’ to refer to a new 
phase in U.S.-Japanese relations where Japan was surpassing expectations. According to 
Glosserman, that phrase soon reappeared in a column by Yoichi Funabashi, a widely 
respected strategic thinker who might be described as Japan’s version of Tom Friedman. 
One of Glosserman’s own PACNET’s, referring to Japan as Asia’s Switzerland because 
452 Brad Glosserman, “Export Controls: Fighting Proliferation and Building Confidence,” PacNet 
Newsletter 2003-35A (August 22, 2003), available at http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0335A.htm, accessed 
on March 9, 2005.
453 Report of Twenty-first meeting, CSCAP CSBM International Working Group, p. 4, as well as 
interviews A11 and A20
454 Interview A1 
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of their economic potential, was cited and used as the basis for a cover story in Newsweek
International. 455
Whether CSCAP’s efforts actually made a difference in these countries is beyond 
the scope of this paper, but the interviews conducted for it revealed some evidence that 
they may have been successful. Interviewing foreign participants might reveal more.
Conclusions
The 2004 reorganization of CSCAP’s working groups could mark either the beginning of 
the end of the network’s value as multilateralism becomes a regional habit, or it could be 
the beginning of its transition to even greater, more focused regional influence. 
Whichever emerges, CSCAP in just its first dozen years has had value for U.S. 
participants even though not a single American exclusively works on or for CSCAP. 
Although at least one member wondered whether CSCAP was useful as an organization 
and how many people actually benefited from it,456 the key value is primarily to 
individuals and what they get out of it. Or to be more precise, what they take from it. If 
utilized, the network benefits both government and nongovernmental participants. 
For the U.S. government, CSCAP provides: 
• intelligence: honest feedback on U.S. policy both from the region and from U.S. 
nongovernmental experts; 
455 Author’s interviews with Ralph Cossa, Washington, D.C., December 16, 2004; and with Brad 
Glosserman, Washington, D.C., December 14, 2004. See Yoichi Funabashi, "From Japan Bashing to Japan 
Surpassing," International Herald Tribune/Asahi Shimbun, March 30, 2004; Brad Glosserman, “Japan’s 
‘Swiss’ Option,” PacNet Newsletter 11 (March 15, 2002) at http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0211.htm; and 
George Wehrfritz with Hideko Takayama, "Japan: What to Wear," Newsweek International, May 13, 2002, 
p. 28.
456 Interview A12 
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• integration: a tool to help government officials, usually with narrow portfolios, to 
provide an integrated regional perspective on security issues; 
• public diplomacy: a forum to reach out both to U.S. experts off-the-record to 
explain U.S. policy in more depth and to the Asian foreign policy elite; 
• regional agenda setting: a way to help shape the Asian security agenda through 
their own foreign policy elite; 
• an avenue to contact North Korea; 
• a safety net for issues such as PACATOM that slip between bureaucratic cracks; 
and 
• contingency planning to begin to think through the implications of different 
political circumstances, such as if an agreement between Washington and 
Pyongyang were to be reached.
Outside the U.S. government, CSCAP provides information and ideas— from 
thoughtful debates, from the region directly via Asian experts as well as indirectly 
through peers’ recent trips, and from U.S. government off-the-record briefings—on U.S. 
policy, events in Southeast Asia, and recent events such as crises, political change, and 
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summits. Quite simply, CSCAP’s primary influence is not as an organization but to 
empower individuals who are members of CSCAP with information and sharper 
opinions.457 The influence individuals may wield is rarely policy recommendations, but 
the ability to give feedback to the U.S. government and to the public about how U.S. 
policies are perceived, the repercussions of a crisis or summit, or what the foreign policy 
implications might be of domestic changes overseas, as well as, for the handful that travel 
overseas, to explain the United States to the region. As Cossa himself simply stated, it is 
about “perceptions not policies.”458
457 Interviews A1, A2, and A4 
458 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., December 16, 2004
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE NORTHEAST ASIAN COOPERATION DIALOGUE
The Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) was founded in 1993 to “continue 
to reduce mistrust within the North Pacific region and to avert conflicts through 
confidence and security building measures” by periodically convening a handful of 
government officials in their private capacity with nongovernmental experts from China, 
Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and the United States in an informal, 
multilateral forum.459 From 1993-2005, NEACD (commonly pronounced nee’ sid) has 
convened sixteen times in plenary sessions which have been held at least annually (two 
were held in 1996, 1997, and 2002). The host rotates among the six countries except for 
North Korea, which was a founding member but has only attended three dialogues from 
2002-04. NEACD has been organized by the University of California’s Institute on 
Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) under the direction of Susan Shirk, except from 
1997-2000 when she left to be a U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia 
and the Pacific and Stephan Haggard temporarily stepped in. Since its founding, the 
network has been funded almost exclusively by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office 
of Nonproliferation and National Security, although substantial assistance is sometimes 
provided by the host country.460
Each meeting notionally consists of 30 participants, with one representative from 
the Foreign Ministry, one policymaker from the Defense Ministry, one uniformed 
military officer—all participating in their private or unofficial capacity—and two 
459 Summary of Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue, available at http://www-
igcc.ucsd.edu/regions/northeast_asia/neacd/ (accessed June 8, 2002), hereafter referred to as NEACD 
summary.
460 Electronic message from Susan Shirk to author, July 24, 2005
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nongovernmental experts from universities or think tanks from each of the six countries 
attending. Although no session has exactly met this formula, they have been quite close 
except for North Korea’s participation. The agenda for each meeting contains a tour 
d’table of national perspectives on regional security, at which one participant from each 
country (almost always from the Foreign Ministry) gives a 5-10 minute presentation from 
their country’s perspective, ideally emphasizing issues since the last NEACD meeting. 
After each presentation, a question and answer as well as discussion period follows for up 
to 50 minutes on each country.461 Through the years, the rest of the agenda has been filled 
by a variety of subjects including presentations of occasional NEACD study groups, 
national military perspectives on regional security, the future of NEACD itself, and 
special discussion sections on a particular topic.
Because it seeks to create an informal environment where government officials 
can speak freely, NEACD publishes very few documents. Participants are assured that 
sessions are off-the-record and there are no public transcripts of any meeting. Although a 
handful of papers prepared for the first six meetings were published by IGCC, no paper 
has been published since 1997. A general, 1-2 page newsletter summary has been 
prepared and posted on a website after all but one meeting, along with the agenda and 
participants list for all sixteen NEACD plenary meetings. Conclusions of any study 
groups, ranging from 1-3 pages long, have also been prepared. In 1998, at the eighth 
meeting, the IGCC also established an online infrastructure, entitled Wired for Peace
(www.wiredforpeace.org), to support NEACD by posting the newsletter summaries, 
agenda, participant lists, and establishing a password-protected bulletin board enabling 
alumni to conduct “virtual diplomacy.” Since at least 2003, Shirk and two or three other 
461 NEACD summary
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U.S. participants have also held a public briefing for the D.C. community at the 
University of California’s Washington Center.
For this case study, seventeen original interviews with staff, funders, participants, 
and senior U.S. government policymakers were conducted. Participants, either 
nongovernmental or governmental, were targeted for interviews if they attended two or
more NEACD meetings. Table 4.1 contains descriptions of the candidates for interviews, 
divided by their role in NEACD and whether they were primarily NGO or government 
participants. Some interviews were not conducted either because candidates had retired or 
otherwise could not be found, declined to be interviewed, or did not respond to requests 
to be interviewed.
Table 4.1 NEACD Interview Candidates NGO USG Total
NEACD Staff 7 462 - 7
NEACD Funders 0 3 3
NEACD Participants 4 15 19
Attended 2 or more NEACD meetings 3 8 11
Policymakers who attended once463 1 464 7 8
Senior government policymakers465 - 5 5
Total 11 23 34
462 NEACD staff sought for interviews included Susan Shirk, Stephan Haggard, and five assistants to 
Professors Shirk or Haggard, most of whom were graduate students during their affiliation with NEACD. 
Only one of those assistants has actually been interviewed for this study.
463 Because of their positions in the policymaking chain, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretaries, and policy planning staff members were sought for interviews even if they only 
attended one meeting.
464 Former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Robert Einhorn, who only participated once 
and had already left government at that time, was interviewed for this study and is oddly categorized 
simultaneously as an NGO participant and a policymaker who attended once. The other former 
policymakers attended NEACD when they were in government and are included as USG officials.
465 Senior government policymakers are defined as senior directors of the NSC staff, Assistant Secretaries 
of State for East Asia and the Pacific, or the chief U.S. coordinator for the six-party talks on North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program. Two subjects were already recorded in the CSCAP chapter because they 
participated in that study. Although they also discussed NEACD, they are not tallied here to avoid 
redundantly counting those interviews. 
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Eleven of the seventeen interviews conducted were with U.S. government 
officials, two of whom are members of the revolving door but were in government when 
they participated in NEACD. The other six interviews were with members of 
nongovernmental organizations, although two of those six, including Shirk herself, also 
had government experience before and/or after their NEACD participation. In other 
words, of the seventeen interviews conducted, nine were with permanent or retired 
government employees (civil service, foreign service, or military), four with members of 
the revolving door, and four with academics who had not been employed in government. 
Descriptions of the interviews actually conducted are contained in table 4.2. Throughout 
this chapter, opinions expressed in only a single interview, whether cited anonymously or 
specifically, will be noted as one person’s opinion. In addition to these interviews, 
NEACD was kind enough to allow the author to attend the 2004 La Jolla meeting 
(NEACD-15), which the North Koreans attended, and the 2005 Seoul meeting (NEACD-
16), which the North Koreans did not.
Table 4.2 NEACD Interviews Conducted NGO USG Total
NEACD Staff 3 - 3
NEACD Funders 0 3 3
NEACD Participants 3 7 10
Attended 2 or more NEACD meetings 2 5 7
Policymakers who attended once 1 2 3
Senior government policymakers - 1 1
Total 6 11 17
Having introduced NEACD’s infrastructure as well as the primary materials and 
interviews utilized, the subsequent three parts of this chapter will include descriptions of 
the issues NEACD has covered from 1993-2005; an evaluation of the network based on 
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the four-part framework presented in the introductory chapter; and finally a series of 
observations and conclusions about NEACD. The concluding chapter (chapter 6) will 
include comparisons with the other two case studies. This chapter will be limited to 
NEACD itself, starting with the issues the network has addressed.
Issues NEACD Has Addressed
In addition to the central tour d’table of national perspectives on regional security, early 
NEACD sessions typically included a focused session on one non-security issue and/or 
updates on the progress of one or more of four special NEACD study groups. The non-
security sessions explored potential economic cooperation, the environment, agricultural 
cooperation and trade, energy security, or maritime trade.466
Two special study groups were established at the 3rd NEACD meeting (NEACD-
3), held in 1995. At each study group, one member from each participating country 
would contribute, aiming to issue a series of recommendations for the main plenary 
meeting to discuss further.467 One project focused on “Principles of Cooperation in 
Northeast Asia,” ultimately agreeing upon eight, which were presented to and endorsed 
by NEACD-7 participants, held in Tokyo in December 1997 (see box 4.3). Although it 
seems fair to say that the principles were quite bland, it was arguably both a significant 
step given regional politics at that time and equally important, NEACD statements 
emphasized, not to overlook what participants learned through the process of discussing 
these issues, even if agreement was not reached on some issues such as human rights.468
466 NEACD summary
467 Ibid.
468 Summary of Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue IV, Beijing, China, January 8-10, 1996, available at 
http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/regions/northeast_asia/neacd/neacd1.hmtl (accessed June 12, 2002) and 
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The second study group focused on mutual reassurance measures (MRMs), or 
“broader measures to promote a basis for mutual confidence and reassurance that include 
but are not limited to military-related measures.”469 Although NEACD members did 
Summary of Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue V, Seoul, Korea, September 9-12, 1996, available at 
http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/regions/northeast_asia/neacd/neacd5.hmtl (accessed June 12, 2002)
469 NEACD summary
Table 4.3: Principles of Cooperation in Northeast Asia
The states of Northeast Asia share the common objectives of peace, prosperity, and 
security in the region. To achieve these ends, they advance the following principles of 
cooperation in Northeast Asia.
1. The states of Northeast Asia respect each other’s sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, and equality; accept that other countries have different political, 
economic, social and cultural systems and the right to determine their own 
laws and regulations as well as other domestic affairs. They also recognize that 
they are obliged to abide by and implement international agreements to which 
they are a party.
2. The states of Northeast Asia will refrain from the threat or use of force against 
each other; will settle disputes through peaceful means; and pledge to use 
consultation, negotiation, and other peaceful means to prevent conflict 
between and among each other.
3. The states of Northeast Asia express their commitment to the protection and 
promotion of human rights in accordance with the purposes and principles of 
the UN Charter.
4. To prevent misunderstanding and develop trust, the states of Northeast Asia 
will promote dialogue, information exchange, and transparency on security 
issues of common concern.
5. The states of Northeast Asia respect the principle of freedom of navigation 
based on international law.
6. The states of Northeast Asia will promote economic cooperation and the 
development of trade and investment in the region.
7. The states of Northeast Asia will cooperate on transnational issues of common 
concern, such as organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, and illegal 
immigration.
8. The states of Northeast Asia will cooperate in the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, such as food aid and disaster relief.
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agree on the statement that “MRMs are vital to the maintenance of peace and 
stability,”470 the group bogged down, deciding within 18 months “to proceed in an 
incremental way, focusing first on dialogue and exchanges to cultivate a sense of 
cooperation and lay a sound foundation for future efforts.”471 Participants at NEACD-5, 
held in September 1996 in Seoul, decided to focus the MRM efforts on Defense 
Information Sharing (DIS), creating a third NEACD project which continues to this day. 
The purpose of the DIS effort, which includes only civilian defense officials and 
uniformed military officers, “is to provide a forum for discussion of current efforts at 
information sharing and systematic discussions of perspectives on military doctrine, to 
clarify information currently found in information sharing documents, and to encourage 
voluntary and unilateral information sharing.”472 In essence, it is a multilateral military 
exchange among officials in their private capacity, ideally enabling study participants to 
discuss military doctrine informally and tour facilities such as the PLA Navy North China 
Sea Fleet headquarters, stationed in Qingdao.473 Although they were initially held at a 
different time and place than the NEACD plenary session, the DIS talks have become a 
permanent addendum to the NEACD format, being held on the margins of every NEACD 
plenary session since 2001, and have effectively replaced the national military 
perspectives on regional security that were presented in the plenary session itself from 
1995-99.
470 Summary of Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue IV
471 Summary of Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue V
472 Summary of Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue VI, Harriman, New York, April 2-4, 1997, available 
at http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/regions/northeast_asia/neacd/neacd6.hmtl (accessed June 12, 2002)
473 Meeting Report of Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue 14, Qingdao, China, 1-2 September 2003, 
available at http://www.wiredforpeace.org/neacd14.php (accessed November 21, 2003)
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The fourth and final NEACD study group convened in 2001 to discuss the 
potential for a formal, track-one Northeast Asian multilateral dialogue. The group 
produced a concept paper slightly longer than two pages, outlining four possible ways to 
establish such an organization: “establish a new forum; expand an existing 
[governmental] forum (e.g. The Four Party Talks); convert a track-two forum into a 
track-one forum; or use an occasion when officials of all six countries are present.” To its 
credit, the group avoided the temptation to promote NEACD overtly and concluded, “The 
last approach seems preferable….At the next ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2001 the 
foreign ministers of the six countries of Northeast Asia could meet informally for 
breakfast or tea.”474
In addition to any study group reports, NEACD-8 began to include a special 
session on recent events, effectively supplanting the earlier non-security oriented session. 
At that November 1998 meeting, participants discussed the security implications of the 
1996-97 Asian financial crisis, as well as the August 1998 North Korean missile test and 
its potential implications for regional or national missile defense programs.475 The 
November 2000 meeting (NEACD-10) focused on more positive developments: 
rapprochement on the Korean peninsula after the June 2000 Korean summit between 
South Korea’s Kim Dae Jung and North Korea’s Kim Jong Il.476 After the September 11 
attacks, the 2001 and April 2002 NEACD sessions discussed regional counterterrorism 
cooperation, including the expanding role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in 
474 “Northeast Asian Track-One Multilateral Dialogue,” A Concept Paper of the NEACD Study Project, 
June 21, 2001.
475 Summary of Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue VIII, Moscow, Russia, November 11-12, 1998, 
available at http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/regions/northeast_asia/neacd/neacd8.hmtl (accessed June 12, 2002)
476 Summary of Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue X, Seoul, Korea, November 9-10, 2000, available at 
http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/regions/northeast_asia/neacd/neacd10.hmtl (accessed June 12, 2002)
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assisting the United States.477 Finally, in 2002, attention turned back to Korea after North 
Korea began to attend NEACD for the first of three consecutive years. Coincidentally, 
the North Korean nuclear crisis reignited almost as the October 2002 NEACD was being 
held, when Assistant Secretary of State Kelly confronted North Korea with U.S. evidence 
that the DPRK was pursuing a highly-enriched uranium program in violation of the 1994 
Agreed Framework.
While these were the formal NEACD topics during its first thirteen years, subjects 
interviewed portrayed the network as informally going through three stages.478 In the 
mid-1990s, NEACD initially appeared to focus on seeking to integrate, or socialize, 
China into a regional, multilateral framework particularly after incidents like the 1995 
Taiwan Strait missile crisis—when China launched missiles off the coast of Taiwan to 
seek to deter the Taiwanese from electing Lee Teng-hui, who Beijing believed was 
pursuing a secessionist agenda. In the late 1990s, a second informal stage, keeping 
multilateralism alive, seemed to be a primary goal as the immediate post-Cold War 
optimism for its potential began to fade. Finally, the North Korean nuclear issue has 
become the primary focus since 2002. 
Although missile defense was briefly discussed, particularly potential Japanese 
participation in theater missile defense after the 1998 North Korean nuclear test and 
before the September 11 terrorist attacks, the proliferation issues at NEACD have almost 
exclusively revolved around the North Korean nuclear crisis, even when North Korea did 
not attend. Two former deputy assistant secretaries and one NEACD staff member 
interviewed for this study separately relayed that, in its earlier years, NEACD seemed to 
477 Meeting Report of Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue 11, Honolulu, Hawaii, 8-9 November 2001, 
available at http://www.wiredforpeace.org/neacd11.php (accessed November 21, 2003)
478 Interviews B2, B34, and B36 
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have almost a desperate quality to it at times, searching for topics to tackle in lieu of 
North Korean attendants, who sometimes canceled at the last minute, while attending 
members discussed how to entice North Korea to attend the next meeting.479
Results
Contacts and Perceptions
Similar to CSCAP, whether NEACD established valuable networking connections and 
whether participants gained useful new information or perceptions depended on the 
previous experience of each participant, with nongovernmental contributors potentially 
gaining different connections and insights than government officials. Even among 
nongovernmental members, academics and think tank employees, and within 
government, State Department and military officers seemed to garner different benefits.
Nongovernmental Participants For some U.S. nongovernmental participants, NEACD 
introduced them to new, professionally valuable contacts. In those cases, NGO 
participants cited the opportunity to follow up individually after the conference as 
valuable for their own research and writing, particularly with participants from China or 
government officials from all participating countries.480 Bob Einhorn, formerly the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation who participated in NEACD after he left 
government, directly explained: “When I was in government, I had all the government 
contacts I could ever want, even with the North Korean government. I could have as 
479 Interviews B4, B36, and B39 
480 Interviews B30, B32, and B37 
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many nongovernmental contacts as I wanted….In terms of networking, frankly, it’s more 
valuable for nongovernmental people than for governmental people.”481
From the plenary sessions themselves, U.S. nongovernmental participants 
mentioned at least two insights they gained. First, North Korean participation seemed to 
make an impression on academics who had not served in government, and had no 
previous contact with Pyongyang. In the formal session, for example, the character of the 
North Korean rhetoric struck one academic participant: 
[T]he North Koreans were talking at great length about…how all of this 
was predicated on the perception of changing, and increasingly hostile, 
U.S. policy toward them. It wasn’t that this was particularly new or 
shocking to me, but the clarity with which the message was conveyed by 
them, and the continued resonance of the same approach, made it very 
clear to me that much of what the American government had been 
presenting as its policies was just running into a terribly solid brick wall 
with the North Koreans that made me much more pessimistic about the 
possibility for resolving the differences than I was, perhaps, going into 
it.482
On the margins of the formal plenary sessions, another academic engaged the North 
Koreans and found that, although they certainly were not critical of their own 
government, they seemed interested about what kinds of questions were being posed to 
them, and were willing to open up about their own perspectives on North Korean 
relations with other countries around the table.483
Second, U.S. NGO participants said they learned some things about the 
contemporary policies and perspectives of other countries around the table besides North 
481 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., June 2, 2005
482 Interview B37 
483 Interview B30 
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Korea and the United States.484 Although participants did not remember specifics when 
pressed, they recalled that they felt they were getting unique insights about current policy 
from government officials in other countries. As one participant put it: “In general, 
academics express their views about what should be policy. Governments express what is 
policy.”485
Participants in and out of government stressed that the ability of government 
officials to speak in their personal capacity did not reveal any hidden opposition to 
current policy from within governments. The insights were more nuanced, allowing for a 
deeper explanation of current policy, rather than disagreeing with it.486 One government 
official went so far as to say that, even in the United States, the idea that a government 
official would express an opinion distinct from official policy “is a fallacy. No 
government official ever speaks on their own unless their own personal opinion is the 
government opinion. It’s ludicrous!”487 [emphasis in original interview]
Government Participants One of NEACD’s unique aspects is that government 
contributors outnumber nongovernmental ones, sometimes leading it to be labeled a 
“track one-and-a-half” dialogue. Those officials generally already knew each other, 
limiting NEACD’s potential networking value for government participants. One observer 
mentioned that many conference participants seemed to hang out in between formal 
sessions with their own profession488—diplomats with diplomats, military officers with 
military officers, and professors with professors—further reducing the opportunity for 
484 Interviews B30, B32, and B37 
485 Interview B30 
486 Interviews B29, B30, and B34 
487 Interview A4 
488 Electronic message from B4 
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government attendees to make new contacts. Although one did mention that they met 
valuable NGO contacts,489 and two others working in the U.S. State Department valued 
meeting Chinese military officials for the first time,490 just as many government 
participants interviewed for this study believed they did not make professionally valuable 
contacts through NEACD, either because they did not value them or did not follow up 
after the conference.491
One exception seemed to be that officials—either at low levels or even in 
policymaking positions—who were either new to the region entirely, to a particular 
element of the region (such as a Korea expert who was beginning to work on China), or 
even to diplomacy in general were able to gain introductory insights into the region 
through NEACD.492 A second potential exception is if any contacts made or reinforced 
through NEACD might eventually rise to an even more influential position within their 
own government.493 Fu Ying, a Chinese participant in NEACD who subsequently became 
Beijing’s principal participant in the six-party talks, was cited as an example. Notionally, 
these specific personal ties built at NEACD could plant the seeds for a better future 
working relationship. If political relations among countries were to improve in the future, 
one government participant cited the potential for these early investments in personal 
relationships to become even more valuable.494 They could be, in other words, down 
payments in case relations improved, even if NEACD had no immediate effect on 
relations at all.
489 Interview B3 
490 Interviews B39 and B40 
491 Interviews B29, B34, and B36 
492 Interviews B1, B39, and B41
493 Interviews B29 and B39 
494 Interview B38 
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Even if most government officials did not believe that they established valuable 
new contacts through NEACD, those officials still might have learned something new 
from their participation, or used NEACD for diplomatically useful purposes. Specifically, 
three primary characteristics were cited that made NEACD different from official 
government contacts: the presence of NGOs; the informality, or ability for officials to 
speak unofficially in their private capacity; and the multilateral format. The question is: 
do these differences matter? Do government officials believe they learned something new 
because of the presence of scholars, the informality of the dialogue, or its multilateral 
dimensions? 
Nongovernmental analysts seemed to provoke the discussion in otherwise 
overlooked directions, according to government participants.495 Robert Scalapino, a 
highly respected Asian expert from Berkeley who has attended thirteen of NEACD’s 
sixteen meetings, was specifically cited as someone who could frame current issues in an 
historical context, provoking at least one U.S. diplomat to look at current problems in a 
new, deeper historical way.496 One participant, however, felt that nongovernmental 
participants used to be more valuable. That participant felt that NGO participants used to 
speak more when NEACD first started,497 increasingly deferring to government officials 
as those officials have become more comfortable in an unofficial setting. Nevertheless, at 
one of the more recent meetings, NEACD-15 in La Jolla in 2004, NGO participants did 
seek to stimulate the plenary discussion, which North Koreans attended, by asking 
questions like: why Pyongyang objected to the U.S.-proposed CVID formula 
(comprehensive, verifiable, irreversible disarmament) for solving the nuclear crisis; 
495 Interviews B29, B36, and B39
496 Interview B39 as well as B4
497 Interview B31 
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which countries around the table supported CVID; what North Korea felt the United 
States should do differently if it wanted to prove it did not have a hostile policy toward 
the DPRK; and what various countries’ positions were on the proliferation security 
initiative (PSI).498
The informality, NEACD’s second difference from official talks, seemed to allow 
discussion to flow in a distinct direction that got at the roots, or core motivations, behind 
various governments’ policies. As mentioned earlier, being able to speak in their private 
capacity did not embolden government officials to raise objections to their government 
policies. It did, however, change the character of the dialogue to make NEACD more 
relaxed and informative, according to current and former government officials, 
stimulating an exchange of views rather than talking points.499 Although one diplomat 
disagreed, particularly arguing that “with North Koreans, there really is no such thing as 
informal dialogue,”500 others cited a difference, especially with countries other than 
North Korea.
One senior government policymaker listed a range of differences—including 
lesser time constraints on talks which might include field trips to allow for broad 
discussions; an open, unconfined agenda in the formal sessions themselves; the absence 
of media scrutiny; the lack of extremely detailed reporting requirements; and the fact that 
agreed decision points are not required at the end of each meeting—all of which allowed 
participants to explore questions they might have about other governments’ positions and 
498 Author’s notes from NEACD-15, La Jolla, California, April 5-6, 2004
499 Interview B32 and B301 as well NEACD summary
500 Interview B34 
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to be more expansive about their own answers.501 Another former senior policymaker 
even cited what resembles peer pressure as a potential factor: 
In your track-1 context, everyone is constrained. There’s not terribly much 
premium in being too interesting. It’s better to be safe than too interesting…. [In 
track one-and-a half], why should I look like the stilted, rigid schnook in the 
group, who is reading talking points? Let me be a little bit more spontaneous. 
There’s an incentive in that setting, I think, to be somewhat more candid.502
That same former official also mentioned a relaxed setting, such as the La Jolla hotel 
right on the beach, away from normal diplomatic conference rooms, as a factor that could 
accelerate informality and the learning process even further. Another government official 
cited the personal relationships developed over time, particularly with Asian countries 
who they argued culturally rely more on personal and less on contractual or professional 
relationships.503
NEACD’s third distinct factor, its multilateral format, allows participants to see 
how other countries relate to one another, enabling them to become a proverbial fly on 
the wall, and had not otherwise been available for just these five or six countries. 
Participants with U.S. government experience cited the window it gave even regional 
experts into how frank and tense relations could be between China and Japan,504 or South 
Korea and Japan. The United States could also use the forum to try to get those parties to 
talk to one another, particularly U.S. allies Korea and Japan.505 Jim Steinberg, the State 
Department’s policy planning director at the time who would go on to be the deputy 
national security advisor, said the 1996 dialogue he attended even led him to dispense 
501 Interview B301 
502 Interview B32 
503 Interview B3 
504 Interviews B39 and B40
505 Interviews B3 and B36 
177
with the notion that Sino-Japanese relations tended to balance Sino-U.S. relations. Prior 
to the meeting, he sensed that bad Sino-U.S. relations drove China toward Japan, while 
better Sino-U.S. relations allowed Sino-Japanese relations to deteriorate. After the 
NEACD meeting he attended, he came away with the impression that Sino-Japanese 
relations were driven more by endogenous factors, heavily constrained by “strategic and 
historic animosity and mistrust.”506
Such a multilateral forum for the five or six Northeast Asian countries was not 
available anywhere else, at least for government officials, until the six-party talks were 
first held in August 2003, ten years after NEACD started. Although the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) did exist, it included a number of other Southeast Asian countries that 
complicated dialogue. Government officials argued that NEACD foreshadowed the more 
focused official talks, acting as a trial to see if such a multilateral security organization 
might work.507 To further enhance opportunities for government officials to interact, 
NEACD hosts a luncheon just for foreign ministry officials during its plenary session. 
Two of the U.S. State Department participants, however, each said that the wrong people 
attended those luncheons to make any sort of meaningful progress and, in at least one 
case, the agenda focused more on “the timing, venue, participation, and objectives of the 
next [NEACD] meeting” rather than a substantive agenda.508 Nevertheless, for the 2005 
NEACD meeting in Seoul, South Korea proposed and hosted an expanded version into a 
full afternoon, giving some indication that they felt the official forum was useful, or at 
least that it could be if more time was available.
506 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., August 22, 2005
507 Interviews B3, B33, B36, B38, B39, and B40
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While some government officials believed they learned new things through 
NEACD, U.S. officials also emphasized the potential to use the forum to send a variety of 
diplomatic signals, namely: to conduct multilateral diplomacy, to engage in public 
diplomacy both narrowly with NGO participants and more broadly as a sign of 
willingness to engage North Korea, and to help reinforce the track-one dialogue at the 
six-party talks. Different government officials used NEACD for different multilateral 
diplomatic purposes, depending on the state of relations at the time. In the early stages of 
NEACD, one government policymaker said he used a 1996 session to help inform the 
other countries about ongoing bilateral talks between North Korea and the United States 
and where they might be going, at a time when South Korea was uncomfortable with 
those talks, Beijing was much closer with Pyongyang, and no other multilateral format 
existed.509 Similarly, in 1996-97, another policymaker was primarily seeking to get the 
United States, Japan, and Korea to work more closely together on a variety of issues, 
while simultaneously seeking to get China to bring North Korea to the negotiating 
table.510 More recently, others sought to explain elements of U.S. policy to the region as a 
whole, such as its reasons for concern about the North Korean nuclear program, why it 
might seek to refer North Korea to the UN Security Council, and the likely priorities of a 
new diplomatic team at the State Department when Condoleezza Rice had just begun as 
Secretary of State and Ambassador Christopher Hill was replacing Jim Kelly as Assistant 
Secretary of State.511 It also provided an opportunity, as one senior policymaker 
mentioned, for various pairs of countries, such as the United States and South Korea, to 
509 Interview B39
510 Interview B36
511 Interviews B38 and B301 and author’s notes from NEACD-16, Seoul, Korea, April 12-13, 2005
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clarify their policies toward North Korea and explain to others that they were not 
diverging as media stories might portray.512
NEACD also provided an opportunity for more public diplomacy. At the talks 
themselves, one participating government policymaker said it gave them an opportunity 
to explain U.S. policy, and to answer North Korean accusations in front of 
nongovernmental participants who might, in turn, shape their own country’s opinions.513
Others with government experience said that the dialogue served as a signal to reassure 
everyone, even beyond the participants in the meeting, such as U.S. allies in South Korea 
that the United States was interested or at least willing to engage North Korea.514
A third benefit that has emerged more recently is an opportunity to follow up 
directly with North Korea, when they participate in NEACD, and reinforce the formal 
six-party diplomatic channel. While the theoretical argument is that channels like 
NEACD can be useful when formal government contacts do not exist, government 
officials argued that the network was more useful when it served to supplement nascent 
contacts.515 One senior government policymaker argued that building personal contacts 
was somewhat useful, but realistically those were limited with so much mistrust built up 
between Pyongyang and Washington. Because there were almost no supplementary 
bilateral channels (with the possible exception of contacts that could be made on the 
margins of the UN) like those that exist between the United States and the other four 
parties, NEACD allowed the U.S. government to potentially foreshadow an upcoming 
512 Interview B301 
513 Interview B34
514 Interviews A21 and B36 
515 Interviews B301, B34, and B38
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round of the six-party talks, giving North Korea a “heads up” about what issues would be 
particularly important to the United States.516
NEACD could also be used to follow up after a round of the six-party talks. By 
sheer coincidence, NEACD-13 was held in China, just a week or two after the first 
official round. At least two NEACD participants, Fu Ying from China and a Russian, had 
actually attended the six-party talks and were able to bring that direct knowledge to 
NEACD. Don Keyser, who was the U.S. Principal Deputy Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs at that time, explained that he was able to pursue a wide range 
of objectives at the NEACD meeting, including reiterating that the United States did not 
have a hostile policy toward North Korea,517 and elaborating on the benefits of an 
executive agreement for any potential solution, as opposed to a treaty which would 
require Congressional consent.518 Keyser was also able to correct some of the media 
coverage immediately after the six-party talks, addressing any potentially inaccurate 
reporting such as whether the United States was demanding that North Korea make all 
the concessions first.519 Keyser also said that the network meeting allowed him to see 
what messages had been absorbed by North Korea and the other four parties.520 In turn, it 
allowed the United States to demonstrate the solidarity among the parties other than 
North Korea in the negotiations.521
Finally, NEACD uniquely allowed the United States to clearly convey bipartisan 
support for certain aspects of the administration’s position. Keyser said that at the 2004 
516 Interview B301 
517 Electronic message to author, August 19, 2005
518 Author’s notes from NEACD-14 briefing, Washington, DC, October 9, 2003
519 Interview with author, Fairfax, VA, June 15, 2005, and electronic message to author, August 19, 2005
520 Author’s notes from NEACD-14 briefing
521 Interview with author, Fairfax, VA, June 15, 2005, and electronic message to author, August 19, 2005
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NEACD meeting in the United States, Bob Einhorn, the former Assistant Secretary of 
State for Nonproliferation from the Clinton administration, was able to convey solidarity 
for many aspects of the administration’s policies, such as PSI, and dissuade North Korean 
participants from the notion that Pyongyang might get a better deal from a future Kerry 
administration. Keyser emphasized that Einhorn could credibly go into greater detail 
about the reasoning behind U.S. policy because he was out of government but had 
previously served in an authoritative position.522 Although another former official 
highlighted the potential difficulty that nongovernmental participants might theoretically 
publicly disagree with U.S. policy toward North Korea,523 in this case Einhorn actually 
did the opposite: using the network to emphasize that media coverage highlighting 
controversy should not give foreign governments the impression that disagreements 
within the U.S. government were deeper than they actually were. Forums like NEACD 
allowed officials and even nongovernmental officials to clarify that these differences 
were merely nuances, played up to sell copies, but agreement on the policy fundamentals 
was solid.524
Whether these messages were getting through to North Korea in NEACD or in 
direct talks, for that matter, is anybody’s guess, Keyser emphasized. He said that the state 
of our knowledge about North Korea is so minimal that it is not even clear whether 
DPRK diplomats communicate with Pyongyang by cables, the traditional diplomatic 
method, or exclusively by direct, oral briefings. Keyser even believed that the North 
Korean delegation at the 2003 NEACD meeting in China did not know what had actually 
happened at the formal talks that had just concluded. The key, he said, is therefore to get 
522 Interview with author, Fairfax, VA, June 15, 2005, and electronic message to author, August 19, 2005
523 Interview B36 
524 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., June 2, 2005
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as many different streams of information as possible to Pyongyang, reinforcing the same 
message to maximize the chances that it gets through, and provide opportunities to 
answer any questions that may have arisen through whatever information-sharing process 
Pyongyang uses.525
When asked whether any sort of trial balloon may have been floated by the United 
States to the North Koreans, however, two former officials serving at separate times, one 
from the State Department and one from the Pentagon, said there were none in their 
experience.526 In the broadest sense, as mentioned earlier, NEACD was an organizational 
trial for the six-party talks, but no specific policy trial balloons were mentioned in 
interviews conducted for this study.
In sum, although experienced U.S. government officials did not seem to make 
professionally valuable contacts through NEACD, some were able to learn about 
relations among other parties in the network because of the catalytic presence of 
nongovernmental participants, the informality of the dialogue, and the multilateral 
format. They were also able to send diplomatic messages to all the parties 
simultaneously, to conduct public diplomacy in order to shape elite as well as public 
opinion through nongovernmental participants, and to reinforce nascent diplomatic 
contacts with North Korea. 
U.S. Government Access and Interaction 
Because NEACD generally meets only once a year, includes only five participants from 
each country, and integrally relies on confidentiality, the level of participation within the 
525 Interview with author, Fairfax, VA, June 15, 2005
526 Interviews B34 and B36
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U.S. government has been crucial to its potential effect in the United States.527 From at 
least the U.S. State Department, the consensus seems to be that a deputy assistant 
secretary (DAS), and ideally the principal deputy assistant secretary (PDAS), is the 
appropriate level of participation.528 As one former policymaker who worked their way 
up to become an assistant secretary said: “The level of deputy assistant secretary is the 
most important level in the government. DASs are the most junior senior people and the 
most senior junior people. In other words, they have to have the detail of an action 
officer, but they also have to think in policy terms and be able to translate that policy to 
the action officer. There is kind of a critical bridge.”529 The primary problem seems to be 
the time demands on a policymaker of that level, particularly because in four out of every 
five years, NEACD meetings are held in Asia, requiring extensive travel. Even if a 
government official commits to going to a meeting, it is always possible that something 
will come up at the last minute, requiring them to stay in Washington and leave NEACD 
with either a lower level or no U.S. State Department representative.530
In the first two NEACD meetings, the U.S. State Department initially committed 
to send a PDAS, but it has varied over time. After those two initial meetings, the U.S. 
State Department sent the DAS responsible for China because of its initial focus on 
NEACD as a forum to help integrate China into the region.531 As that happened and the 
State Department’s perception of the network shifted to use NEACD as a building block 
for regional multilateralism in the late 1990s, while simultaneously becoming more 
skeptical about regional multilateralism’s prospects, State downgraded its NEACD 
527 Interviews B34 and B301
528 Interviews B2, B32, B38, and B301 
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530 Interviews A4, B34, and B41 
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participant to the office director for regional security policy.532 Finally, after North Korea 
reemerged as the network’s focus after 2002, State once again sent the PDAS, at least in 
part because the office director for regional security policy did not have Korea as part of 
their portfolio, and the PDAS could cover the entire range of regional issues, including 
North Korea.533 Altogether, over the sixteen meetings, State has sent a PDAS almost half 
the time (7 of 16), a DAS a quarter of the time (4 of 16), an office director or below a 
quarter of the time (4 of 16), and no participant from State went to the most recent 
meeting, principally because the confirmation hearings for Assistant Secretary of State 
Chris Hill were being held at the same time. A member of the policy planning staff has 
also attended twice.  
The civilian representative from the Defense Department has generally been at a 
lower level, and less frequent, than State. At the inaugural meeting, the Pentagon sent the 
deputy assistant secretary of defense (DASD), the highest ranking official responsible for 
Asia. In the subsequent fifteen meetings, only one DASD attended: Kurt Campbell, who 
attended twice. In six of the other NEACD meetings, an office director or lower attended 
with the deputy director for regional affairs and Congressional relations attending three of 
those times, and no civilian from the Pentagon attended the other seven meetings, 
including all six of the sessions since 2000. Altogether, a DASD attended less than a 
quarter of the time (3 of 16), an office director or below about one-third of the time (6 of 
16), and no civilian from Defense went almost half the time (7 of 16).
Although a uniformed military officer was not part of the initial participation 
formula, a member of the U.S. military has attended twelve of the subsequent fifteen 
532 Interviews B1, B31, and B34 
533 Interviews A4 and B34 
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meetings, with the Joint Staff (J-5) sending a representative to ten of the last twelve 
sessions. Rear Admiral William Sullivan has attended three NEACD sessions including 
the most recent one in Seoul as the Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy of the 
Joint Staff (J-5). He said that, despite an institutional reluctance in the military to attend a 
meeting that produced no decisions, he personally found the sessions very valuable. 
Nevertheless, he said he probably would never have attended in the first place but he 
accompanied his boss, Admiral Blair who was the Commander in Chief of the U.S. 
Pacific Command (CINCPAC), who encouraged him to attend.534 Sullivan has 
subsequently either attended or sent a member of his staff to four of five meetings.
Although interrelated effects can sometimes be artificially separated into 
dependent and independent variables too readily, it does seem that NEACD’s ability to 
get government participation depends more on government’s interest and exogenous 
events, not NEACD’s efforts.535 One factor is certainly the attitude of other countries, 
principally whether North Korea has even been willing to participate. 536 But even within 
the United States, some cited that the preeminence of U.S. power, or the Bush 
administration specifically, has recently made the United States less interested in 
listening to others, perceiving this and other fora simply as a way to lecture to other 
countries.537
Others detected more of a difference within departments or among personalities. 
At the State Department, for example, the initial optimism and confidence of the Clinton 
administration’s first term for multilateralism, when Winston Lord was the Assistant 
534 Interview with author, Seoul, Korea, April 12, 2005
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Secretary, faded in the second term under Stanley Roth.538 In the Bush administration, 
despite its professed skepticism of multilateralism, the State Department’s participation 
has generally actually been more senior than the second term of the Clinton 
administration. It seems that Don Keyser and/or Jim Kelly, who had previously run 
CSCAP, were the sources of the State Department’s recent support.539 Shirk 
acknowledged that her connections from her service with the State Department may have 
also helped with career employees at lower levels of the bureaucracy.540 Meanwhile, the 
Bush administration’s Pentagon has never even sent a participant, and NEACD staffers 
have perceived little to no interest from their attempts to get Bush administration 
Pentagon participation.541
Beyond those members who attend the meetings, how else might other 
government officials benefit from NEACD? Although whether and how individual 
attendees brief their colleagues varies, one government participant cited the potential for 
things learned from the meeting to shape their talking points that are vetted up through 
their own bureaucracy and into the interagency process. They cited an example in which 
a brief discussion they had on the margins of the most recent NEACD meeting—where a 
participant questioned whether it was helpful to publicly call North Korea “an outpost of 
tyranny,” a term Secretary of State Condeleezza Rice had used in her January 2005 
Senate confirmation hearings—might affect how future talking points are shaped.542
Whether it did, and whether it would have made it through the interagency process, is not 
known.
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A second possible channel is if government officials are briefed by NGO 
participants. One Senate staffer interviewed for this study mentioned that they had been 
briefed by Shirk as well as some of the other U.S., South Korean, and Chinese 
participants.543 Another potential channel is for alumni of the process to be informed
about more recent meetings, although two former participants—Tom Hubbard, a former 
PDAS at the State Department who went on to become ambassador to South Korea, and 
Jim Steinberg, the former policy planning director and deputy national security adviser—
each said that they had lost track of NEACD, despite their continued engagement in 
Northeast Asian affairs.544
A final potential channel is the revolving door. Here, however, the effect 
practically has been limited to Shirk herself. In no other case has a U.S. nongovernmental 
NEACD participant subsequently gone on to a government policymaking position. 
(Steinberg and Campbell participated in the other direction: as government policymakers 
who then left, and Einhorn participated after he left government.) Scalapino did not 
remember specifics but said that, although he has not served in government, in cases 
where he has been asked to brief government officials “there is no doubt that contacts 
with individual government and NGO representatives in non-governmental agencies like 
NEACD help shape the views which I pass on.”545
Shirk herself explained that what she was able to take into government from the 
first five or six NEACD meetings was constrained because her State Department 
portfolio was limited to China, not to developing multilateralism or a formal government 
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544 Author’s phone interview with Thomas Hubbard, July 28, 2005, and author’s interview with Jim 
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dialogue on Northeast Asia. Nevertheless, her experience with NEACD’s informality and 
the fact that it did not require decisions at the meeting’s conclusion, she said, helped 
convince her that such a process might help shape, or at least better understand, the 
evolution in China’s strategic thinking. Shirk subsequently was one of a number of 
government officials that helped to embed “more informal discussion time with the 
Chinese, that we called a strategic dialogue, which was not about bilateral issues per se 
but what’s going on in the world, and what do we think about it, and what are our 
interests” at every level of government interaction.546 Separately, two former government 
participants in NEACD each mentioned another effect of the revolving door on the 
network: they felt that Shirk’s return from government helped her better understand what 
government officials were interested in learning, making NEACD even more valuable for 
government participants in recent years.547
Despite the potential for talking points to be shaped, current policymakers to be 
briefed, or future policymakers to have their views influence by NEACD, it seems that 
most of NEACD’s access to the U.S. government is dependent on official participation, 
which has varied over time depending on the administration, the government department, 
and even individual interests. 
Agenda Setting 
Although NEACD meetings are very loosely structured to allow participants, particularly 
Foreign Ministry speakers who kick off the tour d’table of perspectives on regional 
security, to raise whatever issues they want, there is little evidence that the network put 
546 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., May 17, 2005
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any nonproliferation issues on the policy agenda. One participant mentioned that missile 
defense had been a big issue at one time,548 but North Korea has clearly become the focus 
of the organization. Instead, NEACD has followed recent events, not anticipated 
unforeseen ones or focused on overlooked items, as an agenda setting organization would 
do.549 The initial presentations by government speakers has tended to focus discussion on 
current policy, rather than setting a new agenda.550 One former government policymaker 
raised his doubts about the agenda setting potential for meetings like NEACD:
Every day—12 hours a day, well 24 hours a day, really—but everyday 
we’re getting inputs from wherever it comes from. While it’s not 100 
percent impossible that a significant new input would arise from this kind 
of a meeting, it would be very unusual because you have to hypothesize 
that somebody has just finished a seminal study in something who decided 
to make it known for the first time there, at that forum, to produce an 
interesting conversation about it. Is it possible? Sure, it’s possible but, 
again, there are so many inputs every single day from so many different 
sources—from foreign governments, intelligence, U.S. and foreign 
academics and people, from business community people, the 
parliamentarians of the world, you name it—you’re basically deluged with 
information so, at least speaking for the U.S. government, I would say no 
[new issues are raised].551
Policy Options 
Similarly, there is little evidence that policy options on any nonproliferation issue, 
including North Korea, have been raised.552 According to one former DoE employee 
involved in funding decisions, in its early stages the network may have helped shape a 
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program to can and store spent fuel under the Agreed Framework,553 but that is the only 
evidence that the network has had any specific policy impact.554 From the funder’s 
perspective, according to Ed Fei who headed DoE’s nonproliferation policy shop and 
initially funded the network, NEACD was not founded to perform traditional think tank 
roles like setting agendas or developing policy options. The key was to develop a 
learning process about, and dialogue with, China and North Korea, at a time when there 
had been little contact with either, and subsequently to help build regional stability.555
Shirk herself said NEACD has not really tried to develop policy options, change, 
or even discuss specific policies. It has been more of a quasi-official opportunity to allow 
diplomats to talk to each other informally.556 Although one DoE official involved in 
funding emphasized that networks should always strive to develop creative policy options 
or otherwise change policy to be relevant, it was extremely difficult to fault NEACD for 
not having had that effect, at least yet, because of the complexity of the North Korean 
nuclear issue.557 Other governmental and nongovernmental participants also emphasized 
that the key was not developing policy options or changing policy, but the process itself, 
or socialization: to develop people-to-people relationships, share information as well as 
opinions, and gain a better understanding of the perspectives of the other Northeast Asian 
countries among mid-level officials who might later rise to even more prominent 
positions within their own government.558 Part of the appeal and uniqueness of the 
dialogue, in fact, was that decisions were not even sought. As one nongovernmental 
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participant said, “it’s not as if a conclusion or joint position is expected to emerge out of 
that. That’s not the purpose of the exercise.”559
Observations
Although this study focuses on whether transnational security policy networks have 
changed U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policies or the perceptions that shape them, a 
number of other issues related to the network’s operations emerged during interviews. 
Rather than ignore them entirely, they will be briefly mentioned here for others who may 
examine different aspects of the network’s utility. Although many of these issues have 
been touched on earlier in this chapter, five issues related to NEACD will be discussed 
further here: the network’s potential drawbacks, its membership, potential socialization of 
Chinese and North Korean participants, the potential impact on other countries’ policies, 
and NEACD’s sustainability. 
Drawbacks? 
Every subject interviewed for this case study was directly asked whether NEACD was 
harmful in any way. Not one came up with any empirical examples or even suspicions 
that led them to believe that NEACD was harmful. Although many did not believe there 
were any negative implications at all,560 a few raised hypothetical concerns worth 
mentioning. The most common concern was the potential opportunity cost of either 
money invested in NEACD or the time officials spent traveling for the meetings, 
although none suggested specific alternatives where money or time would be better 
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spent.561 Other than that, one participant mentioned that discussions leaking to the media 
was always a concern, although none had to this point.562 Another nongovernmental 
participant wondered whether it might theoretically be possible if NEACD, or any other 
similar organization, disappointed its participants, it might undermine multilateralism or 
track-two in general.563
A final set of concerns raised is the potential for misperceived signals. Although 
one participant mentioned the possibility that U.S. participants might misperceive a 
foreign individual’s opinion as a shift in policy,564 the more frequently discussed 
contingency in this study was whether foreigners, particularly North Koreans, 
misperceived signals from Americans. At least one participant thought it was 
theoretically possible,565 but other current or former government officials believed that 
even North Korea was unlikely to perceive any NEACD conversation as a shift in U.S. 
policy. In fact, they said, NEACD was more likely to give Americans the opportunity to 
clarify apparent dissent in the U.S. media than it was to reveal some sort of dissension.566
They also argued that even North Koreans were beginning to understand U.S. politics 
enough to understand the perspectives that certain individuals might bring to network 
discussions.567  The one common bias that all participants might convey, one government 
staff member said, was that all participants assumed that:
it is at least possible that negotiations could result in a denuclearized Korean 
peninsula. There’s another whole subset of the policy community that has lost 
faith utterly in a negotiated solution to this mess, and does not participate either in 
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track-two or formal dialogue, and is preparing for other contingencies. So, the 
voice that is missing is the voice of the true skeptic who sees most of this as a 
waste of time.”568 [emphasis in interview]
Network Membership 
Because the benefits of NEACD are so confined to its participants, membership is a 
crucial issue, both from the United States and other countries. The level of U.S. 
participation has already been extensively discussed, but five sets of questions about 
participation were raised during interviews: the continuing value of the participation of 
the defense community, potential Congressional participation, the experience of 
nongovernmental members, foreign participation, and efforts to broadcast the value of 
meetings beyond participants. 
Initially, including military officers and even defense ministry officials may have 
had substantial benefits, but lower-level or nonexistent Pentagon participation, limited 
engagement in dialogue by attending officers and officials from all countries, reportedly 
limited informal interaction with non-military officers, and the emergence of the parallel 
Defense Information Sharing (DIS) process since 2001 raised questions among at least 
among some participants about the value of the defense community’s continued 
participation in the main NEACD meeting.569 On the other hand, one academic and both 
U.S. military participants interviewed for this study reported that they learned from the 
entire spectrum of perspectives within the government—foreign, defense, and military—
as well as nongovernmental members.570 One other nongovernmental participant also 
emphasized the potential value of “socialization to diplomacy” for military officers, even 
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if they did not speak, who otherwise would presumably have few diplomatic 
opportunities.571 One U.S. military officer’s claim that they personally were much less 
comfortable speaking at the first NEACD meeting, compared to more recent ones they 
attended, provides an example of this potential military socialization.572 Whether that 
value justifies continuing to include the defense community at the plenary sessions as 
well as the DIS process, and whether the DIS process sufficiently socialized military 
participants, seem reasonable questions given the benefits that others could gain from 
attending NEACD and the countervailing pressure to keep discussions intimate and 
manageable.
Theoretical evidence presented in chapter two led to a question about the potential 
participation of an entirely different branch of government: should a Congressional 
member or staff member participate in NEACD? The answer was no. Even a 
Congressional staff member argued against it. They explained that Congress does not 
play enough of an operational role in diplomacy to get involved in fora like NEACD. 
That staffer did argue, however, that it might be in NEACD’s interest to invite, or offer to 
brief, a member like Senator Biden, Bingaman, or Lugar in order to raise awareness of a 
forum like NEACD, even if it is unlikely that the Senator or a member of their staff 
would come. If NEACD wanted to approach a Senator in the future with an idea derived 
from the meetings, the Senator may have heard of the network, making it easier to gain 
access.573 In the meantime, because network discussions have been so detailed and 
because Congress’ role in promoting think tank ideas rests in agenda setting, which 
NEACD does not seem to do, Congressional involvement makes little sense. Briefing or 
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even just offering to brief Hill members, however, may be a useful down payment on 
future access and influence.
A third membership issue raised during interviews was the experience of U.S. 
nongovernmental participants, particularly whether it might be beneficial if more had 
government experience. Previously in this chapter, the unique role that Bob Einhorn was 
able to play with the North Koreans was cited, because of his governmental experience 
and the credibility he brought to the discussion of U.S. nonproliferation policy. In 
contrast, one former career governmental policymaker went so far as to say about those 
without government experience: “I don’t want to be harsh, but I could not point to any 
value from [the academics].”574 Other participants disagreed, at least in principle, arguing 
that academic participants such as Robert Scalapino might stretch a policymaker’s 
thinking in new directions, potentially providing a unique perspective rather than just 
having another policymaker around the table, particularly one who was not currently 
serving in government.575 Beyond Scalapino, though, a former government policymaker 
who even supported academics as theoretically more useful to the discussions said that, in 
practice when he attended in the mid-1990s: “I don’t even remember who [the other 
academics] were, so they obviously didn’t leave any impression on me.”576
What makes career academic participants different seems to be their more distant, 
and arguably strategic, view of contemporary challenges and policies. Yet that difference 
may also have drawbacks, limiting or altering the benefits that some of them might get 
from NEACD. One academic participant who had not worked in Washington described 
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their individual concerns as much more strategic than tactical, and explained they found 
the specifics of current policy less relevant to their own interests:
[Y]ou need to understand that even though I participate in these track-two 
diplomatic activities, and a lot of the focal points of their discussion are 
contemporary events and contemporary security policy and so forth, deep 
down inside I’m basically looking for broad structural causality, and big 
changes and big processes…Intuitively, I tend to be more interested in 5-
year, 10-year shifts.577
In contrast, those participants from the revolving door did focus more on the specifics of 
policy. One argued that government experience led them to approach issues differently, 
in a way that was more useful to government policymakers: “No matter how 
sophisticated somebody who has never been in government is about these things, they 
just don’t quite see it the same way or understand it with the same kind of intuitiveness 
that former officials have.” The simplest explanation that person gave is that those with 
government experience understood the political pressures that might make an 
“intellectually elegant” solution practically infeasible. Those with government experience 
might also go back into government again, making them both potentially useful assets 
who might take NEACD lessons learned with them, and even raise the incentive for 
current government participants to talk to them,578 increasing the likelihood that NEACD 
would facilitate frank discussions. 
Another revolving door member pointed out that they might have individually 
worked with certain officials, either from the U.S. or other governments. Those personal 
bonds formed might make it more likely that officials would open up either in formal 
NEACD sessions or at least informally at meals in between sessions. Even if they hadn’t 
577 Interview B37 
578 Interview B40 
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personally worked with them, that same participant explained that: “I know better how to 
extract [information] from a government official, having been a government official. I 
know how government officials approach kinds of things like that. I know what defense 
mechanisms they put up. I know how to break down those defense mechanisms. In that 
respect, I’ve benefited from being on both sides.” Finally, that participant explained that 
revolving door members would know more about what motivated U.S. policy from 
experience and would be at liberty to explain it, particularly to foreign participants, since 
they were out of government. In turn, sharing that information about the United States 
might even build trust with foreign officials, and lead them to reciprocate with insight 
into their own country’s political dynamics.579
In the end, those that had served in government and those that had not each 
brought different perspectives to NEACD meetings. Part of the issue revolves around the 
perceived role of nongovernmental participants: one former government policymaker 
asserted that their role was exclusively to “listen and learn” what was really going on in 
formal negotiations,580 while others pointed to a catalytic role that they could contribute 
to NEACD discussions. There seems to be a legitimate debate about what background 
would be more valuable for NEACD: those who are not as involved in current events and 
might theoretically look at an issue a different way, or those who follow current policy 
more closely but are not burdened with the day-to-day demands or constraints of 
governance while being able to lend their own experience. 
Less debate, though, seems to exist about who would take away more from the 
meetings: those who more closely follow current events do. That also makes them a 
579 Interview B32
580 Interview B34 
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better audience for public diplomacy, as they may be more likely to spread that 
information around their own networks. The issue is not whether participants without 
government experience found the network valuable or contributed anything; they did. 
The issue is whether at least one nongovernmental U.S. participant with government 
experience may contribute, and certainly derive, different and potentially even greater 
benefits from NEACD meetings. 
A fourth participation issue raised was the potential to distribute network benefits 
beyond each country’s five participants and their own personal networks.581 The trick is: 
how can you distribute NEACD’s findings more broadly without jeopardizing its 
confidentiality? One nongovernmental participant suggested that meetings be held more 
frequently to help build personal ties even further.582 It seems, however, that proposal 
would exacerbate the strenuous demands already placed on senior government 
participants. Alternatively, NEACD has experimented with different ways to try to 
disseminate its experiences. Since at least 2003, the University of California Center in 
Washington has hosted a briefing by attendees of the most recent NEACD meeting, 
including Shirk herself. It is unclear, however, how many government officials or even 
members of the D.C. think tank and university communities have attended. Part of the 
problem may be that the UC Center does not otherwise frequently host members of the 
Asian expert community in Washington. Another outreach effort is the virtual network, 
Wired for Peace, that UCSD established in 1998 to sustain dialogue among conference 
participants and NEACD alumni in a password-protected forum. According to network 
staff members, however, participants simply did not engage in the online forum either 
581 Interviews A20, B3, and B41 as well as Lawrence T. Woods, “Learning from NGO Proponents of Asia-
Pacific Regionalism: Success and its Lessons,” Asian Survey 35:9 (September 1995): 826
582 Interview B37 
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because they were too busy or were not comfortable posting anything interesting, and 
Wired for Peace withered. As one NEACD staff member said: “it was an interesting 
experiment that didn’t work.  We have pretty much given up on it now.”583 Distributing 
NEACD’s benefits beyond its participants remains a challenge for the network.
The fifth, and final, membership issue raised dealt with foreign members. The 
biggest problem expressed about non-U.S. participation has been Russian governmental 
attendance, which generally has not been high-level or in some cases even 
knowledgeable at all,584 while those that have attended have been restrained in open 
sessions.585 One participant mentioned that at least the Russian academics were useful, 
providing potential insight from bilateral Soviet Cold War and current Russian ties with 
North Korea.586 Beyond Russia, South Korean Foreign Ministry participation was also 
brought up as a problem by one participant because that Ministry does not control North 
Korean policy in Seoul; the Unification Ministry does. Although a representative from 
the Unification Ministry has attended NEACD in recent years, the South Korean Foreign 
Ministry participants have had limited utility.587
Socializing China and North Korea 
Although these questions were raised about some Russian and South Korean 
participation, NEACD participants praised Shirk for her ability to get useful network 
participation from China over the years.588 In the beginning, Beijing’s participation was 
583 Electronic messages from B31 as well as B4
584 Interviews B2 and B4
585 Interviews B30 and B34
586 Interview B34 
587 Interview B38 
588 Interview B3 and B34
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reportedly extremely rigid,589 but has evolved to the point where U.S. participants believe 
the Chinese are the “most serious,” well prepared, independent (at least non-American), 
and informative NEACD members.590 One participant noted that some limits to Chinese 
candor certainly still existed. For example, they would not openly criticize North Korea 
in the formal sessions, but would privately criticize Pyongyang on the margins of 
NEACD meetings, particularly for not undertaking political and economic reform quickly 
enough.591 Nevertheless, the question remains: to what extent has, or can, Chinese and 
North Korean NEACD participation helped integrate these countries into Northeast Asian 
dialogue and multilateral approaches to subregional problems? For some, this process of 
socialization has been the major purpose of NEACD.592
The analytical question often asked about socialization is whether fora like 
NEACD helped change China, or whether China’s participation in NEACD demonstrated 
its engagement in regional affairs after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In other words, 
it’s the analytical equivalent of the chicken or the egg: did Chinese participation change 
their engagement, or did a Chinese decision to engage cause their participation? In 
NEACD’s specific case, the limited participation to five members makes the case for 
broad socialization more difficult to make. Most Americans interviewed for this study 
felt that any socialization was not obvious from one meeting to the next, and that the 
limited NEACD participation would have made widespread Chinese socialization 
difficult.593 Nevertheless, change over time has been clear. One participant argued that 
589 Interview B36, and electronic message from former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs Charles Kartman, July 11, 2005
590 Interviews B34, B37, and B40
591 Interview B30
592 Interviews B31 and B41
593 Interviews B3, B34, and B36
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the biggest effect fora like NEACD has had on China is to develop its nongovernmental 
participants “to the point now that their think tankers are as good as anybody in the 
world.” That participant elaborated that informal dialogue helped raise “the comfort level 
and sophistication of the analysis of Chinese scholars…and made them much more savvy 
about how to think about these kinds of policy issues.” That participant contended that 
networks like NEACD helped Chinese analysts and scholars break out of their previous 
ideological constraints from the Communist system and “I think the dialogue exposed 
them so they could see the difference between what they were doing and what good, 
independent policy scholars were doing.”594
The goal or hope, of course, is that North Korea will follow in China’s footsteps. 
One question immediately raised is why North Korea began to participate in NEACD in 
2002, ten years after it was one of the founding members of the organization. According 
to Shirk, the answer probably stems from two sources. First, she reached out to Han Sung 
Ryol, who had returned to the UN in the late summer of 2002. He had hosted Shirk in 
Pyongyang in 1992 when NEACD was initially established, and later visited Shirk in San 
Diego in the mid-1990s, when he was initially posted at the UN. Shirk said she called 
him in 2002 to appeal for his help to get North Korea to participate. With his ties in 
Pyongyang still strong, he agreed to try. A few weeks later he officially committed North 
Korean participation, as long as Shirk was willing to come to Pyongyang first as part of 
an unofficial bilateral discussion. 
The other reason, she cited, was that North Korea was seeking to establish better 
relations around the region, with Kim Jong Il’s summit meeting with Japanese Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi in September 2002 the most obvious example, as well as 
594 Interview B40 
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with the United States. A few months earlier, in January 2002, President Bush had 
labeled North Korea part of the “axis of evil,” and the United States was in the midst of 
building its case at the UN and elsewhere to change the regime of another member of the 
so-called axis, Iraq, which it did a few months later in the spring of 2003. Through some 
combination of timing and personal connections, North Korea agreed to participate in 
NEACD in 2002.595
How much of an effect the three meetings from 2002-04 have had on North Korea 
is unclear, as discussed earlier. North Korean participants apparently travel in pairs, 
presumably to monitor one another even on the margins of meetings, inhibiting the 
potential advantages of informality.596 Yet such restrictions apparently don’t completely 
prohibit informal opportunities. Amazingly, a couple of younger North Korean 
participants at the 2004 meeting in San Diego reportedly went to a party in a graduate 
student’s dorm after the formal session, but it’s hard to know what effect, if any, 
something like that may have.597
Whatever the effect may be on North Koreans, their participation affects the 
character of the NEACD dialogue among all other members. When they do attend, 
participants agree that discussions have been more formal, often enduring a series of 
North Korean talking points, and inhibited participants from speaking more frankly about 
how to deal with the DPRK.598 Most recently, North Korea did not attend the 2005 
NEACD meeting in Seoul, declaring it would not send its Foreign Ministry-affiliated 
think tanks and officials to South Korea which it treated as domestic territory. The 
595 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., May 17, 2005
596 Electronic message from B4 
597 Interview B37 
598 Interviews A4 as well as B30
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discussions at that meeting contrasted with the previous three years. The most recent 
NEACD meeting included a general, and of course unclassified, discussion of whether 
countries believed that North Korea had an HEU program as well as whether they had 
assembled nuclear weapons, and whether countries were willing to accept a nuclear 
North Korea; whether and when countries might be willing to refer North Korea to the 
UN Security Council or impose sanctions; the potential effects of pressure on North 
Korea; what leverage countries might wield as well as what signals they might send to 
encourage North Korea back to the six-party talks; what energy assistance the U.S. might 
give North Korea as part of any potential agreement; the effect of the new Rice/Hill team 
at the U.S. Department of State; and the state of progress of North Korean economic 
reform as well as the political stability of the North Korean regime.599
On the other hand, even if the most recent discussions were more frank, a central 
purpose of NEACD has always been to open a dialogue channel with Pyongyang and, at 
least from the U.S. government’s perspective, to be able to reinforce formal negotiations 
in a more informal and unofficial, but still multilateral, setting.600 At the last 2004 
meeting that North Korea attended, discussions included debate about whether the United 
States had a hostile policy toward North Korea; participants’ assurance that a Kerry 
administration would not pursue a different policy toward the DPRK; debate about the 
desirability of the CVID formula for regional disarmament; and inquiries about national 
positions on PSI.601 In the end, one nongovernmental participant concluded that “maybe 
there is a certain advantage in the North Koreans showing up every other time.”602 If 
599 Author’s notes from NEACD-16, Seoul, Korea, April 12-13, 2005
600 Interviews B34 and B301
601 Author’s notes from NEACD-15, La Jolla, California, April 5-6, 2004
602 Interview B30 
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North Korean participants were socialized over time, the discussions would presumably 
get increasingly frank and informal.
NEACD’s Effects in Other Countries 
Whatever the effect on North Korea, NEACD arguably has had effects on other, non-
American participants. For example, NEACD staff members argue that the network has 
facilitated interagency cooperation in other countries. At least Chinese participants, as 
well as possibly Japanese and South Korean members, reportedly meet as a delegation to 
review the presentation their Foreign Ministry representative will deliver.603 Even if 
nongovernmental participants from China are often from the Foreign Ministry-affiliated 
think tank, it is unclear how much other communication exists between the Foreign 
Ministry official and the nongovernmental members that attend, not to mention between 
those participants and the Defense Ministry and military representatives. NEACD funders 
and staff also cited the evolution in Chinese participation as well as the high level of 
interest and participation from at least China, Japan, and South Korea as evidence that 
those countries see value and potential in the network. In contrast, NEACD has had to 
fight to get anyone from the Pentagon, and at times a sufficiently high representative 
from State or the Russian government, to attend.604
Sustainability 
Although North Korean NEACD participation and rising regional tensions over the 
nuclear issue have boosted the network’s recent utility, two concerns about its 
603 Interviews B31 and B41 
604 Interviews B3, B4, and B31 
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sustainability were raised. First, some had bureaucratic concerns about the stability of 
DoE funding for the network. The initial funder, Ed Fei, had come over from the State 
Department and, as he said, “implemented a State agenda with DoE money.”605 The idea 
has been to build confidence among the countries that participate and reduce tensions that 
can cause proliferation.606 According to one official previously involved in funding 
decisions, DoE was not historically involved in regional security. As it expanded into 
nonproliferation, it initially used NEACD to help understand the region and how to 
implement its programs more effectively. The question now is whether institutional 
support would continue. Some within DoE, according to one former employee, seemed to 
be beginning to question why the Department of State was not funding the program, 
although that person was not aware of any plans to discontinue funding for NEACD.607 In 
a broader sense, as one former NEACD staffer argued, a program that relied on intangible 
results such as socialization was vulnerable to criticism from those who did not 
intuitively believe its value, including funders seeking to scientifically evaluate what to 
do with their money and whether their investments were getting sufficient returns.608
Beyond the financial issues, a strategic question was also raised about the 
network’s sustainability. Because NEACD seems recently to be so focused on North 
Korea and its participation, participants wondered what the network’s value might be if 
North Korea becomes integrated into the region as China has, or at least if the six-party 
talks become more formally institutionalized.609  In other words, if NEACD is successful 
in socializing North Korea or establishing permanent six-party talks, would it have 
605 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., July 18, 2005
606 Interview B38 
607 Interview B33 
608 Interview B41
609 Interviews B2, B3, B36, and B40 
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planted the seeds for its own irrelevance? One possibility, as one former government 
policymaker mentioned, is that nongovernmental NEACD participation would become 
increasingly important if an official dialogue existed.610 A former funder speculated that 
NEACD might become “a think tank-type exercise that serves a formal structure in 
Northeast Asia, the way CSCAP has sought to do that for ARF.”611 Another government 
policymaker also mentioned that network participants might be different.612 Shirk herself 
felt it was important to have “more frequent interaction among the director generals of 
the Asia departments of all of these Foreign Ministries—the guys who have real authority 
and are handling the regional policy, dealing with problems…otherwise it’s just a photo-
op.”613 If any formal six-party talks were only held at the foreign minister or head of state 
level, NEACD might provide a forum for more substantive, working level talks.
Shirk also acknowledged that, even now, NEACD was considering evolving since 
the six-party talks have tenuously become more regular, at least on the North Korean 
nuclear issue. Evolving into a parallel organization that put more emphasis on 
nongovernmental participation was certainly possible, if not likely. But Shirk herself said 
that ultimately: 
I’m all but prepared to go out of business….I think we might become 
more purely academic and maybe we could work on particular projects 
that they want to pursue as cooperative undertakings. I don’t really 
know….I think it would be a mistake to have this all planned out. I also 
really don’t want to be like the March of Dimes, you know, polio goes 
away and the organization stays on. In other words, I’m not into 
organizational maintenance. We have plenty of other things to work on. If 
we create a real, ongoing official process in Northeast Asia, I will feel that 
610 Interview B39 
611 Interview B33 
612 Interview B301 
613 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., May 17, 2005
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we contributed somehow….If there’s no demand side, we can go back to 
other things.614
Conclusions
Although the network seems to have had little impact on the U.S. nonproliferation policy 
process—its agenda, options, or decisions—that has not been its purpose. Rather, 
NEACD has sought to build relationships among influential mid-level officials, who 
might rise to even greater heights, and to facilitate information sharing among them, 
increasing understanding about each other’s interests, motivations, policies, and political 
pressures shaping those policies. It has been more of a tool of diplomacy than of 
policymaking itself, although the two are certainly related. The network even served as 
an institutional model and trial for the six-party talks themselves.
For U.S. government participants, NEACD has not necessarily helped establish 
many valuable new contacts, but it has provided the potential for individuals to learn 
from catalytic nongovernmental members, who might reshape policy debates in certain 
ways; from the informal nature of dialogue, allowing participants to go behind and 
beyond formal talking points; and from being able to observe the interaction of other 
participants in a multilateral setting. NEACD has also provided a forum for U.S. 
government participants to conduct diplomacy, reinforcing the six-party talks with North 
Korea, with other participants, and with the foreign policy elite. With North Korea, the 
network has provided a forum enabling U.S. government participants to preview 
significant issues at upcoming meetings; to follow up on recent formal meetings, 
particularly by clarifying media reports and reinforcing messages; and potentially to have 
former officials elaborate on U.S. policy in order to demonstrate both its bipartisan 
614 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., May 17, 2005
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support and unofficially explain it further than government officials are comfortable 
doing. With other parties in the six-party talks, NEACD has also provided a forum to 
conduct multilateral diplomacy, reinforcing messages in front of all the parties 
simultaneously, and clarifying media misperceptions. Finally, U.S. government 
participants have been able to conduct public diplomacy, generally signaling a 
willingness to engage North Korea, and more specifically enabling nongovernmental 
participants to see what dealing with North Korea is really like, as well as for U.S. 
officials to brief a few nongovernmental experts from other countries about current U.S. 
policy in an off-the-record setting.
For U.S. nongovernmental participants, NEACD has provided an opportunity to 
establish contacts with Northeast Asian government officials, and to get a better 
understanding of North Korea and of current policies from all six parties. Some 
legitimate questions exist, given the network’s experience and its evolving utility, about 
whether the very limited number of seats around NEACD’s table is allocated most 
effectively. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that the network as a whole, to this point, 
has been focused on maximizing benefits for government officials from six countries that 
in some cases have had only nascent or even no contacts with one another. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
THE PROGRAM ON NEW APPROACHES TO RUSSIAN SECURITY
The Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS) “is a small network of 
scholars who analyze Russian and Eurasian security issues and the region’s role in 
international affairs.”615 First convened in 1997, PONARS has two objectives according 
to its founder, Celeste Wallander: “to build a scholarly network of the leading social 
scientists in the United States and Russia (and other post-Soviet countries) in order to 
allow members to produce the best possible scholarly work, and to make that scholarship 
and those scholars known and useful to the policy world.”616
PONARS began as just twelve young American scholars when Wallander started 
the network while she was at Harvard. It has been entirely funded by foundations, 
initially and primarily by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. According to 
interviews with both Wallander and David Speedie, who was the program chair in 
Preventing Deadly Conflict at Carnegie when PONARS was founded, the idea was to 
better understand Russia as a country in its own right, then more than five years after the 
Soviet Union had collapsed. These junior faculty members brought both a post-Soviet 
perspective on Russia, with some having recently lived in the country, and an 
interdisciplinary expertise in politics, economics, demographics, society, or culture, not 
just the defense issues which had dominated the Cold War.617
615 From web description of PONARS, 
http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/index.php?option=com_csis_progj&task=view&id=202 (accessed 
October 26, 2005), hereafter referred to as PONARS web description.
616 Celeste Wallander, “Borderlands and the Value of Academic Research for Policy: A Case Study,” Asia 
Policy 1 (January 2006): 37.
617 Author’s interviews with David Speedie (telephone interview, November 14, 2005) and Celeste 
Wallander (Washington, D.C., November 17, 2005)
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Over the next nine years, the network grew slowly and selectively. PONARS 
sought young members, primarily academics not think tank analysts.618 It sought 
geographical diversity, not just the standard suspects from Ivy League and West coast 
institutions.619 Members had to be Russia-area specialists who spoke Russian, not 
generalists who happened to work on Russia.620 They are also supposed to be cordial, as 
working well with others was deemed important to the network (although some 
questioned whether the selection process had successfully screened for affability).621
Beginning in 1999, the Macarthur Foundation gave additional money to help support the 
network’s expansion to admit first Russian members, and later Ukrainians and eventually 
Belarusians.622
Partially to help manage this growth, in 1999 Wallander established an Executive 
Committee (ExCom), which also helped make other administrative decisions.623  About 
seven members—Russians or other members from the former Soviet Union as well as 
Americans—make up ExCom with Wallander serving in an ex officio capacity. The 
committee makes membership decisions by majority vote, and in 2002 began both to 
suggest an agenda for PONARS conferences and to decide among members’ applications 
to present at them.624
In July 2001, PONARS moved its base of operations to the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., where Wallander became the 
618 Author’s interview with Wallander as well as C23 
619 Author’s interviews with Speedie and Wallander
620 Author’s interview with Wallander as well as C26
621 Interviews C43 and C481
622 Author’s interview with Wallander
623 Celeste Wallander, principal investigator, PONARS Final Report on Grant B7308 (July 1, 2001-June 30, 
2003), submitted to the International Peace and Security Program, Carnegie Corporation of New York 
(September 30, 2003): 7, hereafter referred to as 2003 Final Grant Report.
624 Wallander, PONARS 2003 Final Grant Report, pp. i, 12
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director of its Russia and Eurasia program. By the end of 2005, PONARS had grown to 
80 members—with just over forty percent from Russia, Ukraine, or Belarus.625
Exclusively for those members, the network hosts a listserv that typically produces about 
10-20 e-mail messages a day,626 and convened a handful of academic conferences, which 
were funded until 2003. 
For non-members, PONARS produces no consensus documents but distributes 
products of its individual members. Two publication series are sponsored: scholarly 
working papers—about two dozen 20+-page academic essays—and over 400 about 2000-
2500-word policy memos, geared for government analysts.627 Most memos are 
distributed for and discussed at PONARS’s premier public event: an annual day-long 
conference for the Washington policy community, including government officials and 
employees, journalists, businesspeople, other university scholars and think tank analysts. 
Prior to a typical policy conference, a book of about 25-30 policy memos authored by 
PONARS members was circulated to those who RSVPd. In recent years, more than 200 
people replied to attend the event, generally held on a Friday in December, at which most 
memo authors would present their work for about 10 minutes each on a series of panels 
of 3-5 authors, and subsequently engage in 45-60 minute discussions with the audience. 
For this case study, primary written materials analyzed include the 26 PONARS 
memos on nonproliferation issues, and summaries from seven of the nine policy 
conferences held through the summer of 2005 (1997 and 1999 were not available). In 
addition, 28 original interviews were conducted with staff, funders, members, 
625 Celeste Wallander, principal investigator, PONARS Final Report on Grant B7408.R01 (July 1, 2003-
June 30, 2005), submitted to the Carnegie Corporation of New York (September 30, 2005): 5, hereafter 
referred to as 2005 Final Grant Report.
626 Wallander, “Borderlands,” p. 40
627 PONARS web description 
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government attendees at the policy conferences, and senior U.S. government 
policymakers. PONARS members were sought for interviews if they specialized on 
nonproliferation or traditional security affairs, and attended three or more of the five 
policy conferences for which participant lists were available in the fall of 2005. 
Government attendees at the policy conference were also sought if they attended three or 
more of those five policy conferences. Table 5.1 summarizes the interview candidates, 
categorized by their relationship with PONARS and whether they were primarily NGO or 
government participants. Some interviews were not conducted either because candidates 
had retired, deceased, or otherwise could not be found, declined to be interviewed, an 
interview could not be arranged, or did not respond to requests to be interviewed. 
Table 5.1 PONARS Interview Candidates NGO USG Total
PONARS Staff 3 - 3
PONARS Funders 4 - 4
PONARS Policy Conference Participants 16 24 40
Attended 3 or more policy conferences 14 20 35
DASs, NSC, or Hill staff attending twice628 2629 4 5
Senior government policymakers630 - 4 4
Referrals from other interviews 1 5 6
Total 24 33 57
Fifteen of the 28 interviews conducted were with U.S. government officials, three
of whom are members of the revolving door but were in government for significant 
periods of time or in senior policymaking positions. The other thirteen interviews were 
628 Because of their positions in the policymaking chain, Deputy Assistant Secretaries were sought for 
interviews even if they only attended two meetings. Because of the theoretical evidence in chapter two, Hill 
staffers were sought for interviews even if they only attended two meetings.
629 Two current or former members of PONARS served on the NSC staff during fellowships, and are 
therefore classified as both PONARS members and NSC staff.
630 Senior government policymakers are defined as Assistant Secretaries of State for European Affairs, their 
equivalent for Russia, or senior directors of the NSC staff.
213
principally with PONARS members, staff, or funders, although three of those thirteen
were also members of the revolving door who had government experience before or after 
their PONARS participation. In other words, of the 28 interviews conducted, twelve were 
with career government employees, six were with members of the revolving door, and ten
were with nongovernmental employees who had not been employed in government. 
Categorizations of interviews actually conducted are listed in table 5.2. Throughout this 
chapter, opinions expressed in only a single interview, whether cited anonymously or 
specifically, will be noted as one person’s opinion.
Table 5.2 PONARS Interviews Conducted NGO USG Total
PONARS Staff 2 - 2
PONARS Funders 1 - 1
PONARS Policy Conference Participants 10 10 20
Attended 3 or more policy conferences 8 9 17
DASs, NSC, or Hill staff attending twice 2 1 3
Senior government policymakers - 2 2
Referrals from other interviews 0 3 3
Total 13 15 28
Having introduced the network’s infrastructure as well as the primary materials 
and interviews utilized, the subsequent three parts of this chapter will contain 
descriptions of the issues PONARS has covered; an evaluation of the network based on 
the four-part framework presented in the introductory chapter; and finally a series of 
observations and conclusions about PONARS. Chapter six will include comparisons of 
PONARS with the other two case studies. This chapter will be limited to PONARS itself, 
starting with the issues the network has addressed.
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Issues PONARS Has Addressed
PONARS has always sought to address not just traditional security challenges like 
proliferation, but also the new, internal challenges that Russia and the region face as they 
transition from their former Soviet union to independent statehood. More than any topic 
focusing on Russia (see table 5.3), especially in recent years, PONARS members 
published memos on trends in and policy toward the surrounding former Soviet region, 
such as the Caucasus, Central Asia,631 and Ukraine632 (including the 2004 Orange 
Revolution).633
Among the topics that focused just on Russia, the economy and related 
socioeconomic challenges garnered more network activity than any other. A panel on 
some aspect of the Russian economy was held in all but one of the eight conferences for 
which agenda are available. In 1998, the ruble collapsed, becoming a major topic of 
network conversation focusing on the causes of the financial crisis and whether assistance 
should be provided to Moscow.634 Just five years later, the economic outlook had 
changed dramatically with the central government reasserting some control and network 
debate shifting to potential Russian accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO)635
and government relations with business, particularly after the 2003 YUKOS affair when 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the principal owner of Russia’s largest private oil company, was 
631 Jacqueline M. Miller, Report of the January 2002 PONARS Policy Meeting (Washington, D.C., 2002): 
2; and Miller, principal author, Report of the December 2003 PONARS Policy Conference (Washington, 
D.C., February 2004): 6. Hereafter, after the first full citation of each conference report, all will be titled 
after their date such as “December 2003 Policy Conference report.”
632 See, for example, December 2003 Policy Conference report, p. 3
633 Susan Gasper, principal author, Report of the February 2005 PONARS Policy Conference (Washington, 
D.C., June 2005): 9-10.
634 Celeste A. Wallander, Conference Report on December 1998 PONARS Policy Meeting (Washington, 
D.C., 1999): 1-3.
635 January 2002 Policy Meeting report, p. 7
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imprisoned for tax evasion and embezzlement.636 PONARS also tackled socioeconomic 
afflictions such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, sparking articles in The Boston Globe and 
The San Francisco Chronicle,637 and the declining health, life expectancy, and size of the 
Russian population.638
Table 5.3 PONARS Memo Topics (1997-2005)639 # Memos % total
Other former Soviet states (Ukraine, CAsia, etc.) 64 15.9
Economic/socioeconomic 51 12.6
Russian regional issues (Federalism, Chechnya, etc.) 45 11.2
Nuclear issues 39 9.7
(Nonproliferation Issues 26 6.5)
Russian politics (Putin) 39 9.7
Democratization 35 8.7
Russia-US bilateral issues 33 8.2
(U.S. Policy toward Russia 16 4.0)
Relations with Europe/NATO 26 6.4
Russian military issues 24 5.9
General foreign policy and security issues 23 5.7
Terrorism 16 4.0
Relations with Asia (China) 8 2.0
Total 403 100.0
The second most common Russian topic has been relations between Moscow and 
the regions, including the war in Chechnya. Reflecting common concerns in the 1990s, 
the network’s early years considered whether Russia itself might fracture into smaller 
pieces.640 Although that fear faded with time, the war in Chechnya dragged on, was 
636 December 2003 Policy Conference report, p. 5, and February 2005 Policy Conference report, p. 8
637 Wallander, 2003 Final Grant Report, pp. 8-9 
638 February 2005 Policy Conference report, p. 10
639 Nonproliferation issues and U.S. policy toward Russia are each a subset of nuclear issues and Russia-
U.S. bilateral issues, respectively. They are accordingly marked in italics and flush right so as not to be 
double-counted in the totals.
640 See, for example, December 1998 Policy Meeting report, pp. 6-7.
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reshaped by the September 11 attacks, and continued to be a topic at the annual policy 
conference.641
Politics was another common feature of PONARS policy panels, including 
analyzing Putin’s rise to power in Yeltsin’s wake, the meaning of changes in election 
laws,642 and results from the 2003 Duma contest and other political events.643 More 
broadly, the status of Russian democratization and civil society was a focus of attention. 
Reflecting the chaos of the later Yeltsin years, panelists in the late 1990s expressed the 
need to stabilize Russian government and protect civil society against the emerging 
Russian mafia, or prevent an autocratic crackdown.644 Over time, Putin asserted his 
power over the Russian media,645 and used the fear of terrorism to justify additional 
central powers, leading PONARS members to reconsider strategies to assist Russian 
democracy.646
Members of course also discussed Russian relations with the United States, 
particularly in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks647 amidst a growing sense of 
nationalistic anti-Americanism,648 and Russia’s relations with Europe as it sought to 
develop good relations with the rest of the West.649
641 Jacqueline M. Miller, editor, Report of the December 2002 PONARS Policy Meeting (Washington, D.C., 
2003): 1, and February 2005 Policy Conference report, p. 7.
642 December 2002 Policy Meeting report, p. 3
643 December 2003 Policy Conference report, pp. 1-3 
644 December 1998 Policy Meeting report, pp. 4-8, and Celeste A. Wallander, Conference Report on 
December 2000 PONARS Policy Meeting (Washington, D.C., 2001): 1.
645 January 2002 Policy Meeting report, p. 5
646 February 2005 Policy Conference report, pp. 3, 6
647 January 2002 Policy Meeting report, p. 6
648 December 2002 Policy Meeting report, p. 6
649 December 2000 Policy Meeting report, p. 6; January 2002 Policy Meeting report, p. 6; December 2003 
Policy Conference report, p. 4; and February 2005 Policy Conference report, p. 3
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Proliferation Issues
As table 5.3 indicates, nuclear proliferation was a common but not dominant network 
issue. Among its 80 members, only six (2 Americans and 4 Russians) claimed an 
expertise in nonproliferation on the PONARS website and wrote more than one memo on 
the subject. One PONARS staff member was not entirely surprised since, they argued, the 
network was initially shaped to focus on new, internal dimensions of Russian security 
rather than traditional challenges like proliferation.650 Two other PONARS members 
argued that nonproliferation tended to be dominated in the United States by technical 
experts often based in think tanks rather than regional experts in universities.651 Because 
PONARS recruited from the latter group, nonproliferation was not a focus for many 
members. Nevertheless, PONARS did discuss various aspects of nonproliferation over 
the network’s first nine years, particularly focusing on three: securing Russian fissile 
materials and scientific expertise (commonly known as the “loose nukes” problem), 
missile defense, and Russian nonproliferation policy toward Iran, Iraq, and to a lesser 
extent North Korea.
Loose Nukes
Of the 26 nonproliferation memos, seven were on securing fissile materials or scientific 
expertise. One relatively early one by Nikolai Sokov, a Russian based at the Monterey 
Institute of International Studies, discussed the prospect that Russia might politically 
fracture and lose control over its nuclear weapons, concluding that “the possibility that 
Russia might break apart…is extraordinarily small, and for all practical purposes 
650 Interview C43 
651 Interviews C24 and C25
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nonexistent….Nuclear regionalism, however, [the possibility that Russia’s regional 
leaders might establish de factor control over various nuclear assets on their territories] is 
a reality.”652
The dominant PONARS analyst on loose nukes, writing or cowriting five of the 
seven memos, has been Deborah Yarsike Ball, a postdoctoral fellow when PONARS was 
first founded who subsequently was hired by the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory. After writing an initial memo about a 1998 Department of Energy (DOE) 
anti-smuggling initiative called “the Second Line of Defense,”653 Ball focused on the 
state of Russian science,654 including efforts to help develop the ten Russian so-called 
closed cities, the core of their nuclear weapons industry,655 and the fear of brain drain, or 
that Russian scientists might sell their knowledge and services to aspiring proliferant 
states, given the poor state of the Russian economy. Ball’s most recent memo in 2004, 
cowritten with fellow PONARS member Theodore Gerber from the University of 
Wisconsin who is an expert in survey methods, reported the findings of “an 
unprecedented survey of 602 Russian physicists, biologists, and chemists suggest[ing] 
that the threat of WMD brain drain from Russia should still be at the forefront of our 
attention.” The memo more optimistically reported that “the data reveal that U.S. and 
Western nonproliferation assistance programs work. They significantly reduce the 
652 Nikolai Sokov, “The Reality and Myths of Nuclear Regionalism in Russia,” PONARS Policy Memo 133 
(May 2000): 1. 
653 Deborah Yarsike Ball, “The US Second Line of Defense: Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Across 
Russia’s Borders,” PONARS Policy Memo 50, November 1998. 
654 Deborah Yarsike Ball, “The Security of Russia’s Nuclear Arsenal: The Human Factor,” PONARS Policy 
Memo 91, October 1999; as well as Theodore P. Gerber and Deborah Yarsike Ball, “From Crisis to 
Transition: The State of Russian Science Based on Focus Groups with Nuclear Physicists,” PONARS 
Policy Memo 220, December 2001.
655 Deborah Yarsike Ball, “Accessing the Inaccessible: The Case for Opening Up Russia’s Closed Cities,” 
PONARS Policy Memo 194, March 2001. For a more recent discussion by a PONARS member of a risk 
presented by the closed cities, see Robert Orttung and Louise Shelley, “Linkages Between Terrorist and 
Organized Crime Groups in Nuclear Smuggling,” PONARS Policy Memo 392, December 2005.
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likelihood that Russian scientists would consider working in [North Korea, Iran, Syria, or 
Iraq]. These findings have clear policy implications: the U.S. and its allies must continue 
to adequately fund nonproliferation assistance programs rather than hastily declare 
victory.”656 Subsequently, the data was expanded into an article for the spring 2005 issue 
of International Security.657
Missile Defense
Ten memos were written on missile defense issues, splitting into two distinct phases. In 
the network’s early years, discussion focused on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 
and Russian attitudes toward building U.S. momentum to withdraw from it. As early as 
1999, Nikolai Sokov contended that the Russian military was actually looking forward to 
U.S. withdrawal so it could use that as leverage for its own modernization interests.658 A 
number of PONARS members, however, pointed out that Russia was concerned that U.S. 
withdrawal would lead China to modernize its own nuclear forces, which might threaten 
Russia as well.659 Within a year, according to Alexander Pikayev, a Russian scholar from 
the Carnegie Moscow Center, rising anti-Americanism within Russia and the uncertainty 
of a transition to a post-Yeltsin government made any sort of compromise to enable the 
U.S. to agreeably withdraw from the treaty at least temporarily difficult.660 After Putin 
was elected in March 2000, Wallander wrote a memo outlining the potential incentives 
656 Deborah Yarsike Ball and Theodore P. Gerber, “Will Russian Scientists Go Rogue? A Survey on the 
Threat and the Impact of Western Assistance,” PONARS Policy Memo 357 (November 2004): 1.
657 Deborah Yarsike Ball and Theodore P. Gerber, “Russian Scientists and Rogue States: Does Western 
Assistance Reduce the Proliferation Threat?” International Security 29:4 (Spring 2005): 50-77.
658 Nikolai Sokov, “The Death of Arms Control: Popular Myths About What Russia Can and Will Do,” 
PONARS Policy Memo 93 (1999): 3-4.
659 See, among others, December 2000 Policy Conference report, p. 8
660 Alexander Pikayev, “The Prospects for ABM Treaty Modification,” PONARS Policy Memo 108 (2000)
220
for Moscow’s new leader to reach an ABM agreement with Washington.661 By the end of 
the following year, the Bush administration, which sought to withdraw from the ABM 
Treaty, had been elected, the September 11 attacks had completely changed the 
framework of the U.S. national missile defense debate, and the United States announced 
its intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, which took effect six months later, in 
June 2002.
The second phase of the missile defense debate then commenced, focusing on 
potential missile defense cooperation with the West. Pavel Podvig, a Russian scholar 
primarily based at the Center for Arms Control of the Moscow Institute of Physics and 
Technology, recalled that as early as 1992, while Russia was ardently opposing U.S. 
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Yeltsin himself had publicly expressed Moscow’s 
readiness to develop and even jointly operate global early warning or missile defense 
systems.662 Podvig and other PONARS members subsequently elaborated on the 
emerging technical, political, and bureaucratic obstacles to bilateral cooperation.663
Although Pikayev also acknowledged some tactical and even fundamental obstacles to 
some forms of bilateral cooperation, in 2003 he outlined political and technical reasons 
why the United States was probably interested in some form of cooperation along with 
the potential areas for preliminary joint research and development.664 Network members 
661 Celeste A. Wallander, “Russian Policy and the Potential for Agreement on Revising the ABM Treaty,” 
PONARS Policy Memo 134 (2000)
662 Pavel Podvig, “A History of the ABM Treaty in Russia,” PONARS Policy Memo 109 (2000): 3.
663 Pavel Podvig, “U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Missile Defense: Is It Really Possible?,” PONARS Policy 
Memo 316 (November 2003). Also see Alla Kassianova, “Missile Defense Cooperation in the U.S.-
European-Russian Triangle,” PONARS Policy Memo 313 (November 2003). Hereafter, after their first 
citation, memos will be cited as author, memo number such as Kassianova, PONARS Policy Memo 313.
664 Alexander Pikayev, “U.S.-Russian Missile Defense Cooperation: Limits of the Possible,” PONARS 
Policy Memo 315 (November 2003). 
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have also recently explored incentives and obstacles to Russia’s quest to cooperate with 
Europeans as an alternative to the United States.665
Russian Nonproliferation Policy 
Nine memos focused on Russian nonproliferation policy, particularly on Putin’s policy 
toward Iraq and Iran. In October 2002, during the heat of the international debate 
preceding the invasion of Iraq, network members contended that Russia’s relations with 
Saddam Hussein were driven primarily by its economic interests in Iraq, not by some 
geopolitical rivalry with the United States.666 On Iran, Wallander argued that the Russian 
Ministry of Atomic Energy, or Minatom, had particular interests in developing Iran’s 
nuclear industry and was running Moscow’s policy up until at least 2002.667
Subsequently, Vladimir Orlov, the founder of the Center for Policy Studies in Russia, or 
PIR Center, explained that Russia did prioritize nonproliferation, but was trying to 
engage Iran just as the United States had with North Korea when it reached the 1994 
Agreed Framework. He even maintained that Russia had previously trusted the United 
States to look after Russia’s own economic interests in the earlier North Korea 
agreement. When they weren’t addressed, Moscow felt it learned the lesson that it had to 
take the lead to ensure its own interests.668 Most recently, Wallander concurred that 
665 Pavel Podvig, “Putin’s Boost-Phase Defense: The Offer that Wasn’t,” PONARS Policy Memo 180 
(2000); Kassianova, PONARS Policy Memo 313; and December 2003 Policy Conference report, p. 7
666 Celeste A. Wallander, “Russia’s Interest in Trading with the ‘Axis of Evil’,” PONARS Policy Memo 248 
(October 2002); and Ekaterina Stepanova, “Russia and U.S. Policy toward Iraq: Conflict of Interests and 
Limits of Dissent,” PONARS Policy Memo 249 (October 2002).
667 Wallander, PONARS Policy Memo 248, pp. 4-5 
668 Vladimir Orlov, “Nuclear Programs in North Korea and Iran: Assessing Russia’s Position,” PONARS 
Policy Memo 178 (November 2000): 3. Also see Orlov, “Iran and Russia: U.S. Nonproliferation Dialogue,” 
PONARS Policy Memo 314 (November 2003); and “Iran’s Nuclear Program Implications for the Dialogue 
Among Russia, the United States, and Europe,” PONARS Policy Memo 358 (November 2004). Orlov’s 
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Russia believed Iran was motivated by insecurity and that engagement was more likely to 
address the problem.669
PONARS members also assessed Russia’s evolving global nonproliferation policy 
under Putin.670 Both Pikayev and Wallander argued that although Russia values 




Whether PONARS membership, or participation by non-members, established valuable 
networking connections or changed perceptions often depended on the previous 
experience of individual participants. Given the more frequent interaction among scholars 
within the network, members were apt to find different benefits from PONARS 
participation. 
PONARS Members Many U.S. scholars cited the value of meeting their American peers 
from universities scattered throughout the country.672 Usually, the benefit was to know 
whom to contact, whether through the listserv or other means, to ask questions related to 
their research. The academic conferences also helped facilitate substantive feedback from 
arguments were later published in Orlov and Alexander Vinnikov, “The Great Guessing Game: Russia and 
the Iranian Nuclear Issue,” The Washington Quarterly 28:2 (Spring 2005): 49-66, which this author edited. 
669 Celeste A. Wallander, “Geopolitics and Neo-containment, as well as Common Security,” PONARS 
Policy Memo 371 (December 2005): 26-27.
670 See, for example, Orlov, PONARS Policy Memo 178; and Wallander, PONARS Policy Memo 248, pp. 1-
2, 6; as well as Wallander, PONARS Policy Memo 371.
671 Alexander Pikayev, “The U.S.-EU-Russian Nonproliferation Triangle,” PONARS Policy Memo 359 
(November 2004), and Wallander, PONARS Policy Memo 371
672 Interviews C24, C26, C43, C481, C55, and C58
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a larger group.673 PONARS contacts even catalyzed collaborative research, such as 
coupling Ted Gerber’s methodological expertise on surveys with Debbie Ball on Russian 
nuclear science or with Sarah Mendelson on democratization trends and attitudes.
Several U.S. members also mentioned that they met valuable young Russian 
scholars whom they would not otherwise have known.674 When American scholars 
traveled abroad, these connections helped set up meetings or seminars in Moscow, St. 
Petersburg, or even more importantly in remote regions of Russia.675
One aspect of membership which generated a lot of discussion during interviews 
is the members-only listserv. Conducted in English and mostly used by Americans, the 
most active participants have reportedly been about five U.S.-based academics along with 
Wallander.676 Other members gave the listserv mixed reviews. On one hand, members 
based in Washington other than Wallander herself almost universally confessed that they 
did not have much time to read the listserv,677 often filtering the stream of e-mails by 
deleting or only reading certain contributors unless they themselves had posed a 
question.678 Some were reluctant to post any messages because they were not frequent 
participants.679
On the other hand, many members valued the listserv as a way to ask their 
colleagues for research advice, recommendations on what to read on a particular topic, or 
what readings to include in a syllabus for an upcoming course.680 Particularly to those 
based in Washington, the listserv was also praised for facilitating information- and 
673 Interviews C24 and C26
674 Interviews C24, C42, C43, C46, and C47 
675 Interviews C1, C24, C43, and C46 
676 Interviews C24 and C43
677 Interviews C42, C46, C481, and C55 
678 Interviews C481 and C55
679 Interviews C46 and C55
680 Wallander, 2003 Final Grant Report, p. 9; as well as interviews C1, C23, C26, C46, and C55
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opinion-sharing during crises such as the 1998 financial crisis, the 2004 Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine, or the 2005 terrorist attack in Nalchik.681
Beyond networking with and learning from other scholars, PONARS members 
lauded the opportunity, particularly early in their career, to draw the attention of media 
members or government officials to their memos or policy conference presentations.682
This was less useful for those based in Washington who had similar opportunities 
elsewhere.683 Harvard’s Mark Kramer mentioned that different memos he wrote had been 
cited in The Financial Times, The New Republic, and The Wall Street Journal.684 He, 
among others, was subsequently asked to return to Washington to brief executive branch 
officials,685 or to attend a summer retreat for Congressional members called the Aspen 
Congressional conference and brief them on their research.686 In at least one case, a 
PONARS member may have even received funding for further research on their topic.687
For some members, the conferences provided a reason to write about certain 
topics which they would not otherwise have addressed.688 Some used PONARS memos 
as trials or first drafts for longer articles, such as Ball’s International Security piece on 
Russian brain drain, or Orlov’s on Russian policy toward Iran’s nuclear program which 
became a Washington Quarterly article, that this author edited.689
681 Wallander, 2003 Final Grant Report, p. 9; as well as interviews C24, C46, C481, and C55
682 Interview C24, C481, and C54 
683 Interview C43, C46, and C55 
684 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., February 3, 2005
685 Ibid. and Wallander, 2003 Final Grant Report, p. 5
686 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., February 3, 2005
687 Interview C481 
688 Interviews C1 and C23 
689 Also interview C55
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PONARS members also used the policy conferences to learn about current 
events,690 other aspects of Russia or the region beyond their specific area of expertise,691
or about U.S. policy. Although many members who were based in Washington or had 
spent significant time there did not find much value in conference feedback,692 others 
found that presenting at conferences brought out audience members with expertise on a 
particular area, such as U.S. food aid or the Russian electricity industry, to approach them 
either during the plenary session or on its margins.693 Just the questions from government 
officials gave some members a sense either of what issues those officials thought were 
interesting, or of the bureaucratic politics on topics such as Chechnya.694
U.S. Government Employees U.S. government officials found different benefits from 
attending the annual policy conference or reading PONARS memos. Some used the 
policy conferences simply as a place to catch up with other Americans who studied 
Russia whom they already knew but did not see regularly.695 Younger government 
officials seemed to actually meet new people.696
For many, however, the value was to meet Russian participants. Some helped 
cement previous contacts,697 while other government officials were introduced to some of 
the Russians for the first time.698 One government employee specifically found it 
valuable to have the Russians come to Washington given that “it’s not that easy to get 
690 Wallander, 2003 Final Grant Report, p. 7
691 Interviews C1, C23, C25, and C58
692 Interviews C46, C55, and C58
693 Interviews C24 and C25 
694 Interviews C23, C24, and C26
695 Interviews C50, C57, and C59 
696 Interviews C51, C56, and C60 
697 Interviews C59 and C62
698 Interviews C2, C50, and C59 
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over to Moscow.”699 Although the policy conference may have initiated these contacts, it 
is not clear how valuable the interchange at the conference itself was perceived to be. In 
some cases, government officials mentioned that it was worthwhile to meet the Russians 
so they could follow up with them in greater depth on the margins of the conference or at 
a later time,700 possibly to invite them back to speak at a government-sponsored 
conference,701 or, in one case, simply to help determine whose work was worth reading 
later.702 Many specifically valued the chance to meet the younger Russians.703
Even if new contacts have been made, that still does not address whether 
government employees were actually learning valuable information from PONARS. The 
first benefit government officials cited was to hear the Russian perspectives. Although 
one retired diplomat discounted them as generally biased,704 other government employees 
felt that these younger academics gave different, less ideological perspectives than what 
they heard from Russian diplomats.705 One valued the stronger social science training and 
policy analysis skills compared to the older Russian generation.706 Another government 
official mentioned they valued the chance to hear someone from some place other than 
Moscow, in this case from Volgograd.707
Some government officials seemed to have debunked the perception that a 
younger Russian generation was universally more pro-Western than their elders. 
Although analysts certainly recalled Russian participants with more pro-Western views—
699 Interview C50 
700 Interviews C47 and C56 
701 Interviews C54, C59, C60, and C61
702 Interview C61
703 Interviews C2, C45, C47, C50, and C57
704 Interview C44 
705 Interviews C2, C45, and C57
706 Interview C2 
707 Interview C47 
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such as one Russian participant very critical of the Chechen war708 or another who 
sympathized with Western fears of China709—others, after hearing the Russian views, 
concluded that, in the words of one government staffer, “we were deluding ourselves into 
thinking a certain generation likes us.”710 In one particular case, a government policy 
analyst who focused on missile defense was surprised to hear traditional Russian 
arguments about the value of the ABM Treaty. “To just hear from a young contemporary 
Russian that she believed this really had a lot of resonance with me.”711
Unrelated to the nationality of the speakers, government officials valued 
PONARS perspectives for other reasons. Particularly for desk officers at lower levels of 
the government hierarchy, the network gave an opportunity to think about broader 
aspects of Russia beyond the specific ones, such as arms control, for which they were 
responsible in their job portfolio. “I liked the fact that those things got me out of the more 
narrow focus of what I was doing. It broadened my horizons…Usually we didn’t get that 
broader picture at work…”712 Another member of the revolving door explained that 
“there can be a real tendency for the bureaus and offices to develop tunnel vision. We fail 
sometimes to see that there is a bigger picture out there.”713
In at least one case, PONARS also helped a policy analyst look longer term 
beyond the various crises or events that drove their job from day-to-day. When asked, 
that staffer argued that even their interaction with the diplomatic and intelligence 
communities was “very much event-driven reporting in both instances, whereas with the
708 Interview C57 
709 Interview C51 
710 Interview C57 
711 Interview C61 
712 Interview C45 as well as C61
713 Interview C62
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academic community, the event is more than a week long, it’s more than a month long, 
it’s really looking at things over the longer range to try and draw more of a perspective 
on it.”714
These themes of supplementing what the intelligence community provides the 
policy community with broader, longer-term analysis, particularly for political trends, 
recurred in a number of interviews.715 In other words, U.S. government analysts valued 
PONARS members because they helped explain Russia. As one member of the revolving 
door, who had experience in both the intelligence community and policy planning, 
argued: “when one thinks through different policy options, I think it gives you a better 
sense of what the Russian response might be.”716  Another policy analyst went so far as to 
say, “if you want to know about where Russia is heading and its political trajectory, you 
don’t go to the CIA or DIA…”717
In other cases, the benefit was simply to have another informed opinion, as a 
sanity check or to protect against ‘groupthink’ within government.718 It is an opportunity 
to hear what smart people have to say about Russia. One policymaker, who is a member 
of the revolving door, succinctly stated: “there’s no monopoly on brilliant thinking inside 
the government…We close the door at our peril to thinking on the outside.”719 One 
member of the intelligence community even admitted, “my own experience, over thirty 
years, is that I have found very, very few issues where over time a good academic, a good 
scholar, or a really good journalist…could not uncover the story and get pretty much the 
714 Interview C61 
715 Interviews C45, C47, C50, C61, and C62
716 Interview C59 
717 Interview C47
718 Interviews C47, C50, and C60
719 Interview C62 
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picture…”720 Yet some government officials argued that the advantage went even further: 
nongovernmental analysts were able to talk to a broader range of contacts within Russia, 
either because government officials and diplomats stayed within their formal circles of 
contacts,721 or because intelligence officials could not travel within Russia or were 
restricted by the need to maintain their cover.722
When pressed for specific examples on the spot, most government employees 
were unable to come up with any. One member of the intelligence community explained, 
We spend our days doing preciously little but absorbing information in this job 
and, eventually, you start to lose track of where you got the information. There’s a 
little classified cabinet in your head…but other than that, I rarely remember 
exactly who told me what. But I do know that I keep going to these [PONARS] 
things so…I must be getting something out of it.723
A policy analyst similarly argued that what information struck anyone depended in part 
on what any individual was thinking about at the time: “In this job, you are inundated 
with information. The thing that comes along that scratches a particular itch of yours at a 
particular time [is what is interesting].”724 That logic would explain the variety of specific 
examples that some subjects did recall, including how free and fair the 2003 
Parliamentary elections were,725 or what the Russian reaction might be if the Baltic states 
were to join the EU.726 On nuclear and nonproliferation issues, recollections included 
when Russia might have to modernize their tactical nuclear weapons727 as well as 
720 Interview C60 
721 Interviews C42 and C50 
722 Interviews C47 and C50
723 Interview C51
724 Interview C47 
725 Interview C51 
726 Interview C59 
727 Interview C47
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Moscow’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear program, including one former Clinton 
administration White House official who remembered first hearing the argument from 
PONARS that pushing Iran too hard might lead them to quit the nonproliferation regime 
entirely.728
Overall, U.S. government analysts were able to meet young Russian academics 
and learn about their perspective on their country, the region, and how it was changing. 
They also were able to use all PONARS members to help them understand broad, long-
term changes, beyond the specific responsibility of their job portfolio, and supplement the 
analysis they received from the intelligence community about developments in Russian 
politics, or projections about Russian reactions to potential policy changes from smart, 
nongovernmental experts who might even have unique insights from a wider array of 
Russian experts in and out of the government.
U.S. Government Access and Interaction 
Who from the U.S. government benefits from PONARS? Who goes to the annual 
conference? Who reads the memos? According to the PONARS Instructions and Notes on 
Policy Memos, “Our primary audience and consumer of the policy memo series are 
policymakers who know a great deal about the issues facing Russia and Eurasia and U.S. 
interests in the region, but who have little time for long-term thinking, synthesis, self-
criticism, and other luxuries we academics are permitted to indulge freely.”729 The 
guidelines further advised that memos should be 2000-2500 words long. From its 
inception, at least Jim Goldgeier, a PONARS member who had experience in 
728 Interview C2 as well as C59
729 PONARS Instructions and Notes on Policy Memos, p. 3
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government, was skeptical of their value, arguing that the network should either stay 
focused on longer, analytical articles that academics were generally good at or should try 
to produce shorter op-eds (generally 600-800 words) that government officials might 
read.730
Within government intelligence, research, and policy analysis communities, it 
turns out that some do seem to read the memos. Subjects interviewed value the discipline 
the shorter format imposes on scholars, forcing them to present their ideas in 2-3 pages 
instead of traditional, longer academic articles,731 although one analyst demurred that 
they were too brief to “shed that much light on things I was already thinking about.”732
While the memos are circulated a few weeks in advance of the annual conference to be 
read prior to it, one analyst said they used the conference as a way to screen the memos, 
going back and reading ones written by speakers who interested them.733
In contrast, the skeptical view turned out to be accurate for policymakers, or those 
at the deputy secretary level and higher, who claimed that they had not read more than 
one or two, if any, memos.734 One former senior policymaker specifically criticized the 
quality of the memos and their “plain brown wrapper” presentation, concluding that 
they are not presented in a way that makes them very inviting to readers who 
don’t know the writer or who are not looking for something on a very specific 
topic. So, I tended to toss them. I guess the ones that I looked at struck me as, I 
don’t want to be too snotty about this, commendable if somewhat amateurish 
work of younger, not super-informed, scholars.735
730 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., October 18, 2005
731 Interviews C2, C56, C59, C60
732 Interview C50
733 Interview C51
734 Interviews C48, C52, and C62
735 Interview C52
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One problem for policymakers seems to be that even 2000-2500 words does turn out to 
be too long. Another former official argued that 
Brevity is hard but it is how you communicate in government….I think the 
people you probably want to affect are deputy assistant secretaries at State, 
office directors, NSC directors. The problem…is that when I was at NSC, 
I started at 7:20 in the morning, and if I left at 8 or 8:30 at night, it was a 
good night. When I was [a deputy assistant secretary] at State, I’d get in at 
7 in the morning and get out by 7, 7:30, and Saturdays would be a half to a 
full day. The problem is just when you get home…the last thing [you]  
want to do is pick up a serious policy paper on Russia and then read 
it…[I]t has to be a 700-word op-ed piece. Beyond that, it’s going to be 
hard to have any certainty that it’s getting to the right target.736
Compounding that problem, particularly in recent years, almost all the memos 
come out simultaneously in a 200-page bound book, right before the annual conference, 
overwhelming potential readers.737 The same former official argued that “If I get a book 
like this, it will go in my inbox right away, to the Russia desk. If it was a small paper, it 
at least had a chance to be read on a light Saturday. The trade-off is you have to decide 
which of the papers you are going to share.”738 One analyst argued that they preferred 
memos targeted at key events, such as a summit, rather than the PONARS conference.739
Events drove greater demand for memos, whereas the supply was driven by the network’s 
conference. 
To triage these memos, policymakers might wait for their staff to recommend 
anything worth reading, essentially having them serve as an additional layer of quality 
control. PONARS members interviewed for this study mentioned that they had heard of 
736 Interview C48
737 Interviews C44, C45, C48, and C51
738 Interview C48
739 Interview C51 
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such cases, including a piece on AIDS in the former Soviet Union that was sent to 
Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky.740 In another case, a 
member was asked to testify before Congress because of a memo that they wrote.741
Conversely, John Harvey, a policy adviser at the Department of Energy, mentioned that 
the Deputy Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security, Linton Brooks, would actually 
occasionally recommend to his own staff that they read a PONARS memo and look into 
an issue further.742 Usually, however, it seemed that analysts and staffers were more 
likely to read the memos than policymakers.
A second way that PONARS sought to access government was by inviting them 
to attend the policy conference. Overall, government turnout at the conferences has been 
quite high, surprising even some PONARS members.743 Based on the participants lists 
available since 2000 (5 of 6 sessions with 2001 unavailable), the conferences have 
averaged over 50 RSVPs to attend from Capitol Hill or traditional security agencies 
(mostly from Defense, State, and the intelligence community but also from Energy or the 
National Nuclear Security Administration, NSC, or the Office of the Vice President), 
with a high of 60 in 2000, a low of 43 in 2003, and 49 and 50 in the last two conferences 
in 2005. Additional members also came from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the Department of Justice, and the Department of Treasury, 
reflecting the network’s emphasis on new security issues. Interestingly, almost 2 out of 
every 3 employees from traditional security agencies who RSVP’d to one PONARS 
conference did not RSVP again, with 1 in 10 attending four or all five sessions (see table 
740 Interview C24 
741 Interview C481
742 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., November 1, 2005
743 Interviews C42 and C55
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5.4). (Although this may indicate that many attendees did not perceive PONARS valuable 
after attending once, it is also possible that it simply indicates that government officials 
do not necessarily stay in one job, on the same portfolio, or even in Washington for more 
than 2 or 3 years at a time.)
Table 5.4 Repeated Government RSVPs to PONARS (2000-05)
Number of Sessions RSVPd (of 5) 1 2 3 4 5
Number of Attendees 106 34 8 13 3
% of Total Government Attendees 65% 21% 5% 8% 2%
Although the participants lists only note the agency at which an official works, 
not their title or level within the government, Wallander herself acknowledged that most 
of the attendees were desk officers, department heads, military officers, and senior 
intelligence analysts, not policymakers.744 Current and former policymakers interviewed 
for this study confirmed that they were either unable to or uninterested in attending the 
annual conference. Deputy assistant secretaries were at least interested in attending a 
panel or two, although none could fathom attending for a full day, but stated they were 
unable to attend until after they were no longer the DAS.745 As one argued, an event like 
PONARS hosted by a nongovernmental organization can be useful but it “tends to be the 
first thing cut from your schedule when you are pressed for time.”746
For the assistant secretary-level, neither interviewed for this study could even 
consider attending unless they were asked to be the speaker (PONARS does not host 
government speakers).747 More generally, these policymakers, some of whom are even 
744 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., November 17, 2005
745 Interviews C47, C48, and C62
746 Interview C48
747 Interviews C49 and C52
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members of the revolving door, felt that they rarely learned anything useful during their 
time in office from any event hosted outside government.748 One stated:
Very rarely [are outside groups useful]. So rarely that I’m going to have to 
pause to see if I can dredge up an exception for you. It’s less that you hear 
from an outsider an idea that nobody ever thought of, and more that 
hearing from outside groups gives you kind of a lay of the land in the 
world of opinion, and a sense of what the distribution of views is among 
outsiders. The government, more commonly, is interested in knowing 
what the traffic will bear, what kinds of things people are saying rather 
than getting authentically new ideas. There are a lot of people in 
government who have the job of generating new ideas. In one way or 
another, they usually come up with pretty much the same menu of 
possibilities that outsiders do. It’s more of a process of validation, 
confirmation, even merely reporting than actually hearing something 
new.749
Two of these policymakers with DAS or assistant secretary-level experience also argued, 
however, that outside groups were often useful to help provide public evidence to either 
Russian interlocutors or even U.S. interagency counterparts that outsiders cared about 
certain issues, such as democratization, which might otherwise be overlooked by strategic 
considerations.750 In other words, outside groups could be useful leverage in interagency 
or international negotiations.
One perception that emerged from interviews is that the set of policymakers 
responsible for Russia has declined drastically, both after the Cold War and again after 
the September 11 attacks, further straining the already immense time pressure on that 
handful of officials.751 One PONARS member even perceived that the shrinking number 
of true policymakers within the government was one, but not necessarily the only, reason 
748 Interviews C49 and C52
749 Interview C52 
750 Interview C49 and C62
751 Interviews C2, C481, and C55
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why they felt “the quality of the people who come to the meetings has declined both on 
the Russian and American side.”752
Unlike policymakers, desk officers do attend the conference, but desk officers are 
only an indirect way to influence the declining number of policymakers responsible for 
Russia. Many arguably were responsible for implementing policy, but not making it. As 
Goldgeier pointed out, “I’ve worked in the State Department, but there are a lot of people 
in the State Department who aren’t policy-relevant either.”753 Some members of the 
policy planning staff also attended, but questions were raised about that staff’s relevance 
and its recent focus on Russia.754 For the Pentagon, a desk officer who frequently 
attended network conferences (one of the 10% of recidivists) confessed that their 
counterparts were skeptical about the value of PONARS because they felt that even they 
didn’t have the time, they perceived the event to have a pro-Russian bias, and they felt 
that it was a “luxury” to be able to attend the event but that “it’s not really pertinent to my 
day-to-day work.”755 Nevertheless, the RSVPs and testimony from PONARS members 
reveal that some desk officers attended, even if their policy influence is unclear.
 The main government consumers that find PONARS useful, however, seem to be 
intelligence analysts. It is hard to say for certain for a number of reasons. Attendees only 
are listed by the department in which they work, so an analyst from the Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research (INR) appears as “Department of State,” while one from the 
Defense Intelligence Agency may register as “Department of Defense.” Others might not 
be able to say where they work, potentially asking not to be included on the participant’s 
752 Interview C481
753 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., October 18, 2005 
754 Interviews C59 and C62 as well as C54
755 Interview C61 
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lists or just putting “U.S. government.” To compound these problems, some members of 
the intelligence community resisted being interviewed for this study or were prohibited 
by their office. Nevertheless, a significant indicator is that of the 16 government 
attendees who RSVP’d to attend either 4 or all 5 of the PONARS conferences since 2000, 
at least 10 of them are from the intelligence community—either the CIA, DIA, INR, or 
National Intelligence Council (NIC). (Of the other six, one was a military officer, another 
from the Pentagon, another a desk officer from the Pentagon, a desk officer from the 
State Department, a Congressional Research Service staff member, and a recently retired 
State Department official.)
Interviews with policymakers, PONARS staff, PONARS members, and 
intelligence community members themselves all reinforced this evidence.756 Goldgeier, 
previously cited for being initially skeptical about the network’s value, admitted that “it 
did not occur to me [that PONARS might be relevant to the intelligence community]. All 
I was thinking at that first [brainstorming] meeting was: why would someone who was in 
the position I just left at NSC going to read a policy memo?”
He explained why the relationship was natural: “[Academics are] not very good at 
prescribing policy-relevant things to do. They don’t know much about what to do. They 
don’t know what the possibilities are on any given issue. They don’t know what’s going 
on, on the inside, but they’re very good at analyzing a situation.”757 As mentioned earlier, 
PONARS members were not just perceived to be smart, but also useful because they 
talked to experts from Russia outside of traditional government contacts. To the 
intelligence community, those connections appear to be particularly useful because of 
756 Interview C1, C42, C43, C47, C59, and C60 
757 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., October 18, 2005
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travel restrictions, possibly because Russia may not give them visas.758 Goldgeier also 
argued that academics may be able to get different insight from Russians because 
“they’re not threatening because they’re just academics. They’re not from the U.S. 
government.”759 That could lead to more frank conversations. Intelligence community 
members could also invite PONARS experts, both Americans and Russians, to 
conferences in the United States for further discussion.
Within the intelligence community, members specifically said that the National 
Intelligence Council (NIC) and the State Department’s Intelligence and Research (INR) 
bureau found PONARS most useful because they were the intelligence community’s 
most public parts, unlike the more sheltered and distant CIA or DIA.760 Especially INR 
and the NIC were not like the 20th-century intelligence community seeking state secrets 
and supporting covert operations, but part of the 21st-century’s emphasis on seeking more 
transparent and open-source analysis. One INR analyst explained that “though INR is 
part of the intelligence community, we are part of the diplomatic community: the main 
institution that’s supposed to be reaching out.”761 In addition, another analyst explained, 
“Most of us here, at least at INR, are only one deep on most issues….If there is a network 
of people out there looking at the same questions, there is certainly going to be an interest 
here in hearing what they have to say.”762 Similarly, with the recent changes in the 
intelligence community after the 9/11 Commission recommendations, one analyst from 
the NIC explained that “the NIC’s role is changing now too: we’re now getting more into 
the policy realm since we now work for the director of national intelligence….The line 
758 Interview C59 
759 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., October 18, 2005 
760 Interviews C51, C59, and C60 as well as C46
761 Interview C60 
762 Interview C51 
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between analysis and policy has become somewhat fuzzier, if you like, more fluid in the 
NIC. Some of the memos address directly policy issues.”763 These analysts argued that as 
the intelligence community continues to put greater emphasis on open-source analysis, at 
least the NIC and INR will find nongovernmental experts, including PONARS members, 
even more valuable.764
Any policy impact that PONARS members might indirectly have through the 
intelligence community is, however, even more difficult to trace. In interviews for this 
study, intelligence community members were not forthcoming with specific examples of 
things they may have learned. Even if they did, the IC finds it hard to trace its own 
impact. When they do interact with policymakers, as one of its members admitted, “I’m 
not going to give [PONARS members] credit for any arguments, but I may well pass the 
argument along. Obviously, the people who I write for don’t care who said it.”765
While executive branch attendance seemed to be concentrated in the intelligence 
community and desk officers, about 5-10 Congressional employees were also among the 
roughly 50 government RSVPs each year. PONARS members had some contact with 
committee staffers but generally felt Congressional participation was much smaller than 
the executive branch, possibly because the sessions were not held on the Hill.766 One 
former House committee staff member who did attend explained that their colleagues did 
not for a variety of reasons. Most personal staffers, in this staffer’s opinion, were not 
interested because they were more political than analytical. Although it helped that 
763 Interview C59 
764 Interviews C59 and C60. For the increasing emphasis on open-source analysis , see Scott Shane, “A T-
Shirt-and-Dagger Operation,” New York Times, November 13, 2005; and Susan B. Glasser, “Probing 
Galaxies of Data for Nuggets: FBIS Is Overhauled and Rolled Out to Mine the Web’s Open-Source 
Information Lode,” Washington Post, November 25, 2005, p. A35.
765 Interview C51 
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Congress was usually out of session (conferences are typically held on a Friday in 
December, when Representatives and Senators were often traveling to their home 
districts) and they personally found PONARS useful because they did not often get to 
travel to Russia, getting an elected official to focus on Russia recently was not a high 
priority. “As much as I want to delve into detail about Russian political life, a member of 
Congress really doesn’t care…. The bottom line is that the things I learned there didn’t go 
anywhere because there was just no place for an outlet.”767
Network members might improve their chances of being heard on the Hill when 
they were asked to testify768 or through a Congressional Briefing Series that Wallander 
runs at CSIS.769 The Carnegie Foundation also runs another program during the summer 
recess called the Aspen Congressional program, a unique event at which 20-25 members 
of Congress attend a week-long retreat with parliamentarians and scholars from Europe, 
Russia, and the United States. Carnegie’s David Speedie explained “for that, we drew 
very much on the PONARS group….I could probably rattle off a dozen PONARS 
members who have been called on as scholars to have this really intimate, in-depth 
dialogue with members of the Congress.”770 What policy impact they may have had is 
ultimately unclear.
A final consumer from the Hill is the Congressional Research Service.771 As 
mentioned earlier, one of the 16 government employees who attended almost all of the 
recent conferences is a CRS analyst named Stuart Goldman who succinctly explained, 
767 Interview C57 
768 Interviews C43, C481, and C53
769 Wallander, 2005 Final Grant Report, p. 3
770 Telephone interview with author, November 14, 2005
771 Interviews C24 and C57
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“I’m a researcher and so it’s one of the many fora in which I acquire information and 
contacts that I use in my work.”772
Overall, although some government analysts generally found the conferences 
useful,773 others complained that they had become too big for meaningful dialogue,774 or 
were too infrequent.775 One policy advisor felt it was just unrealistic to think that one 
meeting in December could have that much of an impact. “The timing is important and 
the quality of the idea is important. You don’t get that from simply having one meeting a 
year in which folks come to Washington….[E]ven if there is a good idea, it may not be 
the right time in December when the PONARS meeting hits.”776 Even if the immediate 
impact of the conference itself was limited, government attendance served a positive 
networking role, making initial contacts between PONARS and government officials, 
particularly from the intelligence community, which could be drawn upon in subsequent 
meetings or conferences.
Beyond memos and government attendance, PONARS might also theoretically be 
able to influence the U.S. government through the revolving door. At this stage, however, 
there are few members—all of whom are young academics—with government 
experience. It may be that academics are generally less interested in going into 
government or it may just be their age. One exception worked at the National Security 
Council but reported that even though they actually did talk to former network 
colleagues, 
772 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., December 1, 2005
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774 Interviews C50 and C58
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I also hasten to add that I can count on the fingers of one hand the 
occasions in which I had…policy influence in any meaningful sense of the 
word, even as an NSC staffer. I didn’t matter very much…. It has to do 
with the limitations of even middle-level officials in government service. 
There’s very little real influence. The only issues that were the sort of 
thing that would be interesting for an academic to think about were issues 
that were decided at the very highest levels. The kind of things that I 
might have had some influence on were very, very, low level, down in the 
weeds, implementation issues. The question, in a way, is the wrong 
question because even if I learned something somehow from PONARS, it 
would be almost completely irrelevant to any actual policy decision.777
Over time, the question remains whether these young academics might become 
future government officials.778 Another member with government experience told what is 
now a familiar story: “I don’t know how many of those folks in PONARS have gone into 
government, but in general to my mind, that’s where think tanks have the biggest role to 
play, which is in helping people while they are out think about policies they want to 
pursue when they are in…Once they go in, they’re not reading.”779 Another PONARS 
member speculated “you assume people in this network will someday be in a position of 
office of policymaking, and that’s when it will matter. Condi [Rice] told me this once a 
long time ago: it’s very hard to renew your intellectual capital while you’re in 
government office….You do it when you’re on the outside.” The uncertainty, of course, 
is “that it’s a big role of the die, and you never know who is going to be in power.”780
Agenda Setting
The PONARS conference agenda is established through a bottom-up process where 






its establishment in 1999) and the committee decides which ones to host at the 
conference. In theory, this process might increase the chance that a young scholar would 
highlight an agenda item that the U.S. government was not currently considering. 
Wallander acknowledges that the process has risks because “PONARS does not assign 
topics, research, or areas of expertise….[I]n the end we shape our conferences and 
publications around what the members do best, not on what the policy community might 
deem important. That is a potential weakness in making PONARS useful to the U.S. 
policy community, but in practice it has never been a problem.”781 Since 2002, ExCom 
has sent out nonbinding guidance to members suggesting some potential topics that were 
hot in Washington, but the agenda was ultimately a mix of those issues and others that 
members suggested.782
Despite the potential novelty provided by this process, interviews did not reveal 
any sense that PONARS had raised any new issues on the agenda. The proliferation 
topics covered—loose nukes, missile defense, and Russian policy toward Iraq and Iran—
were certainly already there. Government analysts more frequently replied that when 
PONARS was useful, it provided different, often but not always Russian, perspectives on 
subjects that they were already thinking about.783 One former policymaker endorsed the 
utility of the results, arguing that the U.S. agenda with Russia was fairly static, making it 
difficult for any organization to change the government agenda: “I think the way the 
bureaucracy works, it will be harder to put a new issue on the agenda…. you are more 
781 Wallander, “Borderlands,” p. 38
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likely to get somebody to really pay attention if it addresses one of the first-tier agenda 
issues with a new idea or new way to think about it.”784
Policy Options
Similarly, PONARS members raised few if any policy options. PONARS staff and 
members explicitly acknowledged that the network often steers clear of policy advice or 
developing policy options because it is not the strength of its academic members, most of 
whom have had no experience in government.785 From its inception during the 1996 
brainstorming meeting, Wallander explained 
There was a lot of resistance to the idea that young professors could or 
should necessarily end everything they wrote for a policy audience saying 
U.S. policy should be x. We decided early on that PONARS policy memos 
can be about: here’s something you haven’t thought about before, or 
here’s a different take on something you think you understood and you 
haven’t got it right and let me tell you why….Because the point of 
PONARS is to make whatever valuable comes out of academic research 
accessible to a policy audience, it’s not necessarily the case to do policy 
advocacy. Actually, I think that’s one of the reasons why people like 
coming to the conference: because it’s not all about what U.S. policy 
should be. Policymakers or analysts get that all the time.786
The network’s instructions for writing policy memos embodied this early consensus, 
guiding “we have received feedback in the past not to think in terms of writing action 
memos, and not to try to duplicate the work of government analysts. Our memos will be 
most effective and useful if, unlike the usual government analyses, they address the long 
term, with a synergistic perspective and greater breadth.”787
784 Interview C48
785 Interviews C43 and C54 as well as C23 and C25
786 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., November 17, 2005
787 PONARS Instructions and Notes on Policy Memos, pp. 1-2 
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Two former policymakers expressed some frustration with this approach, arguing 
it left them with little practical advice. One former senior former policymaker 
summarized that, in general, “My frustration with think tanks has been, for a very long 
time, that it is very eager to say what is going wrong and very little effort to provide 
useful alternatives….Leaving it there isn’t an option that I have.”788 Conversely, an 
intelligence analyst explained that the option-free approach made it even more useful for 
them as, “It’s illegal for me to actually recommend policy….I think the commentary of 
PONARS tends to be on Russian policy and trying to understand how the Russians are 
developing.”789
Even if PONARS organizers sought to develop policy options, its structure and 
membership are not ideally suited to have much of a direct and immediate impact. For 
one thing, as a policy analyst pointed out, the policy conferences are not focused on one 
particular issue but are an annual survey of Russian and regional security issues, making 
it too diffuse to have much of an effect on any individual subject.790 More fundamentally, 
PONARS members resist even trying to make policy recommendations.791 At least one 
sensed that policymakers were simply saturated with suggestions and that PONARS 
should do something different.792 Others contend that academics are just not well suited 
to give specific policy recommendations anyway. One scholar was resigned that “I don’t 
see my views standing much of a chance of being implemented,” so they were content to 
give policy-relevant advice and leave it to policymakers to “draw their own policy 
788 Interview C49 as well as C47 
789 Interview C51 
790 Interview C45 
791 Interviews C23, C24, C25, C26, and C55
792 Interview C24
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conclusions if there are any.”793 Another stated, “I’m not really in the business myself of 
offering policy recommendations myself so I’ve always been kind of uncomfortable 
[doing it].”794
That does not mean it was not important to network organizers to influence the 
policy community, just that some individual members were not as interested or did not 
seek to get specific policy recommendations adopted. Some network members felt that 
having an impact in the policy world was clearly important to Wallander herself.795 Other 
members thought the funders, particularly Carnegie, wanted to see the network’s policy 
impact.796 Wallander confirmed that, for Carnegie in particular, policy impact “is key; 
that’s the core.” When funding for PONARS was reduced, she said, Carnegie wanted to 
keep the policy conferences and eliminate the academic conferences, much to the chagrin 
of many network members, because “the policy view was more valuable and more 
important” to Carnegie.797
Carnegie’s Speedie confirmed that policy impact “was very important for a 
couple of reasons:” because Carnegie generally defined itself “as operating in the 
intersection of scholarship and policy” and because, at the time, “as this unruly period 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union was evolving…the need, at least to us, was 
clearly evident for there to be good input into policy recommendations.” Generally, 
Speedie acknowledged that how you measure policy impact is “a lot more difficult to 
answer.” Nevertheless, Carnegie continued to support and fund the network’s policy 
conferences. Speedie stated that he had been impressed at how well attended they were. 
793 Interview C26 as well as C55
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“In other words, the Washington insiders were paying attention. Where that ends up in 
terms of legislation or policy directions, I’m not qualified to judge. All I know is that 
people were spending time and effort to come to these meetings.”798
Similarly, one PONARS staff member said that they measured their impact by 
access to government officials. The key was not to change policy, because that was too 
unlikely and at least too difficult to measure, but “I would say [it was] important to 
inform policy, which I think is different….I think we at least made people stop and 
think.”799
Government policymakers participating in this study were less optimistic that 
access made that much of a difference. One member of the revolving door said, “It’s true 
that some lower or mid-level folks show up at the policy conferences, but I don’t think it 
means anything.”800
Other government officials who thought PONARS was trying to influence 
government policy felt it was unsuccessful. One former senior policymaker criticized, 
“It’s a problem when you’re a young scholar and you’re just learning how to do it. The 
presumption that you’re going to be tooting your plain brown-wrapper essay, along with 
seven or so others under the same cover over the transom, and have somebody pay 
attention is a little bit unrealistic.”801 One desk officer specifically highlighted their 
frustration with how little contact PONARS members had with the policy community, 
and how uninformed they felt much of the network’s recommendations and discussions 
were about current policy. 
798 Telephone interview with author, November 14, 2005




I think the way PONARS is structured right now, with a once a year 
conference with the policy community, it’s inherently difficult for them to 
really try to influence the policy community because they have less 
interaction….For academics, without that kind of feedback loop where 
they are aware of what we’re working on and what we’re interested in, 
they’re inherently likely to be coming at it from a distance….[I]t’s not 
really well informed by what’s truly going on in the government and the 
interagency right now.802
That does not mean the network is useless, they concluded, but it is not about influencing 
policy. “When I travel, it tends to be interacting with officials and not having as much 
time to get out into the community and talk to the general public ….What I really find 
more valuable is more the in-depth analysis of what’s going on inside the country with 
the populous—getting some historical perspectives to that.”803
Because of this focus on informing not recommending policy, an intelligence 
analyst praised the network’s approach, highlighting how often people outside 
government did not realize that their proposals had been considered.
I’m sure there are many that will disagree with me, but I usually find 
relatively little value in outsiders, academics particularly, making policy 
recommendations. I usually get to the point where, when they get to the 
policy implications, I start to cringe and think I can leave. It’s not because 
they’re not thoughtful; it’s not because they’re not bright people doing it. 
They’re not there. They’re not in the heat of the battle. They don’t really 
know what already has been done, and what is possible that you can do in 
the building….[G]enerally what happens, I find, when we get to policy 
advice and implications [is] that it is at a level of generality that is not 
particularly useful and probably well over half the time, probably two-
thirds or three-quarters of the time, they’re talking about things that are 
already being done, because other bright people…already came to that. 
So, in that sense, I kind of have appreciated PONARS self-imposed 
restraint.804
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804 Interview C60
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The network’s decision, therefore, not to develop many policy options seems to be 
justified. Although many lower-level policy analysts and members of the intelligence 
community valued the analysis PONARS members provide, developing policy options 
was not the network’s focus. 
Observations
Beyond the structured part of this study, a number of other issues related to the network’s 
operations emerged during interviews. Rather than ignore them entirely or leave them 
unreported, they will be briefly mentioned here for others who may examine networks. 
Although some of these issues have already been touched on earlier, six will be discussed 
further here: the network’s potential drawbacks, its membership, how it might be 
structured to improve policy impact, its effects during a crisis, the potential socialization 
of academic members for policy impact, and any effects in Russia.
Drawbacks? 
Although every subject interviewed was directly asked whether PONARS was harmful in 
any way, not one expressed any examples or even suspicions that the network was 
harmful. The overwhelming consensus of members and government participants is that 
PONARS is not harmful in any way.805 Many, both in and out of the network, specifically 
said that the network is not influential enough to be harmful.806 Two different current or 
805 Interviews C2, C23, C25, C42, C48, C49, C50, C52, C54, C59 C60, C61, and C62
806 Interviews C26, C44, C46, C47, C51, and C57
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former government officials specifically pre-empted any idea that network criticism 
might complicate their lives, saying it was just part of living in a democracy.807
The only serious suspicions raised were harms to members themselves. Two 
network members complained that the listserv could get “nasty” or “acrimonious,” 
particularly as the network had gotten larger and its intimacy dissipated.808 More 
generally, one member of the revolving door thought the network’s quest for policy 
influence was counterproductive, going so far as saying, “My recommendation would be, 
especially in the current climate, to give up on policy relevance and focus on being an 
academic network. That is what it is good at. That is what it should do.”809
The most common suspicion, however, was whether PONARS membership ran 
any risks for Russian members.810 The implicit concern was simply that critical 
comments by Russian network members would alarm hard-line members of their 
government or intelligence services. As one U.S. participant put it, “there are times when 
I think to myself ‘holy crap’ I wonder if the Russians realize this is getting said.”811 One 
Russian member, however, dismissed those concerns stating simply “I can watch a 
number of programs or read newspapers which are much more critical to Putin.”812
Government Participation and Network Membership 
Who attends the annual conference is important to the network’s influence. While the 
primary government consumers seem to be the intelligence community and, to a lesser 
807 Interviews C45 and C49
808 Interviews C54 and C55, respectively
809 Interview C58 as well as C60




extent, desk officers, chapter two highlighted Congress as another promising avenue. 
What happened to the legislature? Their interest and actual results was minimal in 
practice. As discussed earlier, staff members did not predominantly seem interested 
enough to leave the Hill. The network’s attention seemed too detailed for a committee 
staff member likely responsible for an entire region, much less a personal staffer covering
the whole world. PONARS also is not focused enough on policy options to serve 
Congress, which focuses on budget allocations and U.S. policy. Wallander explained that 
from her experience, “I think the fit is better with the executive branch… The demand is 
greater. They need to know more, they need to think a little more long term….The U.S. 
Congress is supposed to think about what program they like, how are they going to fund 
it, and whether it will get implemented right.”813
Within the network itself, a few questions were raised about membership. Two 
PONARS members were disappointed by the quality of the Russians, particularly the 
recent emphasis that seemed to be a “near-random” quest for “warm bodies who will 
come to meetings.”814 Two different government participants complained either that the 
Russian members tended to be more pro-Western,815 or that, more broadly, 
nongovernmental Russian analysts had no influence or contacts with their government 
today.816
On the U.S. side, the primary question was the network’s utility to members as 
they became more experienced, particularly for those who moved to Washington think 
813 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., November 17, 2005, as well as interview C57




tanks.817 These members seemed to “outgrow” PONARS as their own contacts 
developed, and the PONARS conference became “trivial for them.” One member, now 
based in a Washington think tank, was eternally grateful for the government and broader 
policy community contacts that PONARS initially established, but over time found that 
once these contacts were established “instead of [the policy conference] being the one 
time a year you’re seeing people, you’re in constant dialogue with them.” As a result, the 
people that remained active in PONARS were, in their opinion, “the residence of a 
bizarre set of personalities that are having trouble finding outlets elsewhere, as opposed 
to a gathering of the best and brightest.”818 One possibility they suggested was to have a 
type of ‘term membership,’ similar to the Council on Foreign Relations, that would admit 
new members on a trial basis, after which they would either be promoted to full 
membership or no longer be members.
Wallander and other network organizers had previously considered whether to 
“graduate people from PONARS” once young scholars got tenure or some similar 
standard, but ultimately decided that “maintaining the network was more important than 
sticking to some kind of age or tenure criteria.”819 In Wallander’s defense, building those 
connections over time is arguably how you build trust, collaboration among members, 
and ultimately how younger members might learn from older ones (if the latter 
participate). Unfortunately, some government participants also found declining utility in 
hearing the “same people” who “after a while, you know what [they are] going to say on 
an issue….At the moment, at least, I don’t really see enough of a variety of voices on the 
817 Interviews C55 and C481
818 Interview C481
819 Author’s interview with Celeste Wallander, Washington, D.C., November 17, 2005
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questions.”820 Another similarly recommended “there should be turnover, younger folks 
coming in all the time, and people graduating and going off on their careers…and then 
maybe their professional connections will carry them through in the future, as opposed to 
having the same people over 5-10 years meet all the time.”821 Even Speedie, who has 
since moved within Carnegie and is no longer involved in reviewing PONARS, advised 
“by definition of the title of the organization itself, new approaches would mean that 
some people would move on, and others are brought into the fold….Let me put it this 
way: if the membership does not evolve in that way, then that would be something of a 
criticism.”822
Maximizing Policy Influence 
Although PONARS is not exclusively designed to influence policymakers, some issues 
raised during interviews recommended four ways that the network could increase it. The 
first is another critique on the membership itself. The network could be more influential 
if it allowed more members with government experience or even government officials 
themselves. Some current members—including Fiona Hill, Mike McFaul, Sarah 
Mendelson, and Wallander herself—have subsequently moved to Washington. That 
should theoretically increase the network’s influence. But these are the members who 
have arguably found the network less useful as they have developed their own contacts. 
They also do not have government experience, at least not yet. Wallander cautioned that 
changing the membership criteria would be a radical step and “it’s really important to 
820 Interviews C57 and C51, respectively
821 Interview C47
822 Telephone interview with author, November 14, 2005
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remember what you’re trying to do.”823 If the purpose is to bring scholarship to 
government, then such a change would dilute scholarship. 
If, on the other hand, the primary purpose is to influence government, interviews 
reaffirmed the theoretical findings of chapter two and the other case studies: the 
revolving door helps. One current member advocated opening membership to “young 
people working the Russia desk or the guy working at policy planning on Russia right 
now….I think one needs to revisit the selection process for who is in and who is out.”824
A member of the revolving door stressed that government membership could facilitate 
relationships that are often the key to influencing, or at least informing, policy from 
outside government.825 From government’s perspective, it is a part of “a public 
diplomacy strategy…. We ignore at our peril what folks on the outside are saying, 
thinking, and writing about issues that we deal with on a regular basis.” Outside 
government, more intimate exposure to government could help develop “an appreciation 
of how difficult it is to be in the government,” particularly “the difficulties of achieving 
consensus” and how, at the end of the clearance process, “you can wind up with 
something that is dumbed down [to its] lowest common denominator.”826 A government 
desk officer stressed that incorporating government members would enable government 
employees to better inform nongovernmental members about what steps the United States 
had taken, considered, or rejected, and why.827
A second, less radical, suggestion was to have smaller working groups on discrete 
issues supplementing the annual policy conference. In this way, membership would 
823 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., November 17, 2005
824 Interview C55




remain limited to academics, but dialogue with the government would be enhanced. Two 
current members with Washington experience separately suggested the idea.828
Independently, a number of government participants expressed interest in smaller, more 
focused groups in addition to or even instead of the annual conference, which one analyst 
called “a circus.”829 PONARS actually has run and received funding from Carnegie for 
occasional working groups called PONARS Plus. Among six that were held from July 
2003-July 2005, one in February 2005 focused on nonproliferation, although its content 
was private. The problem with doing too many of them, explained Wallander, is the 
amount of time and staff work required to run them.830
A third suggestion was an even more intimate interaction: more briefings for 
individual government officials or other ways to interact beyond the annual conference. 
At least one former PONARS staff member seemed to take great pride that PONARS 
primarily distributed even memos and conference invitations only to people who 
requested them. “I got stuff in my e-mail all the time from other think tanks that I haven’t 
signed up for. We never did that. People had to come to us to get the memos, the working 
papers. If they signed up for them, it is because they wanted them.” Although they 
acknowledged in retrospect that they might have been more aggressive about marketing 
PONARS, ultimately the staff member felt, “It’s really not up to us. We put out a 
product.”831
828 Interviews C55 and C481
829 Interviews C50 as well as C44, C59, and C60
830 Wallander, 2003 Final Grant Report, p. 2, and 2005 Final Grant Report, p. 7, as well as interview with 
author, Washington, D.C., November 17, 2005
831 Interview C43 
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One government analyst who frequently attended the conference, while 
complimenting the organization for providing a valuable opportunity to listen to “very 
erudite and informed and useful” discussions once a year, simultaneously criticized that 
It has always struck me that this is a club of insiders…I have never felt 
like anybody reached out to pull me in….I don’t mean any of this 
disparagingly, and I am very grateful that this organization exists, but the 
idea that it exists, in part, to act as a transmission belt between the policy 
community and the academic community, and that they try to network, I 
think, is something that while I won’t say is laughable, I will simply say I 
have never seen it.832
In addition to reaching out to brief officials, a number of interview subjects 
recommended consulting officials more widely to help determine the policy conference 
agenda.833 Such consultations might give PONARS members greater insight into what 
issues were really dominating government policymakers’ attention. Even if they didn’t, 
they could still help build the relationships that might make PONARS more influential. 
The key is to get more than annual interaction with the policy community. As one 
government official advised, “you can’t trust the fact that the guy will realize it’s a good 
idea the first time that he hears it. You have to be persistent and timing is really critical. 
There comes a time when people are searching for new ideas, and if you’re around at that 
time and you got it, then you’re in. It’s really amazing how that works.” On the bright 
side, they continued, since the network’s headquarters and some of its members had 
moved from Harvard to Washington over time,
Now you have a mechanism at CSIS and elsewhere to get ideas into the 
system. I think what that means is that, for the young American scholars, it 
might mean a more concerted effort by Celeste and her team to follow up 
832 Interview C51
833 Interviews C48, C56, and C61
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on a good idea that gets identified and maybe get some resonance at the 
December meeting, and then push it in January and February, or create 
opportunities to re-engage. You know how it is in Washington, you can’t 
get a policy guy to come spend all day in a meeting. Maybe you’ll get half 
an hour of his time, targeted. It may well be that part of PONARS has to 
evolve into something where the Washington PONARS folks help identify 
the good ideas that could play, and then have a more focused campaign to 
engage the right people in State and Defense and Energy to try to advance 
the idea, as opposed to being more passively briefing a meeting where you 
may not even get the people showing up that need to hear about it.834
None of those interviewed expressed any intention to criticize Wallander or the 
job that she has done in creating PONARS. On the contrary, interviews with both 
members and government officials revealed an overwhelming and nearly universal 
admiration for an “outstanding job of leading the organization,” even among some 
skeptics who initially didn’t think PONARS would work.835
It turns out that Wallander had actually put together at least one of these briefings 
for about ten analysts in 2000, at the request of a White House official at the time who 
claimed to have gotten “unique and interesting” insights from it. The session was held 
just prior to the annual policy conference, focusing on nonproliferation policy toward 
Iran and the priorities of the new Russian leadership under Putin, who had just been 
elected president earlier in the year.836 The problem is not necessarily the desire to run 
these smaller sessions, according to Wallander, but the limits on staff and resources to be 
able to consult more widely, and more effectively track “where U.S. policy on Russia is 
so we can find those nodal points…. Honestly, I think we would be more useful if we had 
our own independent office and capacity to organize meetings more regularly, and to 
834 Interview C47
835 Interviews C1, C25, C42, C45, C47, C56, and C57
836 Interviews C2 and C54
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shape the discussion in Washington more regularly instead of just a yearly 
conference…but that costs money.”837
The fourth and final suggestion to maximize policy influence revolved around 
other opportunities to have government officials address network members, not simply 
listen to them or read their memos. Some government analysts seemed to perceive a sort 
of arrogance that the network would only have something to tell government and not also 
be able to learn from them,838 potentially reducing the network’s influence just by its 
appearance. More substantively, earlier discussion consistently highlighted the perception 
that PONARS analysts are minimally informed about internal U.S. policy debates. 
Addresses by government officials could help fill that gap. Assistant-secretary level 
officials, who would not consider attending unless they were a speaker, might be invited. 
At least their deputies and NSC directors would also presumably be more likely to attend 
if they could address the group. 
An early attempt at including a government speaker on a PONARS panel was “a 
complete disaster,”839 according to one member. Wallander also expressed concerns 
about “the amount of work involved in trying to get these folks” as well as a potential 
quelling effect on discussion because a high-level administration official was there. More 
specifically, she said “I want it to be a discussion about what is going on in Russia, and if 
you have a U.S. policy person standing up there, automatically you are going to start 
arguing about defending or not defending U.S. policy….that’s not our niche.”840
Carnegie’s Speedie added, “I’ll be very honest, I’d never thought of [government 
837 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., November 17, 2005, as well as C55
838 Interviews C51 and C61
839 Interview C54
840 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., November 17, 2005
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speakers]. All I knew was that in the beginning, it was clearly designed as an opportunity 
for PONARS people to strut their stuff.”841
Network members expressed mixed support for such an idea with one, more 
involved in policy on a regular basis, saying “I think it could have been brilliant if you 
could have, I don’t know, Bob Joseph [now the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control 
and International Security Affairs and formerly an NSC director for Proliferation 
Strategy, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense] or someone like that” give the 
administration’s view about these issues.842 A prominent academic member was more 
lukewarm, “It wouldn’t be useful so much for me professionally because my work these 
days is not all that policy-oriented anyway, but it would be intellectually interesting for 
me to get more insight into how the government feels about these sorts of issues.”843
Ultimately, a government official need not speak on one of the panels. They might be 
invited to exclusively address network members on the margins of the conference, either 
the day before or in a dinner afterward, or even to be a keynote lunch speaker (they 
would be unlikely to attend the rest of the conference based on these interviews).
Effects in a Crisis? 
Although the theory discussed in chapter one predicted a role during a crisis for these 
networks, the reality is that any impact has been constrained because the conference is 
almost always held at the same time every year, preventing any ability for the network to 
respond in real-time. What a crisis does do is concentrate the focus of network members, 
resulting in a surge in listserv discussion or an occasional memo detached from the 




conference. Conferences did reflect on crises, elections, or even upcoming summits. 
Examples include a December 2005 preview of Russia’s July 2006 hosting of the G-8 
summit; February 2005 discussions of the implications of Bush’s and Putin’s 2004 
reelections, the September 2004 Beslan school hostage tragedy, and the November 2004 
Orange Revolution in Ukraine;844 December 2003 panels on the 2003 Duma elections and 
the October Yukos scandal; a December 2002 lunch session on the October 2002 Nord-
Ost theater hostage crisis;845 a January 2002 panel on the implications of the September 
11 attacks; discussions in May 2001 after Bush first took office in January 2001 and in 
December 2000 on Putin’s initial March 2000 electoral victory; and a December 1998 
focus on the implications of the 1998 financial crisis. The influence of these sessions on 
government is unclear, but they demonstrate an interest and focus by network members, 
at least in interpreting their long-term implications.
Socialization, With a Twist 
Unlike the other cases that focused on socializing China or North Korea into the practice 
of multilateralism or regional or global norms, interviews for PONARS focused on 
whether the network socialized academics to think about policy issues. Two interviews 
suggested that the editorial process could help train members to write more concise 
policy memos, even if a more intrusive process might not be popular among academics 
traditionally used to lighter editorial touches.846 PONARS staff also reported that memos 
are being used in classrooms in 21 U.S. universities—including Cornell, Columbia, 
844 February 2005 Policy Conference report, pp. 1,4
845 December 2002 Policy Meeting report, pp. 5-6 
846 Interviews C481 and C52, as well as Wallander, “Borderlands,” p. 39
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Dartmouth, Harvard, MIT, Princeton, and SAIS—and 12 institutions in the former Soviet 
Union including St. Petersburg State, integrating policy issues into teaching.847
The problem, however, is more fundamental in the academic system. Although 
there may be some exceptions, members complained that universities traditionally 
dissuade junior faculty both from networking or collaborating with others, emphasizing 
individual achievement, and from seeking policy relevance, preferring to emphasize 
theory.848 Wallander explained that those who focused on Russia or the region risked 
being branded as area studies experts, rather than social scientists, and thus “as lowlife 
academics who aren’t real scholars because they’re not really theoreticians.”849
Wallander herself was denied tenure at Harvard, prompting her move to Washington, and 
revealed that “one of her senior colleagues referred to how she had ‘wasted’ her time 
providing for the ‘public good’ of PONARS.”850 Ironically, Wallander had heard 
anecdotal evidence that PONARS membership was “noted as a positive factor in the 
successful tenure cases of members” because it was “selective.” It was too hard to tell 
how widespread that effect might have been or, in other words, whether PONARS had a 
transformative effect on academic standards and interests, although it seemed unlikely. It 
appeared to be sporadic.851
Interviews also revealed that PONARS had a positive, bonding effect on members 
who were coping with a decline in Russian studies after the Soviet collapse. Some of the 
effect was simply social by boosting morale among a group of young academics facing 
847 Wallander, 2005 Final Grant Report, p. 4
848 Interviews C26, C43, and C47, as well as Wallander, “Borderlands,” p. 36, and 2003 Final Grant 
Report, pp. 2-3 
849 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., November 17, 2005
850 Wallander, 2003 Final Grant Report, p. 2
851 Wallander, “Borderlands,” p. 36; and interview with author, Washington, D.C., November 17, 2005, as 
well as interview C43
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job or research money scarcity. Part of the effect was also practical, building 
collaboration among members, sharing research and information about job openings or 
grant money.852 More specifically, members felt PONARS improved studies not just by 
making memos available for teachers but because, as one member said, “it puts students 
also in contact with a network of experts,”853 and because faculty members could more 
easily consult other members for their own research or to ask for suggestions for what to 
put on a syllabus for a new course.854 One member of the revolving door broadly warned 
that “this is a field that is in jeopardy.”855 Wallander herself was surprised that PONARS 
“actually ended up helping preserve something of a post-Soviet studies field in the 
universities, which was completely unanticipated and I honestly had nothing to do with it. 
It just kind of happened. I think that a lot of PONARS members, to my surprise, value it 
more for that than almost anything else.”856
The other postulated socializing effect was on raising academic standards of the 
Russian members: “how you do research, how you attribute your sources, what is 
considered valid scholarship, and what is not,” and even “to understand what peer review 
is like.”857 One specific advantage, one government analyst raised, was to give scholars 
from generally underfunded institutions money to travel so they could air their ideas and 
“to listen to the responses that they get from their presentations…It helps enrich the 
field.”858 In one exceptional case, PONARS member Fiona Hill took members of 
Brookings’s Board of Trustees to The Humanities University at St. Petersburg, where 
852 Interviews C42, C55, C59, and C60
853 Interview C26
854 Interviews C26 and C54
855 Interview C59
856 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., November 17, 2005
857 Interviews C43 and C47, respectively, as well as C2 and C42
858 Interview C56 
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“several” PONARS members were employed, to take a look at one of the dynamic 
examples of Russian scholarship. “Some of the trustees were so taken with the university 
that they actually made a massive donation to it….That, I have to say for me, was one of 
the most gratifying experiences that has come out of this…”859
Influence in Russia? 
Beyond potentially raising academic standards among Russian members, interviews 
revealed no confidence that PONARS made a difference in that country.860 The network 
didn’t really make policy recommendations; Russians were not members until 1999; only 
two policy conferences were held in Moscow; and think tanks in Moscow are not 
generally considered influential. In his 1999 book, Unarmed Forces, discussed in chapter 
one, Matt Evangelista found that nongovernmental analysts did have influence in Russia 
at the end of the Cold War, but that was because Gorbachev gave them influence. There 
is no similar evidence that Yeltsin or Putin went outside government to seek advice, 
much less to junior Russian scholars. One Russian PONARS member concluded, “If you 
ask me how PONARS is known in Moscow, not among its members, but in policymaking 
circles, the answer would be zero….I am not sure there were any significant attempts to 
bring attention [to] the Russian decisionmaking community.”861
Conclusions
Ultimately, the policy influence of PONARS has been to provide young, rising academics 
with access to government analysts to facilitate longer-term, open-source analysis for the 
859 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., October 27, 2005
860 Interviews C43 and C51
861 Interview C25
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intelligence community and desk officers. From the government’s perspective, this has 
been useful but its format has not been ideal. Memos are too long for policymakers; they 
are usually distributed all at once, overwhelming some analysts and marginalizing them 
to become reference materials for future use; and the network’s members, generally 
academics with little other contact with government officials, are not perceived to be 
particularly well-informed about current policy. Some government participants also felt 
the conferences were too big, although others thought it was an advantage to get a 
comprehensive annual survey of Russian and regional security issues. Because it was 
only held once a year, with little interaction beyond that session and few memos sent at 
other times during the year, the relationships that might be developed to facilitate further 
influence were blunted. Some in government resented that PONARS appeared to lecture 
them without an opportunity to give feedback to network members. In the end, it seems 
that smaller, focused roundtable sessions, also known as PONARS Plus sessions, were 
favorably viewed as one way to focus discussion and facilitate dialogue, at least to 
supplement the annual conference.
Nevertheless, the members of government that kept coming back to PONARS, 
particularly analysts from the State Department’s Intelligence and Research (INR) bureau 
and the National Intelligence Council (NIC)—the analytical branches of the intelligence 
community that delved into open-source analysis—and some policy analysts served by 
those entities valued PONARS for five reasons: 
• direct access to Russian nongovernmental analysts; 
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• indirect access through American members to a deeper community of informed 
Russian opinion, particularly in think tanks and universities, beyond traditional 
government contacts; 
• wider perspectives on Russia and the region beyond specific issues on which they 
worked; 
• longer-term regional trends beyond the crisis of the day; and 
• ultimately just a smart set of Russian and American scholars who could provide a 
sanity check on some of the issues about which they were thinking.
The value was not from specific policy recommendations, which were usually not even 
made, but to provide policy-relevant analysis particularly on the long-term implications 
of crises, potential Russian or regional reactions to current or proposed U.S. policies, 
regional political trends, and the implications of political changes either in Russia, the 
region, or in the United States for policy toward the region. If the post-9/11 emphasis on 
open-source analysis in government and the intelligence community continues, networks 
like PONARS providing access to nongovernmental experts should have even greater 
potential influence.
Outside government, among network members, PONARS has had an even greater 
and much more fundamental impact. Interviews revealed that it has knitted together a 
community of academics over a wide area throughout the United States, to Russia, within 
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Russia beyond Moscow and St. Petersburg, and more recently to other parts of the former 
Soviet space like Ukraine, at a time when attention to and funding for the field has 
withered after the Soviet Union collapsed. Through its listserv, academic conferences, the 
policy conferences, and relationships subsequently built from participation, PONARS has 
helped members with their own research, keep up with events throughout Russia beyond 
specific issues they were researching, and for those members that were either 
fundamentally or casually interested, on the interests of the Washington policy 




Do transnational security policy networks matter? If so, why? Do they make a difference 
in U.S. policymaking? How should similar networks be structured to maximize their 
value? Whether contemporary transnational security policy networks have changed U.S. 
nuclear nonproliferation policies or the perceptions that shape them has been evaluated in 
this study to help gain insight on some of these questions. Whether the networks have 
succeeded at meeting their own goals, such as encouraging multilateralism in Asia, is not 
assessed here because of my own language limitations and inquiry into U.S. policy. None 
of these networks focused exclusively on nonproliferation, and none sought solely or 
even primarily to change U.S. policy. Other researchers might seek to ask different 
questions, including their effects on other security issues. Inquiries might be made about 
network effects in other countries, particularly given preliminary evidence on some South 
Korean perceptions of the Proliferation Security Initiative, and their apparent use by 
China and South Korea to persuade North Korea to enter into the six-party format. Many 
other benefits or drawbacks may exist. The answers in this study seek to shed just a sliver 
of initial light on the larger questions of why these networks matter, starting with their 
effects on the nuclear nonproliferation policymaking process in the United States. 
 On occasion, references in this concluding chapter will be made back to 
individual theories that helped form the hybrid framework for analysis constructed in 
chapter one. However, since no single existing theory sought to explain the emerging 
phenomenon of contemporary transnational security policy networks, no section of this 
concluding chapter is dedicated to confirming or denying those individual theories which 
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informed but did not define this analysis. Instead, this concluding chapter contains an 
evaluation of the four benchmarks for analysis—any contacts and perceptions facilitated, 
U.S. government interaction, agendas set, and policy options generated—and 
recommendations before concluding.
Findings
One initial finding is that these networks serve a cooperative security role. The 
pioneering work on track-two diplomacy has examined their role as conflict resolution 
tools. The findings here show that there is some tension between the two roles. Including 
North Korea facilitated a conflict resolution exercise, but changed the agenda of network 
activities, making them broader, and the tenor of discussion, making them more formal 
and strained. When North Korea did not participate, other members of the six-party talks 
more freely discussed cooperative strategies and disagreements among them about the 
threat and how to manage it. Despite the tensions, these networks managed to do both. 
Contacts and Perceptions
These transnational security policy networks have helped introduce participants to 
valuable contacts. The significance of those contacts varies from person to person and 
depends on the network. Most of CSCAP’s U.S. nongovernmental members knew each 
other, but the network linked those U.S. experts on East Asia with functional experts on 
nonproliferation, export controls, nuclear energy, and other security issues as well as with 
experts from East Asia and with government officials from all countries, including the 
United States itself. Most of NEACD’s governmental members knew each other, but not 
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necessarily the nongovernmental or military participants. PONARS’s generally younger 
academic members did not know other members from their own country, much less other 
countries, the media, or government.
The concept of Congressional enterprises—or the ability of individual U.S. 
Congressional members to build their own pool of nongovernmental experts from which 
they could draw—was introduced in chapter two. Transnational networks similarly 
empowered individual governmental and nongovernmental participants with their own 
personal enterprises, particularly early in their careers. Because these networks have all 
been founded within the last thirteen years, the long-term effect of these ties remains to 
be seen. Early returns such as Jim Kelly’s rise from directing CSCAP to become the U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, or Fu Ying’s ascent from participating in 
NEACD to become a principal Chinese participant in the 6-party talks are promising. 
Although it is difficult to prove, or in some cases even imagine, that these networks may 
have improved relations over time between the United States and countries like Russia, 
China, or North Korea, such initial contacts may at least enable stronger future personal 
working relationships if relations get better for their own reasons. 
In just their first few years, however, these networks have been particularly useful 
when they strengthened weak ties, as sociologist Mark Ganovetter advised in the 1970s. 
They helped introduce and maintain relations among experts from different countries (or 
even those dispersed within countries), professions (such as policymakers, professors, 
and analysts), and generations who worked on different issues (regional security, 
proliferation, or politics) or simply might have very little time to otherwise get together.
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For its primarily nongovernmental members, these contacts and network activities 
facilitated the exchange of ideas and information from U.S. members’ recent travel (such 
as after the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade), with officials and analysts 
from the region (as demonstrated by a Chinese member’s explanation of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization), or simply among smart people from any country. The 
exchange of such ideas and information provides further verification of both Joe 
Montville’s track-two diplomacy concept and Matt Evangelista’s transnational networks. 
Networks also enhanced contact with and the flow of information from U.S. 
government officials, helping addressing one of the most common criticisms of 
nongovernmental analysts’ work expressed in this study: that they often didn’t know that 
their recommendations had already been considered in government, much less why they 
had been rejected. A theoretical exaggeration of government participation in networks is 
that it allows officials to express personal disagreement with their own government’s 
policies. Although there was no such evidence in these cases, off-the-record network 
sessions did allow government officials to go beyond what they were willing to tell the 
media, and explain to domestic experts, many of whom they know personally, details of 
recent events like what had happened at the latest round of six-party talks. They provided 
an intermediate option offering more information than what would be shared at public 
briefings, but less than what officials would pass along in one-on-one meetings with 
trusted colleagues.
Conversely, government officials used network activities such as USCSCAP 
lunches to conduct public diplomacy, eliminating the media middlemen who had 
incentives to sell copies by highlighting disagreements with policy rather than elaborating 
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on government rationale. These networks enabled governments to be more candid and get 
their side of the story out to nongovernmental opinion leaders and experts. 
Government officials also learned from participating in, or briefings on, network 
activities because they were multilateral (particularly initially in Asia at a time when such 
gatherings were uncommon), informal, and because nongovernmental members brought 
different perspectives to ongoing events. Informality enabled conversations among 
government participants to wander beyond confined talking points, and try to better 
understand the sources of disagreement rather than having to conclude with negotiated 
settlements or talking points for the media that formal, official talks required. Meanwhile, 
nongovernmental participants enhanced that informality by asking questions that
diplomatic protocol wouldn’t allow and “getting in people’s faces,” such as the NEACD 
discussion directly asking North Korean participants whether it was even possible, and if 
so how, for the U.S. government to reassure Pyongyang.
Government officials also received human intelligence from nongovernmental 
network members. This is not the 20th-century style of intelligence from spies gathering 
and protecting state secrets, but a 21st-century strain emphasizing open-source analysis 
about politics, perceptions, and policies overseas in a more transparent, globalizing 
security environment. As Stanford Professor Alexander George advised, networks often 
sought to diagnose the root causes of security crises such as North Korea’s pursuit of 
nuclear weapons, Chinese policy toward Pyongyang, or perceived Russian support for 
Iran or Iraq before Saddam Hussein was ousted. These nongovernmental experts got 
deeper into societies by interacting with their counterparts overseas with greater agility 
since they were not burdened with the inertia of only meeting in diplomatic channels or 
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the transaction costs of filing out clearance forms, receiving official approval for 
meetings, and filing reporting cables with these nontraditional contacts. They and their 
nongovernmental counterparts abroad more widely integrated issues, such as Russian 
nonproliferation policy with political trends, and countries throughout a region, 
particularly in East Asia, which bureaucratic stovepipes or the time pressures of 
governance often impeded. They looked longer term at either the implications of ongoing 
crises, such as the downing of the U.S. EP-3 plane over China in the spring of 2001, or at 
the historical roots of and lessons for current crises, like the perspective that Robert 
Scalapino was praised by U.S. government participants for bringing to NEACD 
discussions on North Korea. 
There is no question that recollections expressed in interviews were often 
frustratingly vague, describing general types of information learned without specific 
examples. Although some are cited here and in earlier chapters, only a few participants or 
government officials could recall specific pieces of information, new perspectives, or 
policy recommendations from networks or individual members when interviews pressed 
for further examples. Some officials attributed this to the deluge of information to which 
they were subjected, while others thought it might simply be because events or crises 
which were hot at the time changed so much from year-to-year, leaving more general 
residual impressions of a country’s objectives and strategies. Nevertheless, the types of 
information and perspectives that networks and their members brought to those current 
events were cited as valuable by government officials themselves. As one official frankly 
put it, “I rarely remember exactly who told me what. But I do know that I keep going to 
these things, so…I must be getting something out of it.” The key is that claims are not 
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just being made by nongovernmental members tooting their own horns, but by 
government officials themselves.
It would be inaccurate to suggest that the effects of these nuggets of information 
or distinct perspectives were earth-shattering or paradigm forming. One might best think 
of them as threads that were woven into a broader tapestry of individual official 
perspectives. U.S. government officials could draw on policy networks or their 
nongovernmental participants for the acumen of its members and their access to different 
sources of information for more honest assessments as well as deeper, wider, and longer-
term perspectives on how other countries are politically changing and their foreign policy 
implications, how they might perceive current or future U.S. policies, and how to 
diagnose the root causes and implications of crises that unfold over time.
U.S. Government Access and Interaction
The preceding section still leaves questions of whom in government, how, and when they 
might be most likely to gain any advantages from networks. Because of time pressure on 
government officials, particularly policymakers at the deputy assistant secretary (DAS) 
level and up, it turns out to be very difficult to get their participation in transnational 
networks. After the inaugural session or two, DASs did not usually travel to participate in 
NEACD until North Korea joined, or observe PONARS conferences for even part of a 
December Friday a few blocks from their office. If these officials were invited to speak at 
a luncheon in town, such as the USCSCAP sessions, they were much more likely to 
come, although even then they might cancel at the last minute. At lower levels of the 
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government—such as office directors or desk officers—officials were more likely to 
participate or travel, particularly if they were new to the region. 
A more successful target other than policymakers, in at least one of the networks, 
has been the intelligence community (IC) that informs the executive branch. Since all 
three case studies included China and/or Russia, residual restrictions and suspicion about 
the community interacting with these countries may have made the results of these 
networks even more valuable to the IC. Their participation with some members from 
other countries, however, may still be tainted by the stigma of perceived spying 
especially on sensitive discussions, such as on North Korea or that some feared might 
evolve on Russia. Nevertheless, the more transparent branches of the community such as 
the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the State Department’s Intelligence and 
Research Bureau (INR) have been interested consumers of and even contributors to the 
open-source analysis that network activities facilitate. 
Outside of the executive branch, the behavior of domestic think tanks predicted 
that Congress might be targeted by nongovernmental actors to raise attention to certain 
problems or propose solutions. In these networks, however, the level of discussion on 
foreign policy issues was usually too detailed for Congressional interest. Legislative 
participation turned out to be mostly a dead end.
The challenge for all of these networks has been how they or their individual 
members should interact with government officials that do not participate. Written 
materials might be read, but it was much more likely if they were one-page briefs such as 
the PACNET series. Longer materials might be read by desk officers or intelligence 
analysts, but even then, longer individual memos or the volume of a large collection was 
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more likely to overwhelm already overworked officials. NEACD took an entirely 
different approach, recently hosting an annual briefing in Washington but almost entirely 
avoiding written materials. Another channel—attempts to virtually interact through 
listservs—worked among academic members in PONARS but was less successful even 
with members based in Washington think tanks, while NEACD’s attempts to virtually 
include government officials did not catch on.
The most successful means of reaching out to policymakers has been the simple 
labor-intensive briefing of principal officials. Evidence such as former CSCAP director 
and Assistant Secretary of State Jim Kelly’s connections to Ralph Cossa and other 
network members demonstrates the value of personal connections and the revolving door 
to gain access to government policymakers. Other individual members may have 
connections or pursue such meetings on their own, but network organizers are the most 
knowledgeable about the full range of network activities, often making it incumbent upon 
them to do the hard work. In some senses, this seems fair because the directors gain 
knowledge and notoriety from running them. On the other hand, directors and their staff 
are already doing all the heavy lifting to organize the networks, their membership, 
meetings, agenda, and activities in the first place. Given that networks have not received 
the resources to make running them the sole or even principal responsibility of any of 
these three directors, it is a very time-intensive but arguably necessary responsibility to 
add briefing a wide range of government officials.
Determining when those briefings might be most effective, and therefore when to 
seek them, is one way to limit the burden. Evidence from these cases reveals that 
summits, political changes, and recent crises drove many but not all network activities 
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(working groups in all three cases are notable exceptions). These activities could at least 
inform and crystallize the messages of participants that might be passed along to 
governments. Sometimes, governments even sought advice from networks or individual 
participants at these times. Summits like Clinton’s 1998 and Bush’s 2002 trips to China, 
Jiang Zemin’s 2002 trip to Crawford as well as Wen Jiabao’s 2003 visit to the United 
States, the 2000 intra-Korean summit, and Russia’s 2006 hosting of the G-8 summit were 
often the focus of network sessions. Summits involving the United States also spurred the 
U.S. government to seek outside advice, or at least be more willing to accept it, because 
officials invariably look for what are called “deliverables,” or an agreement, statement, or 
other form of tangible evidence, that can be announced after a summit to demonstrate its 
success. Summits that did not involve Washington still provided opportunities for 
analysts to predict their long-term implications.
Political changes in the United States or overseas also opened these policy 
windows, as John Kingdon called them, into government. An opportunity predicted by 
Donald Abelson and Christine Carberry—U.S. presidential election campaigns—did not 
yield results in these three cases. Each network included some participants who played a 
part in presidential campaigns at some level or sent materials from their activities to 
senior campaign advisors.862 For one reason or another, however, in no cases did the 
participants or networks feel they had any noticeable influence. One explanation might be 
the nature of the three presidential campaigns run since these networks were created. 
Abelson and Carberry argued in 1997 that whether campaigns were likely to be 
influenced by nongovernmental experts would depend on two characteristics of 
candidates: their experience in Washington and the strength of their ideological views. 
862 Interviews A13, A16, A21, B32, B37, and C42
277
Insiders were less likely to seek advisers; ideologues more so. The reality is that the 
absence of campaign influence may say more about the campaigns than networks, 
reinforcing Abelson and Carberry’s earlier findings. Clinton v. Dole featured an 
incumbent against a Washington insider; Gore v. Bush saw an incumbent square off 
against a candidate who some would consider an ideologue but had his own set of 
advisers and sought to distinguish himself from his father and the Republican 
establishment;863 and Bush v. Kerry pitted an incumbent against another insider. At least 
for now, the implications of presidential campaigns for networks are inconclusive.
Turnover in U.S. government personnel was more promising. Ralph Cossa’s 
opportunities to separately brief a new director of the regional security policy office in 
the State Department’s East Asia bureau and a new ambassador to South Korea, Chris 
Hill who has since replaced Jim Kelly as the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
and Pacific affairs, provided new avenues into government. Discussions about the 
implications for U.S. policy toward East Asia when Hill replaced Kelly and Condoleezza 
Rice replaced Colin Powell as Secretary of State in the current administration’s second 
term also piqued network interest.
Political changes in other countries provided another set of opportunities to open 
the U.S. government to outsiders. The former White House official who requested and 
praised a PONARS-organized session in 2000 on Putin’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear 
program, just after he replaced Yeltsin, is one example. All three network activities are 
littered with attention to these political transitions including Hu Jintao’s rise in China and 
Putin’s in Russia. Although it is possible that changes in China or Russia may have 
863 For an excellent look at the advisers to George W. Bush, see James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: the 
History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Viking Press), 2004.
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increased network opportunities because of their dynamic changes and unique 
relationships with the United States in the last fifteen years, networks also focused on the 
implications of political changes in allies such as South Korea after Kim Dae Jung and 
then Roh Moo-Hyun were elected.
Crises, on the other hand, had a different effect than summits and political 
changes on government interaction. Specific crises such as the 1998 North Korean 
missile test, the 1999 Chinese embassy bombing in Belgrade, and the September 11 
terrorist attacks certainly focused network activities. They even shaped networks by 
leading NEACD to shift the morning sessions of their second day from non-security 
issues to the host country’s perspective on recent events, and CSCAP to form a working 
group on export controls after the A.Q. Khan network was discovered. But little evidence 
exists from these three cases of any access to government immediately after these crises, 
when they are hottest. 
On one hand, this seems to negate John Kingdon’s prediction that, along with 
political changes, crises are a catalyst to open policy windows and Peter Haas’s 
conclusion that epistemic communities can help explain why crises emerged, identify 
policies to alleviate them, or help states define their interests in a crisis. Alternatively, it 
may refine these findings in the security field, which neither Kingdon nor Haas focused 
on exclusively. In fact, as discussed in chapter one, both John Ikenberry and Alexandra 
Carter raised doubts about the permeability of the U.S. security policymaking system, 
given the national interests at stake and at least the perceived need to have access to 
classified information. That system appears to be least accessible in the heat of a crisis.
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Quite simply, the demands on government officials become overwhelming during 
these times. Networks whose members are scattered around the world are also not often 
agile enough to organize any immediate responses.864 On the other hand, networks either 
virtually or physically organize opportunities to exchange information, helping inform 
individual members who are often asked to comment on crises in the media. After the 
immediate crisis has settled down, they may open windows for members to provide their 
opinions to government officials on the root causes or long-term implications of crises. In 
the near-term though, networks and their members are better off if crises provoked them 
to focus on information gathering and public education.
Although the heat of a crisis is not usually the best time to approach government 
officials, experiences from these networks yielded better results before summits and 
around political and personnel transitions. A related lesson here is that, while it is natural 
for well-positioned network members and their organizers to focus on supplying 
government with findings from network activities, demand in government was not 
greatest at that time. Some government interest might be generated from network 
activities, particularly from working groups that focused on over-the-horizon challenges. 
But governments often opened policy windows and were more interested in opinions and 
analysis from outsiders based on their agenda and events, not network activities. 
Even the most determined network member efforts are not necessarily sufficient 
to get the attention of government officials—particularly because transnational policy 
networks did not seek to leverage public attention through the media. Governments must 
be willing to open policy windows for networks to inform them. In these three cases, that 
864 Also see Wolfgang H. Reinicke, “The Other World Wide Web: Global Public Policy Networks,” 
Foreign Policy (Winter 1999-2000): 47.
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was more likely when officials had themselves been members of the revolving door, or 
when they knew and trusted the individual organizers or members who sought to brief 
them. Ultimately, although at least lower level officials interviewed for this study were 
arguably a sample biased in favor of networks by their continued participation, the results 
precisely demonstrate the point about policy windows: those officials who did participate 
in networks or at least interact with their members believed they benefited. It is in their 
interest to open these windows and accept briefings, at least at key times. The effort here 
is to better define the circumstances and times most likely to benefit officials. But as one 
DAS who is a member of the revolving door said, “We close the door at our peril to 
thinking on the outside.”
Agenda Setting
Despite the findings of John Kingdon, Andrew Rich, and others that U.S. think tanks 
were often most successful at setting the government agenda, there is little evidence that 
these networks were, or even sought to do so. Instead, networks often sought to bring a 
different—longer range, more integrated—perspective to issues already on the agenda. 
The one exception might have been the work on nuclear transparency through 
PACATOM that appeared to stumble into an area that slipped through U.S. bureaucratic 
cracks, effectively serving more like a safety net for the U.S. government.
By design, though, this study focuses on transnational policy networks, as 
opposed to transnational advocacy networks like the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines. In other words, it effectively screened out those networks that would 
primarily use the media to pressure the government and raise an issue on its agenda. 
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Generally, transnational networks have two avenues to seek to influence government: 
behind the scenes, as policy networks sought, or publicly, as advocacy networks do. It is 
possible that some members of policy networks, often populated by experts who had 
served in government before, were more sympathetic to the demands of governance and 
not inclined to pressure current officials through the media (or, as former military officers 
might say, to go outside the chain of command). The only network that allowed media to 
participate and report on their activities was PONARS, whose members were academics 
who almost universally had not served in government and did not feature any government 
speakers anyway. Conversely, NEACD published very few written documents at all, 
relying on confidentiality to maximize the candor of proceedings for government 
participants, and some in CSCAP even speculated that Cossa might have been hesitant at 
times to get his friend and former boss Jim Kelly in trouble by calling him out in public. 
It is possible that other transnational networks might sequentially try both 
strategies: working with government officials first and, if that yields no results, shifting to 
a more public strategy to pressure them. On the other hand, it is also possible that 
differences in membership (with policy networks comprised of more experts) and the 
subject matter (with advocacy networks generally focusing on more principled or 
humanitarian concerns) lend networks to choose either a behind-the-scenes (policy) or 
public (advocacy) strategy. 
There is a trade-off, however, between having influence with current government 
officials behind the scenes, and seeking to influence them through the media.865 While 
policy networks might have access to government officials, their autonomy could be 
865 This point is also made in Herman Joseph S. Kraft, “The Autonomy Dilemma of Track Two Diplomacy 
in Southeast Asia,” Security Dialogue 31:3 (September 2000): 343-356.
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compromised. In other words, not only might policy networks not seek to set the 
government agenda, governments may actually seek some influence on network agenda. 
The trade-off is that governments would by definition be interested in the results of 
network activities.
In two cases, this dilemma manifested itself in an even more direct way: the 
government funded CSCAP and NEACD. The effect may best be described by recalling 
Kent Weaver’s categorization of think tanks from chapter two: government-funded 
networks were more likely to act like consulting tanks, while other sources of funding 
enabled what Weaver called “universities without students” or more autonomous 
enterprises, such as PONARS whose members are academics and funding is from 
foundations. 
Because of the effects of CSCAP and NEACD, it is worth a one-paragraph 
digression to comment on the overlooked impact of consulting tanks. The existing 
literature on think tanks, for obvious methodological reasons, has been limited to a public 
study of the impact of think tanks on public discourse, the media, or Congress. This 
effectively has confined study to look at two of Weaver’s three categories, but has 
excluded an analysis of the behind-the-scenes consulting role that think tanks might play. 
Greater study on think tanks that directly interviews executive branch officials and 
investigates their consulting role is warranted.  
Unfortunately for networks, the playing field to perform either of these two 
different roles is not even. Foundations generally do not fund projects indefinitely, 
seeking instead to start them and move on to new things, confronting networks with a 
dilemma. Governments, with greater resources at their disposal and their own priorities, 
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appear to be willing to fund projects for longer periods of time. That provides an 
incentive for networks to seek government funding which enhances their consulting, 
rather than agenda-setting, role.
It is tempting to conclude that such government influence nefariously co-opts 
networks. But that is not necessarily the only reason networks seek a consulting role. 
Their members are frequently experts who formerly served in government, some of 
whom may prefer the greater access and nuance behind the scenes. While there is surely a 
role to be played by autonomous organizations that bring public pressure and scrutiny on 
governments, the reality is that these more tightly linked policy networks play a different, 
still useful and not necessarily sinister, role. The absence of any evidence that overseas 
participants or governments dismissed policy networks funded by the U.S. government 
demonstrates this value. While it undoubtedly was essential to be transparent about U.S. 
government funding sources, these linkages may have assured overseas participants of 
Washington’s interest in network activities. Participants seemed to relish the opportunity 
to use networks to explain their own country’s policies. The fact that the U.S. 
government funded a network made it no more likely, for example, for U.S. participants 
to convince Japan to give up using plutonium as an energy source than it did for Japanese 
participants to convince the United States why it should pursue it. 
Although these three networks rarely sought to set the U.S. agenda, U.S. 
participation in at least CSCAP and NEACD was more focused on agenda setting 
overseas. In other words, they facilitated the ability of U.S. participants to conduct 
unofficial diplomacy. These findings reinforce the three stages that Matt Evangelista 
observed in these networks’ Cold War predecessors: transnational networks can help 
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share ideas and information, transfer norms, and even coordinate policies. Contemporary 
examples demonstrated these functions were being performed by both nongovernmental 
and governmental actors, either simply out of coincidental interests or even explicitly as 
partners. 
Just as these networks had helped share information, explanations, and ideas 
between U.S. officials and nongovernmental experts as a domestic public diplomacy 
forum, they played a similar international public diplomacy role. U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Cohen’s 1997 briefing on the Quadrennial Defense Review for the first foreign 
audience, Lew Dunn as well as, separately, former Assistant Secretary of State for 
Nonproliferation Robert Einhorn on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and a team 
from the University of Georgia on export controls were all examples of either official, 
unofficial former government, or nongovernmental experts explaining U.S. policy to 
overseas participants.
From CSCAP’s inception, its U.S. nongovernmental members sought to prioritize 
a nonproliferation norm with Asian governments and strategic thinkers, even after facing 
regional resistance, reaffirming Evangelista’s second stage. This general nonproliferation 
work was followed by specific efforts to embed a nuclear energy transparency norm 
through PACATOM. Other initatives, such as CSCAP’s support of a regional arms 
registry and defense white papers as well as NEACD’s principles of cooperation and 
defense information sharing, sought to more generally embed transparency as a norm in 
security affairs. 
The third stage, policy coordination, was also predicted by Joe Montville’s final 
stage of eventual joint strategies in track-two diplomacy. U.S. nongovernmental member 
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efforts to get Asian governments to accede to and indefinitely extend the NPT in 1995 
demonstrate policy coordination, as do similar accession efforts to the CWC, BWC, 
MTCR, and the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards agreement. European 
participation helped convey the potential for EURATOM to serve as a model for 
PACATOM, and for an EU Action Plan for Nonproliferation to provide a template for an 
Asian effort. U.S. government clarifications of media misperceptions of the initial round 
of the six-party talks, and efforts to explain and gain support for the Proliferation Security 
Initiative do the same. Other examples outside nonproliferation such as preventive 
diplomacy and coordinating maritime policy demonstrate similar unofficial policy 
coordination.
Did PONARS include similar diplomatic efforts, or agenda setting overseas? 
Evangelista himself is a member of PONARS, and was kind enough to be interviewed for 
this study. Although he thought the network was analogous to the Cold War predecessors 
he had studied, Evangelista predicted that PONARS’s members, including himself, were 
too young and did not have the access to influence the Russian government. He also felt 
that the political context was so different because the shared anxiety to end the nuclear 
arms race did not bind a network today as tightly as it had during the Cold War.866  In 
Unarmed Forces, he had also concluded that Gorbachev had turned outside the 
government for ideas and allies to implement them in the Soviet system. Now, that 
system was too disorganized under Yeltsin or, more recently, more suspicious of 
nongovernmental actors under Putin as the recent controversial legislation restricting 
NGO activities and increasing their reporting requirements to Moscow shows. In this 
case, the network did not have the right members, the Russian government was not 
866 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., February 4, 2005
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permeable to outsiders, and the common cause did not exist to have the same purpose and 
effect.
In the other two cases, diplomacy was conducted by more senior 
nongovernmental and sometimes even official participants in their private capacity, like 
former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Don Keyser. As previously discussed, their 
multilateral, informal format and the catalytic presence of nongovernmental actors could 
spark discussions to explore behind talking points, formal agenda, and the search for 
negotiated press statements and agreements that governed official negotiations. The 
ability to get beyond these talking points and understand the interests that shaped them, 
not just in North Korea but in China or even South Korea, through transnational networks 
were what Roger Fisher and William Ury advised could help eventually reach a 
negotiated agreement or, as they put it, to get to “yes.” The methodological problem, of 
course, is that it is difficult to trace how U.S. or overseas officials might take these 
unwritten insights from networks and put them into agreements. Rather, it is more likely 
to affect the understanding and norms that diffusely help shape them, as well as their 
coordination.
In these cases, embryonic official relations with China in networks’ initial stages, 
and with North Korea recently, provided additional diplomatic value from transnational 
networks. Although some theoretical concerns were expressed that these networks 
provided a platform for North Korea to conduct their own public diplomacy and 
potentially could relieve their isolation as well as reduce their incentive to participate in 
the six-party talks, the networks appeared to facilitate those official talks. At a March 
2003 CSCAP working group, South Korean and Chinese delegations may have 
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encouraged North Korean participants for the first time to abandon Pyongyang’s demand 
for bilateral talks with the United States and participate in the multilateral format. After 
the first round of those talks were held five months later, a September 2003 NEACD 
session in Qingdao allowed Keyser to follow-up on that first round, reiterate what 
Washington felt was most important, preview to Pyongyang what the United States 
perceived was crucial to the success of the second round, clarify media misperceptions 
that the United States demanded North Korea make all concessions before receiving any 
benefits, and elaborate on the benefits of an executive agreement as opposed to a treaty 
which required Congressional ratification. An April 2004 NEACD meeting enabled 
Einhorn, who had formerly served in Democratic administrations, to try to dissuade 
North Korean participants from stalling official talks for the subsequent seven months if 
they were hoping that they could get a better deal if John Kerry won the U.S. election. 
Ultimately, the primary agenda setting role that transnational policy networks 
played was not in the United States. The primary effort was either to provide a new 
perspective on an already existing agenda item or to set the agenda in other countries by 
acting as a forum for unofficial public or private diplomacy. What these networks often 
sought to do, therefore, was to increase understanding and, where possible, agreement. In 
other words, whether in cooperation with government or by independent 
nongovernmental initiatives, these networks have served as a forum for soft power. 
In their most fundamental role, simply “information is power,” according to the 
opening page of Joseph Nye’s influential book, 867 and its exchange across countries and 
a variety of other weak ties is facilitated by transnational policy networks. But even 
867 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 
2004): 1.
288
further, the diplomatic initiatives they enable has the potential to build a consensus 
among participants “to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one 
wants.”868 As the world globalizes, Nye emphasizes, this power to reach agreements does 
not rest exclusively in governments but is increasingly devolving to nongovernmental 
actors.869 The soft power of networks will undoubtedly vary depending on who 
participates in, or are briefed by, networks as well as how other participants wield 
influence in their own country’s governments and societies; each country’s context will 
be different. Nevertheless, transnational networks exchange information and build 
consensus among opinion leaders, policy planners, government participants, and others 
within the foreign policy elite on the seriousness of threats such as proliferation itself, 
diagnose their root causes, seek norms, explore strategies, and even potentially coordinate 
international policies to respond. 
Policy Options
With two possible exceptions, these networks did not develop policy options for 
Washington to consider adopting. For the most part, they did not even try. Some CSCAP 
efforts focused on the ASEAN Regional Forum or coordinating regional policies in 
countries overseas. Others, such as the North Pacific working group where much of 
CSCAP’s early work on North Korea was conducted, expressed concern “about its 
capacity to produce policy recommendations” from the beginning and never even issued 
a memo. PONARS memo instructions advised members “not to think in terms of writing 
action memos, and not to try to duplicate the work of government analysts.” NEACD also 
868 Ibid., p. 2
869 Ibid., especially pp. 14-15, 17, 32, 99
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avoided trying to reach policy conclusions. In fact, an advantage cited by a senior 
government policymaker on North Korea was precisely that these sessions did not seek to 
reach policy conclusions, allowing greater opportunity to identify and explore differences 
that shaped negotiating positions.
One of the two exceptions may have been the recommendation to synchronize 
comprehensive, verifiable, irreversible disarmament (CVID) of North Korea with similar 
assurances (CVIA) to them. Even this instance was not a network recommendation, but a 
suggestion by at least one Chinese CSCAP scholar, and a separate discussion in NEACD 
provoked by a nongovernmental member asking participants for their perspective on the 
CVID formula. Over time, that formula appears to have been publicly dropped from U.S. 
declarations (although its principles still shape U.S. thinking) and the September 2005 
joint statement of the six-party talks in principle incorporated security assurances. These 
networks were two of a number of channels through which the United States was being 
discouraged to publicly drop the CVID formula and extend security assurances as part of 
any agreement with North Korea. By no means does that mean networks were irrelevant, 
but they were not unique. To borrow the words of one of the interviews from another 
context, it may have been more like another “drop of water on the rock” eroding the 
CVID declaration.
The second exception is a set of contingency planning options, which might also 
be called a form of trial balloons. As one government participant explained, networks 
were where you could “imagine the possible” but not be held accountable for it as official 
U.S. policy. Work to explore what a verification regime with North Korea might look 
like and discussions about the merits of an executive agreement are both examples of 
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contingency planning if political conditions were to change and an agreement with North 
Korea were reached. More broadly, the entire NEACD network was a giant 
organizational experiment to see what six-party talks might look like, a decade before 
that format officially existed. The idea was not to make immediately implementable 
policy recommendations, but to relax practicality a bit and be able to provide a first draft 
of an agreement if politics changed.
A number of reasons could explain why networks did not seek to change U.S. 
policy. It might be unique to the United States. Network behavior could confirm John 
Ikenberry’s hypothesis that the strength of the global hegemon made it less permeable to 
outsiders. It could corroborate Matt Evangelista’s thesis that democracies are too messy 
for nongovernmental actors to have much influence and that, ironically, centralized 
systems are more amenable. It might be unique to the Bush administration, which has 
been roundly criticized for limiting decisionmaking to a small inner circle and not
listening to outsiders. The networks may have been too weak in their early stages to have 
much effect at all, with PONARS only moving its operations to Washington in 2001, 
North Korea just participating in NEACD since 2002, and CSCAP restructuring its 
working groups in 2004. Think tanks and the nongovernmental sector in other countries 
did not often effectively exist before the end of the Cold War, potentially leaving them 
too weak to seek to change U.S. policy through networks. American network directors 
may have been more focused on changing other countries. As explained before, U.S. 
government funding may have encouraged networks to look at other countries.
All these reasons are possible, but they only explain why networks may not have 
effectively changed or focused on the United States. In reality, some network members 
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did make an impact in Washington, but they rarely sought to change policy immediately; 
they sought instead to inform it and shape it more broadly. The networks most successful 
at informing its members have been the ones that strengthen weak ties. As it turns out, the 
very weakness of these ties and diversity of opinions and experiences that makes 
networks the most useful are the same factors that make consensus among members, and 
therefore policy recommendations, difficult to build. Diversity impedes consensus. While 
individual members might have their own policy recommendations improved by what 
they learned at network events, networks themselves rarely reached joint statements. 
CSCAP memos were infrequent, NEACD principles for cooperation were bland, and 
PONARS did not even try. Tanja Borzel’s distinction between homogenous and 
heterogeneous networks,870 or Hugh Heclo’s between issue networks and shared-action 
groups, could have predicted this result. There is a trade-off between heterogeneous 
networks, which are more effective at exchanging ideas and information, and 
homogenous networks, which are more likely to reach consensus recommendations. 
Each of the three networks created smaller units—CSCAP or NEACD working 
groups and PONARS Plus—to focus on more specific issues when they sought to make 
policy recommendations. Chinese participants were also drawn from CSCAP for an 
independently run 1999-2001 Wilton Park project on P-5 security cooperation. One way 
to think of this effect might be to draw on network theory.871 The networks studied here 
have often served as idea and information exchange bases, from which specific policy-
focused cells might be formed for discrete periods of time. Although individual members 
870 Tanja A. Borzel, “Organizing Babylon—on the Different Conceptions of Policy Networks,” Public 
Administration 76 (Summer 1998): 261, 266.
871 Also see James G. McGann, Think Tank Networks and Transnational Security Threats (Philadelphia: 
Foreign Policy Research Institute, December 2003): 7.
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may improve their own recommendations, networks themselves rarely generated or 
advocated policy options, and that is the way it should be.
Recommendations
These findings lead to a series of recommendations for governments and for networks 
that seek to influence U.S. security policymakers, but possibly also for foundations that 
might fund networks. Foundations are not a primary subject analyzed in this study, 
principally funded only one of the cases, and clearly have a responsibility to assess the 
return on their investment of any project they fund. That is extraordinarily difficult when 
the principal product is an intangible idea, exchange of information, or principle from 
which a diffuse process that shapes policy might begin. Nevertheless, to the extent that 
foundations look for evidence that networks produced a policy to demonstrate their value, 
they are looking in the wrong place. Rarely do any nongovernmental actors, even U.S. 
think tanks, make a radical policy impact, almost always having a much more nuanced 
and incremental effect. Their role is to analyze or shape or, as one network staffer said, to 
“inform not influence” or make policy, at least in part because there are too many factors 
in policymaking beyond their control. For policy networks that seek to work with 
government officials, the standard should be access to government officials, as David 
Speedie indicated Carnegie emphasized, not about actual policies themselves. It is simply 
not realistic.
A concomitant set of lessons follow for the U.S. government. Interviews for this 
study revealed a consistent sense of information overload among officials at all levels, 
and often an awareness of the stovepipes or lanes within which officials were expected to 
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operate, confining themselves to single issues and countries, rarely having or allowing 
themselves the “luxury” to think about the bigger picture. As a result, networks can be 
useful because nongovernmental analysts integrate issues across countries as well as time 
and are not burdened by the demands of governance which impede such thinking. Given 
9/11 Commission recommendations and recent failures, it is no great insight to add that 
the U.S. intelligence system is broken, burdened by information overload, stovepiping, 
and Cold War-era stigma on interacting with some other countries. Unfortunately, 
diplomatic protocol is also too formal to get some messages to the United States that it 
needs to hear. Finally, attention has recently turned to improving public diplomacy, but 
understanding the challenges remains in its infancy. 
It is well beyond the scope of this paper to holistically advise how to fix 
intelligence, revolutionize diplomatic protocol, or reinvent public diplomacy. It does, 
however, mean that government officials can and should use transnational networks as 
modern tools to conduct diplomacy and to learn. Except in special circumstances, like 
recently with North Korea, it does not require that senior officials necessarily travel 
overseas to network events or attend day-long conferences, especially given demands on 
their time. It is beneficial for lower level officials, analysts, and certain members of the 
intelligence community to do so, particularly those new to a region, issue, or even to 
diplomacy. But it does mean that even senior officials benefit from candidly speaking 
off-the-record over a meal with select nongovernmental experts, and from accepting or 
even seeking briefings from directors and members of select networks to improve the 
open-source analysis available to them.
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Which networks are the most useful to government officials? The final set of 
recommendations is for networks that seek to inform U.S. security policymakers or 
provide a forum for governmental and nongovernmental actors to conduct public or 
private diplomacy. It is tempting to compare, contrast, and where they fall short criticize, 
the three pioneers studied here. But that is simply not fair to the networks as they did not 
primarily seek these roles in all cases. Nevertheless, they yield lessons—do’s and 
don’ts—for others that aspire to those roles. 
First, membership matters. Diversity powers the exchange of information and 
ideas through transnational security policy networks, strengthening weak ties across 
geography, expertise, generations, and professional backgrounds. Inertia will settle 
networks to work with current members, risking devolving into a group think mentality 
as new ties grow old and familiar.872 New members can continually revitalize networks.
Among their participants, transnational security policy networks should include 
members of the revolving door to maximize network value to other members and the U.S. 
government. Adding members who have recently left government is one way to keep 
membership fresh, but that is just the tip of the iceberg. Those with government 
experience better understand the challenges of governance and the realities of 
policymaking from their own experience. They are often able to get information from 
former government colleagues. Perhaps most importantly, they are more likely to go back 
into government, taking the training and knowledge they have received from network 
872 Also see Wolfgang H. Reinicke, “The Other World Wide Web: Global Public Policy Networks,” 
Foreign Policy (Winter 1999-2000): 56; Diane Stone, “Introduction: Global Knowledge and Advocacy 
Networks,” Global Networks 2:1 (2002), p. 8; and Jan Martin Witte, Wolfgang H. Reinicke, and Thorsten 
Benner, “Beyond Multilateralism: Global Public Policy Networks,” International Politics and Society 
(Politik und Gesellschaft Online) 2/2000 (www.fes.de/IPG/ipg2_2000/artwitte.html (accessed April 16, 
2004)).
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participation with them. As was the case with Jim Kelly, it is not that network contacts 
will change policy when those officials are in government, but network membership 
prepares them before they go into government, and enhances scarce access to exchange 
unclassified information with them when they are serving.
Second, networks should seek multiple channels to influence governments. For 
starters, they should conceptually consider informing multiple governments at various 
layers: to multilateral institutions (such as ARF, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, or 
even the UN or G-8), to national governments (such as the members of the six-party 
talks), and through individual policymakers or members who may be in government now, 
a member of the revolving door, or even nongovernmental members who may seek to 
influence governments publicly or privately on their own. 
When they do seek to interact with the U.S. government, networks should do so 
with strategies tailored to different levels of seniority. Particularly for policymakers at the 
DAS level and up, networks should seek to have them speak at special sessions for a 
limited period of time and do not require travel, otherwise it is unlikely they will 
participate. At lower levels, networks should seek, where appropriate, to get office 
director and desk officer participation particularly if they are new to an issue. Today’s 
office directors might even be tomorrow’s assistant secretaries. Networks should also 
strongly consider incorporating intelligence analysts, particularly from INR and the NIC, 
while being aware of the potential for an intelligence presence to quell discussion on 
sensitive issues or with participants from certain countries overseas. But when even the 
greenest government analysts participate, networks would be wise not to treat them 
exclusively like notetakers to take advice back to government. These participants are not 
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only sources of information to improve nongovernmental understanding of government 
perceptions, policy debates, and negotiations, but governmental analysts are more likely 
to learn and participate if they engage in a discussion than when they attend a lecture. 
They need not, and sometimes can not, address a large network conference, but they can 
engage in roundtable discussions on equal footing with network members, at least after a 
member or official delivers short initial remarks. 
If they do not participate in person, some officials will read publications, most 
likely one-page op-eds, but are unlikely to engage in any virtual diplomacy or online 
discussions. It is incumbent upon network directors and interested individual members to 
seek to brief officials at various levels both when networks can supply new findings or 
contingency recommendations, and when government demand is greater such as well in 
advance of summits or around political or principal transitions overseas or in the United 
States. 
Finally, transnational security policy networks should focus on facilitating the 
exchange of information and ideas, or the perceptions that shape policies. As such, they 
should remain vigilant against developing organizational bureaucracy and preserve 
flexibility to constantly reinvent new meeting formats and membership to adjust to the 
rapidly changing security challenges that globalization presents. Networks should 
envision themselves primarily as an expert base, to facilitate information and idea 
exchange among its members and with officials, while also providing members for 
working groups, or cells, which can delve into specific policy issues for a discrete period 
of time. Networks should also be endowed with resources from diverse sources to pursue 
these goals with the independence, energy, and creativity required.
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Conclusions
As security challenges have globalized in the wake of the Cold War, the ideas industry 
has been globalizing with it in the form of transnational security policy networks. Based 
on these three case studies, some preliminary hypotheses about the effects of 
transnational security policy networks on U.S. nonproliferation policies or the 
perceptions that shaped them have been proposed in this concluding chapter. Strictly 
speaking, the findings of this chapter are only based on three case studies and only apply 
to nuclear nonproliferation. But their implications are potentially greater. They are 
preliminary hypotheses which can be further tested not just by other transnational 
security policy networks on nonproliferation, but on other cooperative security issues as 
well. As defined in the introductory chapter, these preliminary hypotheses can be further 
tested by other transnational security policy networks (those involving regular 
international interactions including non-state agents not operating on behalf of a national 
government or intergovernmental organization) that deal with security threats which take 
a relatively long time to become acute, have a normative framework to address, and are a 
common interest of countries to cooperate to do so. One immediately obvious other 
potential security issue to which these findings may apply is terrorism.
Networks other than CSCAP, NEACD, and PONARS may provide additional 
values screened out by case selection. Some may have members, such as the scientists 
that formed Pugwash, who may be sought for technical expertise not available in 
government. Others may be led by more politically seasoned directors such as the Aspen 
Strategy Group’s tandem of Brent Scowcroft and Joseph Nye. But these three case 
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studies provide a base from which we can begin to better understand the emerging 
phenomenon and value of transnational security policy networks. Assuming that 
developing improved capabilities in open-source analysis and public diplomacy remains a 
high priority in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and rising anti-Americanism, these networks 
can help.
  Their value is not in having an immediate and catalytic effect on policy or even 
in changing the government agenda or developing policy options for consideration. Some 
potential exists, but a big bang or magic bullet can rarely be traced to networks or even 
individual members. These networks are not primarily about changing policies 
immediately, they are about changing the perceptions that shape them.
To better understand the value of these networks to U.S. security policymaking, 
analysts and officials should take a step back to look at their potential contributions to 
intelligence and diplomacy. Both as a sanity check on and to the intelligence community, 
particularly the NIC and INR, nongovernmental network members combine their acumen 
and perspective with blunter feedback from overseas to produce three-dimensional 
improvements in open-source analysis—deeper into societies, more widely integrated 
across issues and regions, across longer periods of time—to help diagnose the root causes 
and understand the implications of perceptions, politics, policies, and threats abroad 
particularly around summits, political and principal transitions overseas or in the United 
States, and the longer-term aspects of crises. Diplomatically, transnational security policy 
networks provide a forum to conduct public diplomacy within the United States as well 
as public and private diplomacy abroad to better get behind talking points, particularly 
but not only with nascent relationships such as China in the 1990s or North Korea today.
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The benefits of these networks transcend their potential contributions to 
government security policy, even when they are structured and utilized most effectively 
for those purposes. They build the capacity for individual members and participants to do 
their jobs better by empowering them with ideas, information, and personal enterprises, 
drawing from a community of experts across national boundaries and stovepiped issue 
areas to strengthen the otherwise weak ties among them. They can even enable their 
members, participants, and interlocutors among the foreign policy elite to better 
understand and seek agreement on how to define and diagnose contemporary threats, on 
the political pressures shaping national responses, and on the merits and drawbacks of 
strategies to respond, serving as instruments of soft power for contemporary global 
security. These transnational security policy networks improve intelligence and private as 
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LIST OF INTERVIEW SUBJECTS
In addition to four subjects who requested or were required to have complete anonymity 
to be interviewed, the following list of subjects (in alphabetical order by last name) were 
interviewed for this study, identified by name and most relevant institution, either where 
they were employed when the interview was conducted or where they used to work.





































Most Relevant Institution (at interview or former)
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
School of Advanced International Studies
School of Advanced International Studies 
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Pacific Forum/CSIS
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. Department of State (at interview)
Science Applications International Corporation
Former Assistant Secretary of State
Cornell University
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. Department of State, Policy Planning staff
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Pacific Forum/CSIS
George Washington University; former Dept. of State 
Congressional Research Service
U.S. Department of State (retired)
University of California at San Diego
U.S. Department of Energy; former DASD
Brookings Institution
U.S. government (various)
U.S. Department of State (retired)
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
University of California at San Diego graduate
U.S. Congressional staff
Former Assistant Secretary of State
Delaware University; former NSC staff
U.S. Department of Defense
Assistant Secretary of State (at interview)
Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Harvard University
U.S. Department of State
U.S. Department of State, Policy planning staff
U.S. Congressional staff (former)



























Celeste A. Wallander               
Stanley Weeks
Stanford University and Hoover Institution
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Center for Strategic and International Studies (former)
U.S. Department of Energy (retired)
Sandia National Laboratories
PIR Center
U.S. Department of State
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; former NSC
University of California at Berkeley
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology
Institute for Defense Analyses
Stimson Center
University of California at Berkeley
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (at interview)
U.S. Department of State
Former Special Advisor to the Secretary of State
University of California at San Diego; former DAS
U.S. Department of State
Asia Foundation
Carnegie Corporation of New York
Former Dept of State and deputy national security advisor
U.S. Department of State
Georgetown University and former U.S. govt (various)
U.S. Department of Defense
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Science Applications International Corporation
